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This thesis is a philosophical, theological and educational exploration of the theme of 
ontology and otherness.  It is intended to provide a theoretical ground for the possibility of 
Christian religious education in Christian schools, with particularly reference to school religious 
education in South Korea. For this purpose it investigates a philosophical ground of education, 
particularly religious education, in terms of ontology and otherness. The recent ontological turn in 
both education and religious education shows that they take critical realism (CR henceforth) as 
the pivotal philosophical ground. In reception of this approach the thesis argues, after reading of 
the originator of CR, Roy Bhaskar, that there is a characteristic feature in the philosophy, viz. the 
agential  centred form of explanation of reality which results in the production of a lacuna of 
the dimension of  otherness in CR. In response to the problem, the thesis attempt to integrate 
the dimension of otherness into CR through the exploration of Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy 
of otherness which provides an account of the non-agential moment and ethical subjectivity as 
what that fills the lacuna and the point of the integration with CR, and incorporate Bhaskarian 
dialectical agent with ethical subjectivity. However, in doing so, it is revealed that there is a 
radical diverting point between Bhaskar’s notion of alethia and otherness which makes a 
prominent difference in accounting of ultimate reality as shown between Bhaskar ’s meta-Reality 
and Christian  understanding  of  Trinitarian  God. Drawing  from  the  philosophical  and  
theological  account  of ontology and otherness, the thesis finally  attends  Wright’s  approach  
from  the  frame  of  otology  and  otherness,  and  argues  for  the use of Wright’s approach for 
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The thesis is a philosophical, theological and educational exploration of the theme of 
ontology and otherness. The aim of the thesis is to provide a theoretical ground for the possibility of 
Christian religious education in Christian schools, with particularly reference to school religious 
education in South Korea.1  
Why does Christian religious education matter?  In Korea, Christian education practice has 
been negatively influenced by structural ambiguity and contradictions. This is represented 
particularly in two features of the state of religious education in the Korean school system.  
 
Two features indicating structural ambiguity and contradictions in school religious 
education in Korea  
Firstly, according to a report from the Parliament Inspection of Governmental Offices in 
2004, out of 1,170 state-maintained high schools,2 known simply as ‘public schools’, only one chose 
Religion3 as part of its curriculum, while out of 236 religious high schools, categorized among the 954 
‘private schools’, 114 adopted Religion (Byoung-chul Ko, 2005).4 It is particularly striking that 
although Religion is a national curriculum subject, available for all types of secondary school on the 
                                                          
1
 In this thesis religious education will mean school religious education; the country of South Korea will be 
referred to simply as Korea.  
2
 In Korea, the secondary school system comprises two stages, Middle School and High School, catering for 
pupils aged 13-15 years and 16-18 years, respectively.  
3
 Religion is the official name of school religious education in the National Curriculum of Korea.  
4
 See <Table 1> in the Appendix for the number of religious schools that offered Religion in their school 
curriculum in 2004. 
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condition of a double-selective regulation5 since the beginning of the 4th National Curriculum in 
1982,6 only one public school is reported as having offered the subject.  
Secondly, there is a significant discrepancy between the statutory model syllabus of Religion 
provided by the Korea Institute for Curriculum and Evaluation (KICE), and the actual syllabi used in 
the classes of Religion in religious schools. This can be seen in the textbooks provided by religious 
denominations for their religious schools.7 The most obvious discrepancy between the model 
syllabus and these textbooks is in the weight given to section VIII, on Tradition and Thought of a 
Particular Religion. This section is designed to allow religious schools to focus on their particular 
religion, while other sections are devoted to learning about religion in general and world religions. 
Although the model syllabus does not specify the exact proportion for each section, as there are 
eight sections this would presumably be one eighth of the total. However, the actual textbooks 
devote around half of their total content solely to section VIII, as marked by the grey-shadow in 
<Table 3>.  This implies that there is a significant difference in focus or tendency between the model 
syllabus and the actual school curriculum. Whereas the model syllabus gives attention to religion in 
general and world religions, the actual curriculum in religious schools, as evidenced by their 
textbooks, is much more committed to each school’s own religion, while meeting the requirement of 
the statutory syllabus only formally, by containing the other specified sections (Gui-sung Kim 2006).  
The above two features indicate the existence of ambiguity and contradictions in doing 
school religious education in Korea. In fact, the conflict between the two approaches (between 
                                                          
5
 When schools choose to include Religion in the curriculum, it is offered as an Optional Course. Then, in order 
not to violate the religious freedom of pupils, the school is required to provide an alternative class from other 
Liberal Arts subjects categorised as Optional Courses in the National Curriculum. In 2004 these subjects 
included Chinese Characters and Classics, Chinese Classical Literature, Military Training, Philosophy, Logic, 
Psychology, Education, Life Economy, Ecology and Environment, and Future Career and Occupation (KEDI 
2004). 
6
 Since 1945, South Korea has had a system of National Curriculum covering primary and secondary schooling. 
It has been developed through the following stages: the Syllabi-Period (1945-1953), the 1
st
 National Curriculum 
(1954-1962), the 2
nd
 National Curriculum (1963-1973), the 3
rd
 National Curriculum (1974-1981), the 4
th
 
National Curriculum (1982-1988), the 5
th
 National Curriculum (1989-1994), the 6
th
 National Curriculum (1995-
2001), the 7
th
 National Curriculum (2002-2007) and the Revision of the 7
th
 National Curriculum (2008-  ). 
7
 See, <Table 2> in the Appendix for the statutory model syllabus of Religion for the 7
th
 National Curriculum 
(2002-2007), and <Table 3> for a comparison of the statutory syllabus with the actual textbooks of Religion. 
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general studies of religion and denominational approach to religion) has also produced ambiguity in 
the practice of Religion (Gui-sung Kim 2005; Byoung-chul Ko 2005; Chul-joo Kim and Byoung-chul Ko 
2003; Chin-hong Chung 2001). How has this come about? An historical review can provide an answer.  
 
A historical review of the development of Religion  
The history of Religion in Korea since 1945 shows three distinct stages in terms of its relation 
with the national curriculum: indifference, elimination and ambiguity (ambiguous legitimacy).8  
The first stage of indifference was evidenced by the non-intervention from the state. During 
the period between 1945 and 1967 school religions education was not regarded as part of the 
formal curriculum. On the base of the constitutional principle of the separation between state and 
church, the national curriculum did not include religious education. However, religious schools were 
able to keep school religious education in a strongly denominational form, as a kind of extra 
curriculum.9 This was possible because the country was in desperate need of educational expansion 
as a crucial means of national reconstruction during and after the Korean War; private schools, 
particularly religious schools, were established with tacit approval to offer religious education in 
denominational character. Thus, although school religious education was not a part of the national 
curriculum, the state did not intervene in the school religious education.  
The second stage of relationship between the school religious education and the national 
curriculum was elimination. The period between 1967 and 1981 brought upon a series of significant 
changes to the formal education-system.  In order to tackle the excessive competition for entrance 
                                                          
8
 School religious education existed in different forms even before 1945, dating back to the Open Period of the 
country in the late 19th century, when religious schools first appeared at the very beginning of the modern 
educational movement (San-jin Park 2007; Sung-whan Cha 1995; Young-hee Jung 1999). However, the thesis is 
concerned with the period after the introduction of the National Curriculum system appeared in 1945 under 
the US Military Regime which came after the independence from Japanese annexation in 1945. 
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to highly ranked secondary schools, two educational acts were introduced: the Non-Examination 
Entrance to Middle School Act in 1967 and the Standardisation Act in 1974, which implemented the 
3rd National Curriculum (KEDI 2008). The latter Act had a direct effect on religious high schools 
because the 3rd National Curriculum prohibited all kinds of religious activities in all schools (Byoung-
chul Ko 2005). The Act also changed the administration system of entrance to High School from one 
of selection by school based on an individual application, to one of allocation of pupils to a local 
school. This was implemented regardless of the religious or non-religious background of pupils or 
private schools. Since tensions and conflicts in regard to religion had already arisen after the 
implementation of the Non-Examination Entrance to Middle School Act in 1967 (Chul-joo Kim and 
Byoung-chul Ko 2003), the implementation of the Standardisation Act and the prohibition of all 
religious activities in schools under the 3rd National Curriculum was intended to avoid similar 
problem (San-Jin Park 2007; PCK 2000). School religious education became a scapegoat, since the 
elimination of the subject was not made from any educational consideration or any evaluation of its 
educational value, but simply to avoid the contentious side effects of the Standardisation Act.  
The third stage of relationship, was that of ambiguity, began with the implementation of the 
4th National Curriculum in 1982, and continues today. The elimination of religious education and all 
other religious activities immediately raised fierce objections among religious schools and their 
related religious orders, particularly those in Christian circles (PCK 2000), which finally led to a 
reversal of the policy on religious education. But the Standardisation Act has become solidly 
established in the educational context, and has caused significant changes to private schools: 
schools are no longer entitled to select pupils according to the school ethos, and must accept the 
pupils allocated to them on the condition of financial support from the state, which has reached 
more than 40% of their total budget (Joo-ho Lee 2006). Hence, they have become quasi public 
schools (state-maintained) under the Act (Sang-jin Park 2007) and as such are required to be 
accountable for the publicness of the education they offer in the same way as public schools, while 
at the same time they have a certain degree of autonomy to pursue their own school ethos 
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according to the Private Educational Law (Byoung-chul Ko 2005). Thus the relationship between the 
demand for publicness of education and the entitlement of autonomy of private schools has become 
a contentious issue, and produced fierce debates in Korea, particularly in regard to Religion. On the 
one hand religious schools has been entrusted with pupils from all kinds of religious or non-religious 
backgrounds, and asked to be accountable for publicness of education for all pupils; on the other 
hand however, as private, religious ethos schools, they have also been entitled to maintain their 
foundational ideals, mostly religious (inspired) ideals or ethos. In practice it has been hard to 
maintain both together, particularly in the religious education classroom. This difficulty has often 
been expressed as an identity crisis of religious schools (Sang-jin Park 2007; Joseph Kim 2007; PCK 
2000), and when applied to religious education it has produced ambiguity.  
Ambiguity of Religion has become so significant a social issue that it has received scholarly 
attention, particularly after the inclusion of Religion as a national curriculum subject in the 4th 
National Curriculum (1982-1988). It is no coincidence that a number of groups and academic 
journals in the field of religious education in South Korea began to emerge from the time of the 
implementation of the statutory syllabus. Sohn and Kim’s research shows that four major journals, 
actively dealing with school religious education, have been published since 1995: Korean Journal of 
Religious Education since 1995, A Journal of Christian Education in Korea since 1996, Christian 
Education & Information since 2000 and Journal of Christian Education & Information Technology 
since 2001 (Won-young Sohn and Ji-hye Kim, 2005). The relatively short history of these academic 
journals implies that there has been a limited amount of research on school religious education, and 
that most studies have converged on dealing with the issue of the ambiguity of Religion. Indeed, the 
theories and debates presented in those journals have identified various ambiguous aspects of 
Religion prevailing in the school religious education. For example, in his preparation of the draft of 
the model syllabus for the 7th National Curriculum, Chin-hong Chung points out three profound 
forms of ambiguity implied in the current form of Religion that produce contradictions in practices of 
Religion: ambiguity implied in the legal establishment of Religion; ambiguity in the constitution of 
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content of Religion, and the dilemma in the practice of Religion in school level (Chin-hong Chung, 
2001). Gui-sung Kim also points out the ambiguity in the current textbooks for Religion because they 
are, for example, more focused on a particular religion than on the general theory of religion as 
expected in the model syllabus (Gui-sung Kim 2006). Some studies show the ambiguity between the 
public nature and the autonomy of religious schools (Byoung-chul Ko 2005; Chul-joo Kim and 
Byoung-chul Ko 2003).  Sohn argues that, despite the positive evaluation of the statutory syllabus of 
Religion in the 7th National Curriculum, Christian religious education could be repressed because of 
the heavy stress on the general theory of religion in the model syllabus (Won-young Sohn 2001).  
Among those various aspects of ambiguity, most debates concern the nature of Religion as a 
national curriculum subject and the identification of its aims. Sohn and Kim’s research shows that 
studies on school religious education in Korea have shown a tendency to concentrate on educational 
aims rather than other aspects of education such as the teacher, learner, curriculum, educational 
environment and the evaluation (Sohn and Kim 2005). This is because the educational aim is the site 
where the nature of the subject is defined and the content is organised accordingly, but it is also the 
central area of the ambiguity. Thus, with regard to the nature of Religion there has been, on the one 
hand, a group of people who argue that as a national curriculum subject Religion should encourage 
ways to deal with what they think the subject-matter, i.e. general theory of religion and world 
religion, so that it can be valid and reliable for the openness of education, rather than focusing on 
denominational, faith based teaching. Those who take this standpoint argue for Religion for the 
public good of education, or in other words, ‘publicness’ of Religion, and in order to realise their 
educational rationale they argue that Religion should take the form of religious studies about 
general theory of religion and about world religions in relation to fostering personal meaning or 
religiosity (Byoung-chul Ko 2005; Gui-sung Kim 2005; Chul-joo Kim and Byoung-chul Ko 2003; Jin-ho 
Ko 2001; Chin-hong Chung 2001, 1986). They define the nature of Religion differently according to 
their point of view: Religion as an education about religion, not of religion, for personality, social 
integrity and cultural development (Chin-hong Chung 2001); as for ‘individuality within publicity’, 
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conceiving ‘freedom of religion and liberal education as Humanities’ (Byoung-chul Ko 2005, p. 139); 
as a modern school subject teaching religion and culture within the context of religious diversity 
(Guk-sung Kim 2005), and as fostering religiosity or personality cultivated with religiosity (Jin-ho Ko 
2006, 2001).10 Though there is difference between points of view on the nature of Religion, they can 
be grouped together as those who see the nature of the subject in terms of publicness of education 
in that Religion is conceived as liberal inclusive form of education about religion.  
On the other hand, there is another position which forms a different response in regard to 
the rationale for the publicness of Religion known as the denominational position. This position 
understands the nature of Religion from the fundamentals of religion or the religious vocation of 
their religion while trying to response to the question of publicness of education.11 Won-young Sohn, 
who defines Religion in Christian schools as Christian religious education, asks to reconceptualise it 
as relational personality-centred education based on encounter and conversation (Won-young Sohn 
2001, p. 103). Similarly, Eun-ha Cho reconceptualises mission, a key aim of Religion for Christian 
secondary schools, such that ‘mission is both question and answer to the world and it gives rise to 
question for the contemporary people to seek new ways of life. In other words, it is the question to 
ask the meaning of the Gospel in the middle of participation to the world in the name of Jesus’ (Eun-
ha Cho 2006, p. 197). Those from Catholic backgrounds tend to claim that in light of the universality 
of the Catholic faith, which is inclusive of and able to fulfil the publicness of education, Religion 
grounded on the Catholic faith is more truthful and more accountable to the publicness of education 
(Young-hei Choi 2006; Jun-gui Choi 2005; Kyung-yee Kim 2004).  
A number of points can be drawn from the studies on ambiguity of Religion. First of all, 
ambiguity has been the central issue throughout the course of development of the subject. Second, 
in regard to the nature of Religion, two approaches have emerged, differing from each other 
according to the understanding of the nature of the subject: the former understands Religion as for 
                                                          
10
 It is noticeable that those taking this position in Korea are mostly from Buddhist backgrounds or circles. 
11
 People in this position appeared in the academic journals are mostly from Christian background.  
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publicness of education, and holds that it should take the form of general studies of religion so that 
it can be applied for individual meaning construction; while the latter understands Religion from 
religious vocation of each religion so that it takes denominational approach in order to nurture both 
faith of the religion and critical attitude to the world according to the religious vision. However, the 
latter has been criticised by those in the former with various reasons, such as introducing ambiguity 
into Religion, possibly violating pupils’ religious freedom and autonomy and bringing irresolvable 
conflicts between the exclusive truth claims of discrete religious traditions, and threatening harmony 
among religions and in society. Thirdly, in spite of such critical charge upon the denominational 
approach, the finalised form of the statutory syllabus of Religion has emerged in a compromised 
form between the two approaches, which seems to have structuralised the practical ambiguity into 
the subject. Let us see the last point more closely.  
The statutory model syllabus of Religion as the given curriculum by KICE tends to take the 
former approach while incorporating the latter to a degree, allowing time for a transition from a 
confessional or denominational approach to a generic and phenomenological approach to religious 
education. Chul-joo Kim and Byoung-chul Ko trace the theoretical development of this approach 
since the inclusion of Religion in the national curriculum. They find a trend whereby the theories 
consist of both a critique of ongoing denominational religious education and suggestions for 
differently conceptualised Religion, that is, Religion for the publicness of education, not for a 
particular religion (Chul-joo Kim and Byoung-chul Ko 2003). In the development of this approach, 
three scholars (Yi-heum Yoon, Chin-hong Chun and Chon-suh Kim) are significant for two reasons: 
because they provided the ground for this conceptualisation of Religion, and because while the first 
among them provided a theory of basic distinction between the different types of religious 
education, the other two took the central role in the preparation of the statutory syllabus on the 
basis of that theoretical distinction.  
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In his argument for the Religion for publicness of education approach, Yoon distinguished 
between different types of RE as shown in <Figure 1> below (Gui-sung Kim 2005, p. 20, modified by 
adding the element of public education)  
 
                 <Figure 1 Distinction of Religious Education>          
       
  
 
He argued that in a multi cultural and religiously diverse society the public education should 
not take the form of denominational RE because it may bring dangers into society, such as the 
danger of an imperialist cultural oppression from religion and the danger of exclusive faith. Against 
those dangers he called for a form of religious studies that pursues the objective understanding of 
religion. This ‘religion-culture education’ would aim at the cultivation of the mutual personality (Yi-
heum Yoon 1986).  
Chin-hong Chung shows a similar negative perception of denominational religious education. 
For him the existence of Religion in the public educational system is a scandal (Chung 1986, p. 26). 
He argued that the existence of Religion in schools is part of an intrinsic dilemma in public education, 
which can realise its possibility or meet its limit according to the relationship between its universality 
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Public education can reach its highest possibility when its universality works as 
an adequately minimum norm by which a particularity can reflect on itself. But it will 
meet its limit when the universality is itself reduced to a particularity (Chung 1986, pp. 
21-22).  
 
This intrinsic dilemma of public education seems to be most acute with regard to Religion. 
This is because a religion, as a distinctively particular mode of existence, claiming for its 
understanding of ultimate reality, has a strong tendency to deny the possibility of other existences 
or particularities (exclusivism). However, public education can still include Religion through an 
approach in terms of generality or universality of religion, not as a denominational form. For this 
reason, Chung also argued for the conceptualisation of religious education as the object of 
knowledge. For this to be possible he takes phenomenological approach: he insisted on a transition 
from the confessional logic of Religion to the epistemic logic provided by a general theory of 
religious phenomena, by which the history and structure of religious phenomena are presented in a 
systematic way. Therefore Chung argued that religious education in public education should not be 
teaching ‘religion’, but should be teaching about religion as an object of knowledge, based on the 
systematic study of religious phenomena (pp.21-22). 
Though Yoon and Chung’s concerns were not expressed in terms of ambiguity, it is clear that 
their concept of Religion was based on the critical perception of the conflicting nature between the 
public and the denominational. Here their perception of both comes into question. For example, 
Yoon’s distinction of religious education was based on his negative perception of denominational 
teaching as subjective and contentious.  In contrast he seems to perceive public as a kind of neutral 
approach to religion by taking objective knowledge rather than contentious matter so that it can be 
available for all pupils. This is not true nonetheless. The world of reality is full of contentious matters, 
and this also applies to Chung. His conception of public education is not able to reflect what Bhaskar 
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calls a diffracted world, which cannot be exhausted by presumed ideas of it (Bhaskar 2008 & 1998). 
This diffracted world makes our knowledge contentious, asking to be open in the light of 
ontologically understood reality. Since truth is itself a contentious conception, religious education 
should be able to take those conflicting ideas of reality seriously, including truth claims of discrete 
religious traditions (Wright 2007). Denominational approach that presents truth claim of a particular 
religious tradition needs to participate with public approach in a mutual and critical way, but Yoon 
and Chung’s negative distinction between them seems to block any possibility of this happening. 
This negative distinction or separation has since become a default position in arguing Religion, and 
thus any attempt to put them together has become problematic.  
Adding to the main points of Yoon and Chung, Chong-suh Kim pointed to the ambiguity of 
the existence of denominational religious education in the public educational system. He explained 
that this ambiguity was recognised from the outset, when Religion was first legitimated as a school 
subject. The double-selective nature of the subject was intended to avoid the ambiguity, but it did 
not work out as it was supposed to. The recognised ambiguity was neither solved nor weakened 
since all religious school kept their denominational religious education while no public schools 
selected Religion. Furthermore, most religious schools did not provide an alternative course to 
Religion for their pupils (Chong-suh Kim 2001). In an attempt to eliminate this ambiguity, he 
proposed to establish a trans-denominational organisation as a medium for the construction of a 
general religious curriculum (Chon-suh Kim 1990; Chul-joo Kim and Byoung-chul Ko 2003). This 
proposal was accepted and Chon-suh Kim was appointed to prepare the draft of the syllabus of 
Religion as to be included for the first time in the 6th National Curriculum (Chon-suh Kim 2001). 
The new curriculum theory of Religion began from the issue of ambiguity of Religion, 
conceived from the critical perception of denominational approach. In other words, the ambiguity of 
Religion was conceived through the critique of denominational religious education.  The new theory 
made the two terms almost equivalent: the existence of denominational religious education is in 
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itself problematic, and produces ambiguity. This conceptualisation has in turn provided the raison 
d’être of the current curriculum theory of Religion in terms of the publicness of education, because it 
is the logic necessary to overcome the ambiguity conceived as being caused by the denominational 
approach. From this point of view, theories of Religion for the publicness of education have 
developed in terms of these key concepts, which are compatible with phenomenological approach 
to religion: object of knowledge about religion, religion-culture education, teaching about religion 
and systematic study of religious phenomena and cultivating pupils’ mind accordingly.  
 
The problem: the compromised syllabus and the production of practical ambiguity  
In spite of all such endeavours, however, as Kim noted, the ambiguity from the 
denominational Religion was not eliminated or weakened, even with the double-selective rule. 
Although the draft of the model syllabus was designed by Chong-suh Kim with the express purpose 
of fostering an approach of Religion for the publicness of education while eliminating the 
denominational approach, when the draft went to the judgement committee, they decided to 
produce a syllabus that compromised between the two approaches. It is because that they cannot 
ignore the actual situation of school religious education: religious schools have been almost the only 
place where Religion has existed while no public school has chosen it except the case shown in the 
first feature earlier. In other words, in spite of the new theory of Religion curriculum has been given 
as being available for all types of school, however, it has been the reality that only religious schools 
have taken the subject in their school curriculum. Religious schools have been the actual site where 
Religion has taken place12. Thus the committee decided to reflect the reality in the formation of the 
syllabus while taking the inclusive, phenomenal approach as the basic ground so that the final form 
of the syllabus has become a compromised form (Chong-suh Kim 2001).  
                                                          
12
 As can be seen in <Table 1> in the Appendix, Christian (Protestant) schools are the major part (68.6%) of 
those schools who chose Religion in 2004. If it includes Catholic schools then the portion of whole Christian 
schools among those schools reaches to 84.7%.  
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The compromised character of the syllabus can be seen in the constitution of the contents of 
the syllabus as seen in <table 2> in Appendix. Out of eight sections of the contents, only the last 
section is provided as the place where denominational religious schools can propagate their religion, 
hence it can be education of a religion which can be used as a way for the denominational teaching 
or faith based teaching; while the rest of the sections are supposed to be taught more likely through 
phenomenological and inclusive model of teaching, hence it can be education about religion which 
can be used as a way for mature growing of pupils (Byoung-chul Ko 2009). The compromised 
character of the syllabus can be seen in the prescription of the aims of Religion as presented in 
<Figure 2>. Aim A is a derivation of the theory of Religion for the publicness of education: ‘a sound 
view of religion’ and ‘wide and balanced knowledge about religion’ reflect key concepts in the theory, 
such as ‘religion as an object of knowledge’, ‘general or universal theory of religion’ and ‘systematic 
study of religious phenomena’. Aim B is related to the denominational approach in that ‘solid faith’ 
is a key goal, although here it is conceived as instrumental for pupils in solving problems in their 
everyday life. By putting together the inclusive approach to Religion and specific qualities of 
publicness of Religion (serving the society and the state), Aim C implies intrinsic relation between 
the inclusive approach and publicness of Religion.  
<Figure 2> the aims of Religion (The Ministry of Education 1995)     
 
However, the compromised syllabus does not provide any pedagogy or an overall 
educational theory of how to take the seemingly contrasting approaches together in the actual 
A. to let pupils  establish a sound view of religion by gaining a 
wide and balanced knowledge about religion 
B. to let pupils build solid faith by which they could solve difficult 
problems they face in everyday life 
C. to let pupils cultivate inclusive attitude of other religions and 
mind of serving the society and the state  
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teaching context. It seems just a mixture of educational benefits from both approaches; a 
juxtaposition of objectives pursued as educational goals from both approaches under the name of 
the category of Liberal Arts to which Religion belong in the national curriculum. As the result of the 
compromised curriculum, Religion has remained being ambiguous between two approaches as seen 
in the prescribed aim. And more seriously, practical ambiguity has been embodied by the 
implementation of the mono form structure of the statutory syllabus as seen in the actual 
constitution of the content of those actual textbooks in the <table 3> of the Appendix.  
As for those who advocate the inclusive religious education model for publicness of Religion, 
the compromised curriculum is regarded as the transitional process of Religion from the 
denominational to the public. However, as for those who are in religious schools, particularly for the 
Christian schools (the major part of religious schools) the statutory syllabus has produced and 
structured practical ambiguity into the actual site of religious education; at the same time the 
imposition of the statutory syllabus has limited religious schools in developing their own religious 
education curriculum.  
 
Aim of the thesis  
Concerned with the problem, the aim of the thesis is to explore a theoretical ground for 
religious education for the actual site of religious education, particularly for the major part of 
religious schools, viz. Christian schools. 
It is because religious schools are the place where Religion has been actually existed; 
needless to say, it has been so from the very outset of the modern school system of the country; but 
more noticeably, Religion has existed almost exclusively in religious schools even after the inclusion 
of Religion into the national curriculum in 1981 and the introduction of the statutory syllabus under 
the double-selective regulation; it has been the reality of religious education in the country. 
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However, the current curriculum of Religion does not recognize sufficiently the reality; instead it has 
imposed a compromised syllabus upon the actual site with the result of practical ambiguity. 
Therefore the thesis aims to explore a theoretical ground for the possibility of Christian religious 
education in Christian schools, which has been the actually and major site of school religious 
education in Korea. 
  
A Critically Progressive Exploration toward a theoretical ground for Christian religious 
education: from Ontology to Otherness 
Concerned with the reality of Religion in Korea the thesis explores a theoretical ground that 
takes the default position of religious education in a particular religious tradition, Christianity in 
Christian schools, without dismissing the issue of publicness of the subject. What this implies is that 
the kind of publicness of Religion pursued from this position may not be the same as in the liberal 
inclusive position and that there might be possibility or necessity to make critical judgement 
between the differently conceived publicness of religious education. How, then, could it be possible 
to develop such approach and what would be the conception of publicness of Religion in the 
approach?  
This is why the thesis takes the critical realist approach to religious education developed by 
Andrew Wright as the case with which the thesis begins its exploration. The relevance of Wright’s 
work for the purpose of the thesis can be found not only in his critique of the liberal inclusive 
religious education but also in his emphasis on discrete (particular) religious tradition as the default 
position of religious education.13 Furthermore, his conception of pursuit of truth and truthfulness as 
the aim of critical religious education sheds light on our exploration how to conceive publicness of 
Religion when we takes our route from a particular religious tradition otherwise than the liberal 
                                                          
13
 Wright has made the crucial critique on the liberal inclusive religious education in terms of the eclipse of 
truth (related with “learning about” religion) and the ascendancy of truthfulness (related with “learning from” 
religion); both result in the dissociation or the dislocation of truth from truthful life (Wright 2007). 
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inclusive approach. Therefore, having noticed that the same problems of Religion are dealt in his 
work, the thesis takes his approach as the stepping stone for the exploration of the thesis.  
 
There is a crucial point in the critical realist approach, however, that makes the whole thesis 
a critically progressive exploration: the critical realist Ontology, which is the underlying principle of 
the critical realist religious education, while giving rise to another crucial question that puts the 
thesis in a critical stance, which entails a further progressive exploration of Otherness. Having faced 
the problem of inclusive religious education and the related postmodern mishmash spirituality, 
Wright has taken the critical realist position through which he argues for the utmost importance of 
resume of the sense of truth (Wright 2000, 2007). For this purpose, he takes as pivotal critical realist 
ontology originated by Roy Bhaskar (Bhaskar 1975; 1986; 1998 (originally published in 1979); 2008 
(originally published in 1993); 2000; 2002; 2002a; 2002b; 2002c). However, the thesis notices a 
crucial problem of the ontology in regard to the lacuna of otherness. This makes the thesis envisage 
further dilemma that, when applied to the understanding of transcendence, the ontology seems to 
foster non-personal account of God, like Bhaskarian meta-Reality, while being unable to speak of 
personal account of God, like Trinitarian God of Christianity.  
With the envisagement, the thesis sets out a critically progressive exploration of how to 
integrate critical realist ontology into a theoretical ground for the possibility Christian religious 
education. For this exploration, the thesis begins its journey from an immanent critique of critical 
realist ontology in order to reveal the heart of the problem, that is, a characteristic feature of the 
ontology, namely, the agential-centred form of explanation of reality, which results in the 
production of a lacuna of the dimension of otherness. The first critical step is entrained by the next 
steps of critical exploration, such as, examination of whether characteristic feature penetrates all 
stages of critical realism and exploration of how the feature permeates in each stage. Then it is 
followed by the exploration of how to fill the lacuna of otherness so that otherness can be 
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integrated within the theoretical ground, which will be called Ontology and Otherness. This 
philosophical exploration needs to be entrained by a further critical examination of Bhaskarian 
understanding of transcendence, that is meta-Reality, in terms of the inability to grasp ontological 
distinctiveness of otherness so that there merges the need of a theological ground which can 
integrate ontology with otherness. An account of Trinitarian God will be expounded and be 
integrated together with the philosophy of Ontology so that there will be a further qualification of 
the theory of Ontology and Otherness. Therefore, the thesis will be a form of critically progressive 
study from an immanent critique of ontology toward a theory of Ontology and Otherness. The 
theory can articulate, as a result, a model of explanation of human being in terms of double 
openness and personhood, which shed light on how to do religious education from the default 
position of Christian religious tradition of Christian schools. Thus, finally, the thesis will explore the 
critical realist religious education developed by Wright in relation with Ontology and Otherness so 
that the thesis can integrates both Wright’s approach and the theory of Ontology and Otherness as 
the theoretical ground for the possibility of Christian religious education in Christian schools in Korea.  
 
 
Contents of the thesis  
The thesis as a critically progressive exploration comprises five chapters. Chapter One 
introduces the early stage of Bhaskar’s ontological journey, in which the key idea of transcendental 
realism, which penetrates all stages of critical realism, was established. The chapter aims to critically 
explore transcendental realism in order to reveal its characteristic agential-centred explanation of 
being (reality), which leads to another key question of non-agential moment in which the other may 
be found with its genuine significance.  
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In Chapter Two, Bhaskar’s social theory and dialectical turn are explored in terms of the 
agential-centred stance. The application of transcendental realism into social theory and further 
dialectical explanation of reality can be seen as sharing the characteristic feature of agential 
centredness. In this exploration, the non-agential dimension is raised more sharply than before in 
order to reveal the lacuna of the dimension of otherness in the critical realist social and dialectical 
theory. At this juncture, it will also be argued that although Bhaskarian agent can be dialectically 
open to the world, it cannot be ethical unless it successfully engages the genuine other out of its 
agential centredness.  
Chapter Three attempts to fill the lacuna of otherness in Bhaskarian ontology by 
incorporating it into Levinasian Otherness. Levinas’ concept of the other enables us to capture the 
genuine significance of otherness from the non-agential moment of engagement of the face of the 
other. This is known as the genuine moment of transcendence which consists of another dimension 
of openness to the other, and differs from the Bhaskarian dialectical openness grounded on being’s 
agential movement. The openness to the other is an ethical openness, whereby one would take 
responsibility for the other up to the point of substitution for the other. In this chapter, the 
Bhaskarian openness will be incorporated into Levinasian ethical openness so that it postulates a 
double openness of the human being.  
The focus moves to the level of transcendence in Chapter Four. Two contrasting accounts of 
transcendence are explored in regard to the possibility of otherness. While both accounts stand on 
ontological ground, it is the Bhaskarian meta-Reality that conceives non-duality as ground-state 
qualities inherent in all beings, but in doing so it makes impossible a genuine sense of ontology of 
otherness. In contrast, a classical Trinitarian account of God is based on the conception of 
personhood, whereby the otherness is considered not as an added quality but as constitutive of 
ontology of the being of God in hypostatical relation. A particular trajectory to the Trinitarian 
account is provided by referring to McGrath’s ‘iterative procedures’ (McGrath 1999, 2002, 2008, 
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2009), Gunton’s ‘the Triune God as Becoming’ (Gunton 2001),14 and Zizioulas’s ‘personhood and 
ontology’ (Zizioulas 1985, 2006). At this juncture, the double openness postulated in previous 
chapters is conceived as being originated from the hypostatical relation of personhood of God, so 
that it further postulates a theory of stratification of human being between dialectical agent, ethical 
subjectivity and personhood.  
Lastly, Chapter Five focuses solely on Wright’s critical realist approach to religious education 
in regard to ontology and otherness. His critical realist approach to ultimate truth and truthfulness 
and his stress on discrete religious tradition as the default position of religious education are 
explored, yielding the conclusion that his approach is a moderate model in regard to ontology and 
otherness, hence appropriate to be used in all types of schools. When ontology and otherness in 
personhood account of transcendence are fully accepted, then his approach can pave a way for 










                                                          
14
First published in 1978. 
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Chapter 1 Ontology: Nature 
  
Introduction 
Learning is central to educational activity. There have been various ways to theorise about 
learning in education. However, those theories tend to fall into one of two contrasting stances: 
objectivist and subjectivist.15 At the heart of the objectivist accounts there is the claim either that 
reality is known to us as it is (absolutism), or that reality can be verified to the human mind through 
empirical test (positivism). The account makes a claim for infallibility of human knowledge. In 
contrast, in the subjectivist account reality is not the concern. Rather the focus is on the knowledge 
of reality as we perceive it through mind and language (constructivism). This has often commits 
irrealism. While absolutism may be charged with ontic fallacy, since it misses out the role of the 
human agent in forming knowledge,  positivism and irrealism are charged with epistemic fallacy, 
since this approach reduces reality (or being) to knowledge of the reality, and hence makes all 
knowledge dependent on human mind and activity. In other words, the former misses out the 
transitive dimension of knowledge from its account, while the latter omits the intransitive dimension. 
In the situation of such a gulf between the two stances, and the fallacies that arise in consequence, 
there is an urgent demand to find a breakthrough for learning theory. 
The philosophy of Bhaskar is capable of providing such a breakthrough, since his critical 
realism (CR henceforth) is a way of embracing these two stances without committing ontic or 
epistemic fallacy. Bhaskar’s CR emphasises the dialectical process between reality and the possibility 
of human knowledge of the reality in order to reach as closely as possible to the truth of the reality. 
                                                          
15
 The problem of the split of stances – rooted in a metatheoretical problem: an anti-realist philosophy: 
examples of those recognitions: Bhaskar’s case of the critique of the split between positivism and 
conventionalism (Bhaskar, 1998, p.73, 1986, p.64) – critical realism as a meta-philosophy making a critique of 
metatheory of neo-Kantian-Humean-positivism. 
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This is a philosophical endeavour aimed at embracing both reality-based truth and the human 
agent’s effort to access the truth.   
Thus there is no problem for CR in maintaining both an objectivist (alethic or 
non-epistemic) conception of reality and an account of scientific practice that makes full 
allowance for the role of human agency in revealing certain processes, laws and causal 
properties whose manifestation (though not their reality) depends on our procedures 
for finding them out. (Hartwig, 2007, p. 479, emphasis original) 
The initial aim that Bhaskar wants to achieve through this dialectical process is to re-
vindicate ontology in the form of transcendental realism (TR henceforth) as the remedy for the 
fallacies, since it enables us to maintain an objectivist conception of reality (the intransitive 
dimension of knowledge), while allowing the role of human agency (the transitive dimension) in 
reaching a better knowledge of reality. In doing so, the so-called holy trinity of CR is established: 
ontological realism, epistemic relativism and judgemental rationalism. The way in which he 
vindicates ontology and establishes the triune principles is a form of transcendental argument: 
transcendental realism, which is distinct from Kantian transcendental argument, also known as 
transcendental idealism.16  
Having established the TR thesis, Bhaskar then applies it to the social sciences, makes a 
dialectical turn of CR, and moves on to the spiritual turn, which reaches at the philosophy of meta-
Reality.17 With regard to TR, it is crucial to note that the transcendental realist thesis is valid not only 
for the early stages of CR. Rather it is fundamental, and pertains to all stages, up to the final stage of 
                                                          
16
 In establishing his argument Bhaskar resumes what Kant discarded as beyond the limit of human knowledge 
in the realm of knowledge that is transcendent (objective, not human-dependent), while allowing human 
capacity to seek for it (Hartwig, 2007). 
17
 Bhaskar himself distinguishes stages of the development of his critical realism: the original critical realism; 
dialectical critical realism, and meta-Reality (Bhaskar and Hartwig, 2010, p. 217). Here the ‘early stage’ refers 
to the original stage. The original CR, as a philosophy of science, consists of three sequential steps, from its 
interest in the philosophy of natural science, to that of social science, then to ideology critique; these are best 
worked out in Bhaskar’s books A Realist Theory of Science (1975), Possibility of Naturalism (1998) and Scientific 
Realism and Human Emancipation (1986), respectively. The TR argument is first postulated in RTS, then 
applied to the subsequent steps. 
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meta-Reality.  Hence it can be said that the TR thesis is the fundamental philosophical methodology 
of the whole project of critical realism.  As Hartwig rightly points out: ‘The TR thesis is so central to 
any version of the CR case in whatever domain or field of application that one can reasonably claim 
to set it out in representative and clear-cut terms’ (p. 474). Therefore, in this chapter the focus will 
be upon the TR thesis as postulated in the original stage of CR, through which one can discover how 
and why Bhaskar overcomes such dichotomy by re-vindicating ontology. The chapter aims to reveal, 
as the key point of the argument, that the TR thesis is a form of explanation of reality in terms of the 
intrinsic tendencies of reality itself, called here the agential-centred form of explanation. In order to 
reveal the point, the chapter traces Bhaskar’s ontological journey up to the point of the 
establishment of the TR thesis.  It then provides a critical reflection on the agential-centred ontology, 
which posits four characteristic features of reality of a being when understood in the transcendental 
realist way: the primary mode as ‘implicit’; the causal intrinsic tendencies as ‘properties’ of a being; 
the intrinsic ‘directionality from being to becoming’, and the dependence of a being on its relation 
with the circumstances. The chapter will conclude by pointing out that the agential centredness 
gives rise to the question of ‘non-agential moment’, which is related with another question, that of 










1. Bhaskar’s Journey to Ontology  
1.1. The original concern – the absence of a theory of the 
real  
Critical realism is a philosophical stance, originated by Roy Bhaskar. Since the publication of 
A Realist Theory of Science (1975), the first book in his CR series, his thinking seems to have 
developed into a self-sufficient philosophical system.  That is, his critical realism has sufficiently 
developed the three necessary dimensions for it to be a metatheory: (1) what he wants to speak 
about (the content), (2) how to argue the content (methodology), and (3) its capacity for application 
to or dialogue with other discipline areas (application or critical realist embrace). However, his 
genuine concern is not philosophy per se; rather philosophy for him is a way through which he can 
reach at what he wants to talk about. Philosophy is a tool that enables him to criticise what he finds 
problematic, and to pave an alternative way towards it. What then is the subject he wants to explore 
through his philosophical project?  
The order of publication of Bhaskar’s early CR series reveals a logical sequence of subject 
matter: from nature to society, and then depth critique (of ideology). The first book, A Realist Theory 
of Science (1975), aims to provide a general theory of science: a philosophy of science capable of 
speaking of the real world, of ontology (Bhaskar and Hartwig, 2010; Collier, 1994). Its principal 
method of argument, named the transcendental realist argument, is subsequently applied to social 
science and to ideology critique, in The Possibility of Naturalism (1998) and Scientific Realism and 
Human Emancipation (1986), respectively.18  Although the three-volume work shows its own 
developmental order, from the theory of natural science to that of society, and then ideology 
critique, Bhaskar’s original concern was a social one.  His paper ‘Some Problems about Explanations 
                                                          
18
 The term ‘critical realism’ is a hybrid of ‘transcendental realism’ postulated in RTS and ‘critical naturalism’ in 
PN. This hybrid term, although accepted by Bhaskar, was actually invented by those who followed and 
participated in his philosophical strand.  
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in the Social Sciences’ (Bhaskar and Hartwig, 2010, p.22) derived from the thesis he submitted to the 
philosophy faculty of Balliol College at Oxford. He had set out to complete a PhD in economics, but 
as the nature of the thesis changed, he moved from economics to philosophy (pp.22-23).19 
What was the reason behind Bhaskar’s move towards philosophy? In his explanation of the 
diachronic development of CR, Bhaskar presents five phases of the philosophy of discourse of 
modernity as the cultural-philosophical background to its genesis and development (Bhaskar, 2002a, 
p.173).20 Among those five phases the initial moment of CR is found in the third phase, with the 
problematic recognition of modernisation (and underdevelopment). It was Bhaskar’s concern with 
modernisation and his subsequent conclusion regarding the irrelevance of economic theory for 
underdeveloped countries that led him to a philosophical quest. For Bhaskar, theories designed to 
impose a uniform form of society, that of the west, as a standard, so that the whole developmental 
process is understood as unilinear towards that given standard, fail to take account of the reality of 
underdeveloped countries. This recognition led him to look at philosophical tools with which to 
critique the irrelevance of the social science that generated such economic theories. However, he 
discovered within the philosophy of science at that time an inability to talk about the real world, a 
problem he calls a taboo on ontology rooted in epistemic fallacy.  As he explains:  
I went from economics to philosophy of science but … [in] the text books in the 
philosophy of science … you cannot see anything about the real world there either. … So 
                                                          
19
 In retrospect, as Bhaskar said, his critical realism had already been developed in mature form in this thesis. 
Although he was not awarded the degree, he was accepted by a publisher to work out the key ideas of the 
thesis in a more ordered and detailed form in the three volumes we have now. For more detailed explanation 
of his Oxford days, see Formation, Chapter 2.  
20
  The five phases of the philosophy of discourse of modernity are (a) The Classical Philosophy of Discourse of 
Modernity as ‘initiated with the classical English and French bourgeois revolutions of 1640-1660 and 1789’ 
respectively, (b) High-Modernism with ‘its heyday between the revolutions of 1848 and 1917’, (c) The Theory 
and Practice of Modernisation as ‘associated with the revolutionary watersheds of 1945, the end of the second 
world war, and 1947, the symbolically and practically significant de-colonisation and partition of India’, (d) 
Post-modernism from ‘the time of the revolutionary upsurge of 1968’ and (e) Western (Bourgeois) 
Triumphalism, set ‘in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc (1989-1991)’ (Bhaskar, 2002a, p.167). For a 
more detailed critical account of the five phases, see Bhaskar, 2002a, pp.165-174. 
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I went back to philosophy and critiqued the epistemic fallacy, in other worlds the denial 
of ontology, at its roots. (Bhaskar and Hartwig, 2010, p.32) 
What he actually found was the dominance of an implicit ontology in economic theory and 
the philosophy of science. This implicit ontology denies any questioning of the real world, a denial 
based on the presupposition of the impossibility of referring to the real world; but in doing so it 
simultaneously reduces the real world into the package of the given theories used for measure of 
the real world, a form of epistemic fallacy in that the reality is reduced to the knowledge of it 
(Bhaskar and Hartwig, 2010, p.32). Hence Bhaskar recognised a problematic absence of a theory of 
the real: the absence of ontology.  His philosophical project was designed to talk about the real.  
  
1.2. The root problem - empirical realism  
Before beginning his discussion of how to talk about the real world, Bhaskar first focused on 
what prevents us from doing just that. From the moment of his recognition of the problem, Bhaskar 
reflected back in order to find the presuppositions or premises that had generated such absence of a 
theory of the real world.  He found that at the root of the problem was the prevailing empirical 
realism underpinning the ‘implicit ontology’ (Bhaskar and Hartwig, 2010, p. 34; Bhaskar, 1975, p.16). 
In RTS Bhaskar presents three broad positions in the philosophy of science, of which two are 
governed by the principle of empirical realism: Humean theory of causal laws and Kantian 
transcendental idealism.21  
Humean theory denotes a philosophy of science which fashioned ‘our image of science’ 
(Bhaskar, 1975, p.12). It is a positivist view of science in that knowledge gained scientifically is 
regarded as factual and constantly verified in an actual sequence of events. Such positivist science 
aims at explanation of phenomena in terms of causal laws, established according to the criterion of a 
                                                          
21
 The last position is transcendental realism, which is the central theme of Bhaskar’s philosophy. 
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constant conjunction of events.  This position takes events as the ultimate objects of knowledge, and 
considers a constant conjunction of events as the condition of the possibility of knowledge from 
which causal laws can be ascribed (p.24). As Bhaskar explains, ‘a constant conjunction of events 
apprehended in sense-experience is at least a necessary condition for the ascription of a causal law 
and … it is an essential part of the job of science to discover them’ (p.29). However, such a condition 
of knowledge presupposes the world as a closed system, like a laboratory experiment. In empirical 
activities where the situation is controlled, it may be possible to secure the condition of a constant 
conjunction of events by restricting interfering factors in order to identify the causal laws being 
sought. Such a closure cannot be sustained in the real world of open systems, where various 
mechanisms with diverse effects intermingle. Therefore, a sequence of events cannot be taken as 
the case that makes science possible. Instead, Bhaskar argues that it is the endurance and working 
together of natural mechanisms in an open system that make scientific activities possible and 
intelligible (pp.45-47).  
Attempts to understand the world on the basis of an implausible condition such as a 
constant conjunction of events is a categorial mistake. This view of science is based on the category 
of experience, accompanied with an understanding that the world ‘may be viewed as surfaces 
whose points are in isomorphic correspondence’ (pp.24-25). By taking the category of experience as 
the basis of knowledge of the world, this position conceives of an ‘empirical world’ (p.28), defining 
the world as only empirically real. This conception reduces the world to the category of human 
experience, so giving a general ontological function to a particular epistemological concept. This is 
epistemic fallacy, in that the statement of being is always reduced to the statement about our 
knowledge of being. Yet the world exists independently of human epistemic activities, and likewise, 
ontology cannot be reduced to epistemology. Empirical realism fuelled by Humean theory of causal 
laws produces implicit ontology based on the category of experience. This is a mistake, since it is 
unable to speak of the real world or natural necessity, which is independent of and greater than 
33 
 
human experience. Concealed in such a philosophy of science is anthropomorphism, since it is an 
attempt to grasp the world only through human experience (pp.16-28). 
Kantian transcendental idealism is also charged with empirical realism. Unlike Humean 
theory, this position takes models or ideals of natural order as the objects of scientific knowledge. In 
Kantian idealism, there is a basic presupposition of the impossibility of referring to the real world. 
What is possible is to construct artificial models or ideals of the natural order through the function of 
the mind. As such it is a form of idealism; it is transcendental idealism in that it takes a constant 
conjunction of events as necessary (as raw data) for imaging explanatory models that correspond to 
those data. Though not sufficient, a constant conjunction of events ‘is still necessary, for the 
attribution of natural necessity’ and knowledge in this position is regarded ‘as a structure rather 
than a surface’ (p.25). However, by claiming the impossibility of referring to the natural order of the 
world, while instead reducing the world to a human construction or model out of the necessity of a 
constant conjunction of events, transcendental idealism is also charged with the production of 
implicit ontology.  
Bhaskar’s intellectual journey, as so far described, reached the encounter with the situation 
in which empirical realism dominates the domain of scientific explanation of the world, but is unable 
to make in-depth explanations of the world in an ontological sense because of either the 
superficiality of explanation (Humean), or the irrealist negation of the possibility of access to the real 
world (the Kantian). It should be noted that neither of these two positions of science governed by 
empirical realism are able to acknowledge the distinction between transitive and intransitive 
dimensions of knowledge, or the dialectical process between the two dimensions in the formation of 
knowledge of the real. This is because the positivist Humean theory of causal laws neglects the 
transitive dimension: a neglect of the social character of knowledge that is apparent, for example, in 
the laboratory test which is already informed with antecedent knowledge or dependent on 
antecedent social activities (pp.16,28), while the Kantian transcendental idealism neglects the 
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intransitive dimension of knowledge, since ‘the natural world becomes a construction of the human 
mind or, in its modern versions, of the scientific community’ (p.25). What is needed is a theory of the 
real, a theory of depth-ontology which is able to grasp the dialectical process between the two 
dimensions.  
 
2. Re-vindication of Ontology – Transcendental Realism  
Recognition of the problem of empirical realism raised the central question of how to access 
the real world. This behoved Bhaskar to set his philosophical project on the re-vindication of 
ontology. In this project he moved first to discern the dialectical process of knowledge formation 
between the intransitive and the transitive dimensions, then to depth-ontology, in which he argues 
the ontological distinction between causal laws and patterns of events, and finally to his 
transcendental argument of how science can come to have knowledge of natural necessity a 
posteriori (Bhaskar, 1975, pp.18-19).  
 
2.1. Two dimensions of knowledge and the holy trinity of 
critical realism  
Bhaskar’s critique of empirical realism had already alluded to what a theory of the real 
should be in order for it to be able to speak of the real world. It must be a ‘non-reductionist theory’. 
Empirical realism is refuted for its reductionist attitude, whereby the world is reduced either to 
human experience or to human mind; in either case the stance is charged with anthropocentrism 
(Bhaskar, 1975, p.44).  As such, empirical realism fails to grasp the distinction between two 
dimensions of knowledge and their dialectical relation. Consequently, the produced views of the 
world are characterised either by a surface realism or by idealism, neither of which are appropriate 
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to talk about things of the real world. It was already clear to Bhaskar that what was needed was a 
depth-ontology.  
And it was already clear to me that you could not make sense of a notion of 
laws or principles in a domain such as economics unless you construed them 
tendentially, as something that only tended to happen in actuality. Then the question 
was what was it that tended to happen? It was obvious that the kind of ontology one 
needed was a depth-ontology that involved structures, mechanisms and fields, 
something other than events. (Bhaskar and Hartwig, 2010, p.35) 
Though failure to make such a depth-ontology was attributed mainly to the two positions of 
empirical realism, nonetheless Bhaskar did not discard those positions entirely. Rather he attempted 
to transcend their ‘one-sidedness’ by taking what is true of each of them in a dialectical process. He 
conceptualised the real things in nature as natural kinds (the real causal agents) in terms of powers 
or tendencies intrinsic to them, rather than regularity of events. He insisted that they exist 
independently of human theories or statements about them, since they exist in the real level which 
is ontologically distinct from that of events and experiences, and from which they generate events 
according to their intrinsic tendencies; they are the intransitive objects of science, constituting the 
intransitive dimension of knowledge. At the same time he recognised that the descriptions of the 
real things may be historically and culturally specific, a recognition that knowledge of reality may 
vary according to different perspectives. This denotes the transitive dimension of knowledge. But 
not all knowledge gained from any historical and cultural perspectives can be freely admitted as 
adequate to be true to the reality (Dean et al., 2005, p.7); Bhaskar refuted the unconstrained 
admission of any perspectives as perspectivalism, to the extent that in this position ‘there are no 
facts …, only interpretations’ and truth becomes ultimately a matter of ‘expression of will-to-power’,  
in that judgemental rationality is theoretically impossible (Dean et al., 2005, p.7; Hartwig, 2007, 
p.345). Differences between perspectives may be complementary to a true knowledge of reality, or 
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may compete with each other. It is the object itself that brings constraints upon the various 
perspectives so that judgemental rationality may be achieved, or it may be possible to determine 
which perspective is truer than others to the natural necessity of the real things in nature. Therefore, 
having recognised the two dimensions of knowledge, Bhaskar applied them co-operatively in his 
transcendental realist way in order to pursue not knowledge as ‘plausibility of reality’, but truth of 
reality (Bhaskar, 1975, p.166).  
Here we can see the holy trinity of critical realism, which denotes ‘a triple constellational 
identity-in-difference’ (Hartwig, 2007, p.238). The insistence on the independence of intransitive 
things from human activity espouses ontological realism. While it is possible to gain knowledge of 
them, such knowledge will be relative, since they are time and space specific. This epistemic 
relativism is ‘a limited and provisional epistemology’, but still admits of the possibility (and necessity) 
of truth’ since it is anchored in the real things of the world by which the ground of rationality is 
provided for judgement between different accounts of reality: judgemental rationalism (Dean et al., 
p.8). Therefore: 
(1) the possibility of judgemental rationalism (in the INTRINSIC ASPECT of the 
TD [transitive dimension]), presupposing (2) the actuality of epistemic relativism (in the 
extrinsic aspect of the TD), presupposing (3) the necessity of ontological depth-REALISM 
(in the ID [intransitive dimension]). (2) is also entailed by (3). (Hartwig, 2007, p.238) 
 
2.2. Bhaskar’s transcendental realist argument 
How then did Bhaskar pave the way to the real objects, while overcoming the problems 
within Humean and Kantian theories? The answer can be found in his transcendental argument 
which entails a depth-ontology: transcendental realism.  
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The recognition of the prevailing problem of empirical realism behoved Bhaskar to direct his 
intellectual journey to an interest in a metacritical theory with which he could ‘unlock empiricism 
while immanently engaging it’. This set him to read backwards from Marx to Hegel and then Kant, 
and through this reading he discovered that ‘transcendental arguments were the key’ for such a 
theory (Bhaskar and Hartwig, 2010, p.40). Following a Kantian direction, Bhaskar resumed what Kant 
had discarded as beyond the limit of human knowledge in the realm of knowledge which is 
transcendent (objective, not human-dependent), while allowing human capacity to seek for it 
(Hartwig, 2007, pp.476-479). This marks the point of divergence between Bhaskarian transcendental 
realism and Kantian transcendental idealism on the way to knowledge of the real objects: both agree 
on rejecting the empiricist account of science as it exhausts its valid content by atomistic facts and 
their conjunctions; but they take different roads in regard to how to access, or whether it is possible 
to access, the real level.  
On the one hand, transcendental idealism argues that it is impossible to know objects-in-
themselves (the noumenal) beyond the appearance of them (the phenomenal), but it is possible for 
the human mind to impose order on the objects-in-themselves by imaginary model building through 
synthetic a priori. That is, objects-in-themselves are not the objects of knowledge as they are 
assumed as unknowable, but their appearances (events)  come under the investigation of the mind 
and are then explained by imagined models built by subjective synthetic activities (Agar, 2005, 
pp.30-31). The Kantian synthetic activity is a synthesis between a priori categories (like unity and 
causality) of mind and sense data. For Kant, the capacity of an object to be known ‘refers simply to 
the cognitive capacity of the human mind’ (p.31); in other words, we know objects because of the 
ways that we represent them via our cognitive functions. Kant argues that human mind has two 
types of a priori concept: particular and general concepts (categories).  With the former the mind 
can make judgement on certain representations, but the latter is the ground of intuitive 
understanding on which the function of the former depends. Categorial concepts like unity and 
causality are exclusively a priori capacities of the mind; they function ‘to unite various concepts and 
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their judgements and are indispensable to intuition’. For an example of this process, events are 
grasped by the mind and then represented through the net of concepts. Then, each significant part 
of the representation is interpreted intuitively by certain (basic) categories, and those 
interpretations are united into the way that provides an explanatory model for the sequence of 
events. Thus, the synthetic a priori first unites a priori concepts and sense experiences, then builds a 
model of what is beyond the appearance (p.32). Nonetheless, it should be noted that the model is a 
human-mind construction, an ‘object-for-us’ rather than an object-in-itself. What we look for in the 
Kantian sense is ‘information about how the objects are within the parameters of how they appear 
to us rather than how they are independently of these parameters’ (p.31). Thus what is explained in 
Kantian transcendental idealism is not objects-in-themselves, but objects-for-us (Agar 2005), 
objects-for-us that consist of both realism about ‘the concrete contents of experience’ and the 
explanatory form of that experience, contributed by the mind (Collier, 1994, p.26). It is a Kantian 
involution of ontological structure ‘within the transcendental subjectivity of mind’, in order to 
sustain ‘the concepts of the necessity and universality of laws’, concepts such as causation and unity 
(Hartwig, 2007, p.149, Bhaskar, 2010, p.204).  
On the other hand, Bhaskar’s work involutes the involution, locating ‘the a priori structures 
that make experience possible’ in ‘the intrinsic features of objects-in-themselves’. This is ‘the real a 
priori’ (Agar, 2005, pp.32-33). The key question raised by Bhaskar is: what must be the case if 
knowledge of things is to be possible? In other words, what must be the a priori structures or the 
intrinsic features of objects-in-themselves that make knowledge of the objects possible? In 
answering this question, Bhaskar brought the notion of ‘law’ to refer to the a priori structures of 
things, then postulated TR arguments as a means to discover it. While Hume considered conjoined 
events as the ground of the possibility of general knowledge, Bhaskar argues instead for the nature 
of the connection of events as the ground of that possibility. If knowledge or science is to be possible 
in open systems of the world, then ‘there must be necessary connections between matter of fact’ 
and what makes such connections of events (not all, but some) in the open systems a kind of 
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necessity of things. The concept of law is applied to explain the connections between events and the 
necessity of things (Bhaskar, 1975, pp.143-144).  
The consideration of the possibility of knowledge in open systems led Bhaskar to discern the 
categorial independence of causal laws from the patterns of events, and to the argument that 
‘causal laws must be given on ontological basis in the enduring and transfactually active mechanisms 
of nature’ (p.144). He established ‘mechanisms’ as the real, through philosophical arguments on the 
basis of the concept of ‘necessity’. With regard to a sequence of events, the Humean theory 
establishes a law from the regularity of events, while the Kantian imposes models to explain reasons 
why ‘the predicates instantiated in the law-like statement should be conjoined’, explaining ‘the 
connection between … putative cause and putative effect’. But the transcendental realist draws a 
distinction between necessary and accidental sequences: ‘A sequence Ea.Eb is necessary if there is a 
generative mechanism M such that whenever Ea, Eb tends to be produced’; a sequence is accidental 
if Ea and Eb are not connected by a mechanism. If one considers the fact that in open systems the 
mechanism M is ‘subject to interaction and interference between myriad causal mechanisms’, it is 
implausible to expect the mechanism M to produce strictly the empirical effect of the sequence 
Ea.Eb (Hartwig, 2007, p.459). Other mechanisms may be combined to produce patterns of events 
that are mostly conjunctural (accidental), and are not constant, so that it is clear that ‘empirical 
regularity or a constant conjunction of events is not even necessary for the ascription of a law’ 
(Bhaskar, 1975, pp.163-165), as seen in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 Status of constant conjunction of events (Bhaskar, 1975, p. 164) 
 Necessary Sufficient for Law 
Classical empiricism  
Transcendental idealism 











Bhaskar drives depth-ontology from the categorial distinction of causal mechanisms from 
patterns of events. Depth-ontology is ontology capable of capturing the real world, which cannot be 
achieved by explanations at the level of a sequence of events (model-imposing idealism) or 
experience (empirical regularity). Events and experience are part of this ontology and of the world, 
but they are ontologically distinct from generative ‘mechanisms’. So Bhaskar distinguishes three 
overlapping domains of reality: real, actual and empirical.  Among these, ‘[t]he Empirical … is 
comprised only of experiences; not all events are experienced; the Actual consists of events and 
experiences, but mechanisms, insofar as they are not realized, do not belong here; nevertheless they 
are real’ (Collier, 1994, p.44, emphasis original). In their relations, mechanisms generate events 
when they are exercised; hence it is possible that they may exist as tendencies when not being 
exercised; when exercised they generate (or are manifested in) events at the actual level; then 
events may or may not be experienced or perceived by humans (Bhaskar, 1975, pp.45-47). 
Mechanisms (or structures) are real causal agents (or causal laws) that in combination in an open 
system generate the ‘flux of phenomena that constitute the actual states and happenings of the 
world’.  Hence, according to Bhaskar, ‘[t]he world consists of mechanisms not events’ (p.47).  
Table 1.2 Three domains of reality (Bhaskar, 1975, p.56) 
 Domain of Real Domain of Actual Domain of Empirical 
Mechanisms V   
Events V V  
Experiences V V V 
 
If causal mechanisms of things in the domain of the real are what make knowledge of things 
possible, how then does Bhaskar argue for the possibility of access to the domain of the real? He 
does so using his transcendental realist argument. He takes a Kantian road to the extent that the 
access to the real objects needs to affirm the ‘a priori philosophical investigation into the process 
whereby the mind can cognise objects’, and because ‘a priori philosophical truth cannot be deduced 
from logical principles and instead must rely on the first being experience of the world‘ (Agar, 2005, 
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p.33). This Kantian road is reflected in the TR argument, as seen in the diagram below, which shows 
a three-step process of TR argument which indicates the logic of scientific discovery. 
 
Diagram 1 The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Bhaskar, 1975, p.145) 
          result regularity  
events; sequences; invariances (1) classical empiricism 








↓  model-building 
 Ι 
   Ι 
 Ι 
 Ι 
(3)        
        ――――――――― ← ――――――――――――――――― 
(2) transcendental idealism 
Real             empirical-testing imagined imaginary 
transcendental realism 
 
In the process of scientific discovery, the following three questions may be asked:  
(i) Is there an empirical regularity that constitutes a prima facie candidate for a law?  
(ii) Is there some reason, other than the regularity, why the predicates instantiated in the 
law-like statement should be conjoined?  
(iii) Is this reason located in the enduring powers of things and transfactually active 
mechanisms of nature? (Bhaskar, 1975, pp.163-164). 
Answering yes to question (i) renders a ‘protolaw’. With an answer of yes to question (ii) we 
have strong grounds for a law.  Finally, with the yes to question (iii) we have a law. The first step is 
typical of the Humean empirical realism that takes regularity as the criterion of a law, while the 
second step is the Kantian imposition of an explanatory model on the regularity, explaining ‘the 
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connection between antecedent and consequent, putative cause and putative effect’. However, the 
third step is the transcendental realist way, and can only occur when ‘a realist interpretation of the 
mechanisms posted in the model becomes acceptable’ (p.164).  Both Bhaskar and Kant take the step 
from (1) to (2) ‘as involving creative model building in which plausible generative mechanisms are 
imagined’. Yet whereas the Kantian journey ends at (2) in the mode of transcendental idealism, 
Bhaskar’s transcendental realism necessitates the step from (2) to (3) because only in the third step 
can there be ‘an adequate rational for the use of laws to explain phenomena in open systems 
(where no constant conjunctions prevail) or for the experimental establishment’ through which the 
postulated mechanisms can be subjected to tests (p.15; 145).  
In the process between (2) and (3), the model at stage (2) may be modified when it is judged 
to be incorrect; then a new model or explanation can be formulated and tested. Thus the process is 
one of explanation, not of deduction or induction, although both are often involved; this process is 
called retroduction or abduction, and aims to explain the causal powers that lie behind the surface 
phenomena: 
To explain something … is to collect or colligate … it under a new schema of 
concepts, designating the structures, mechanisms, powers, etc., producing it. To pursue 
causal explanation a mode of INFERENCE is required that takes us behind surface 
phenomena to their causes, or more generally from phenomena lying at one level to 
causes lying at a different, deeper one. This is retroduction or abduction. (Hartwig, 2007, 
p.195) 
More specifically, Bhaskar provides the procedure of the transcendental realist explanation 
in terms of the DREI (C) model, where ‘D’ is the step of description of the resulted regularity of the 
collected data; ‘R’ is the step of retroduction of some explanatory mechanisms as plausible models 
of unknown mechanisms using ‘antecedently cognitive resources’; ‘E’ is the step of elimination of 
competing explanations on the basis of their inferior empirical adequacy; so that ‘I’, ‘the 
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identification of the causal mechanism at work is hopefully achieved’, whereby ‘the initial theory is 
corrected in the light of the new knowledge (C)’ (Hartwig, 2007, p.195).   
As such this process of TR argument can explain the possibility of scientific growth and 
provides the possibility of truth claim (once refuted as a taboo) with authority; the authority lies in 
the argument itself. But this truth claim is not an absolute claim, but one that is necessitated by the 
consideration of the possibility of an adequate rationale for laws in open systems. Bhaskar’s use of 
the modal term ‘must’ does in fact reflect the inevitability of the condition in scientific activities; in 
the question-form of TR argument (what must be the case if knowledge of things is to be possible?) 
it is used to denote not the case of ‘indubitable’ features of experience22 (or universal certainty), but 
the necessity of what is a priori (necessity of the generalised social concepts) while remaining 
disputable or interpretable through the competition between indispensable claims (Morgan, 2004, 
pp.319-320). Therefore, the use of the modal term ‘must’ in such claims does not mean that ‘there 
are definite stated transcendental grounds and an exclusive set of definite stated conditions of those 
grounds’. Rather, it is a feature of the TR argument that one can argue that there are definite 
grounds, but the statements of them are not definite. TR argument, in this sense, is characteristic of 
‘uncertain certainty’ (p. 321).  
As we have seen above, Bhaskar postulated his depth-ontology, critical realism, through the 
TR argument: the real of a thing is its intrinsic tendencies, which are qualified as transfactual. With 
the postulation of the transcendental realist thesis at this early stage of his journey to ontology he 
became able to set the firm foundation on which later developments of CR are anchored.  
Ontological realism is the cornerstone of this foundation, since it is taken as a key thesis (what is the 
real of a thing) into later states: in the social level he argues for ontological realism of human agents 
                                                          
22
 Callinicos, using Taylor’s model, ascribes the confidence of transcendental argument to indubitable features 
of experiences. On this position he critiques Bhaskar’s transcendental argument as dangerous when it uses the 
modal term ‘must’, because it seems to assert the condition of possibility of experience with a certain 
authority or power in forms of discursive leverage or status by associating it with an a priori ‘truth’ tied to 
indubitable features of experience (Morgan, 2004, p.320). 
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and social structures (1986, 1998, 2008), and in the spiritual and meta-Reality levels for ontological 
(categorial) realism of the Self and the cosmic envelope (2000, 2002a, 2002b). Thus it is possible to 
state that if Bhaskar’s fundamental account of things (ontological realism) is deficient for any reason, 
then it can be assumed that this deficiency could be generated in later stages. In fact, it is argued 
that there is a deficiency. In the following section, therefore, the task will be to subject Bhaskar’s 
ontological realism to a critical reflection in the light of the deficient element.  
 
3. An Argument: ‘Agential-Centredness’ of Bhaskar’s 
Transcendental Realism and the Question of ‘Non-Agential’ 
This section reflects on mechanisms as tendencies and causal agents.  It points out two key 
features in the account of ontological realism in early CR: the primary mode of things (or beings) is 
‘implicit’, and it is ‘agential’. This reflection is crucial for the wider thesis because it enables us to 
argue the possibility and significance of ‘otherness’, particularly in the critical realist account of 
social reality, and to argue that this ‘otherness’ seems to produce a point of divergence between the 
Bhaskarian account of the transcendent, and the Trinitarian account of God in Christianity.  
 
3.1. Mechanisms as tendencies and the primary mode of 
things as ‘implicit’  
As already noted, Bhaskar argues that reality is stratified and differentiated so that what 
makes knowledge of things possible is the layer of causal mechanisms of things at the real level. He 
seeks to find the necessary condition for the possibility of scientific knowledge (or scientific activity), 
and then argues for the possibility of scientific experimentation on the basis of ontological 
distinction and independence of generative mechanisms (or causal laws) from patterns of events. He 
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explains these mechanisms as the ‘fundamental’ ontological structure of reality (Kaidesoja, 2005, 
p.33), as ‘a real categorial structure of the world [existing] independently of our experiences and 
historical conceptualisations of that world’ (pp.34-35). The ontological basis of mechanisms is the 
causal powers of things, ‘which they possess necessarily due to their essential intrinsic structures’ 
(p.38). Mechanism is the most representative term he uses for  the real categorial structure of things.  
However, mechanisms as objects of scientific activity are ‘unobservable’ or ‘non-
transparent’, although their generated events may be the objects of experience (Kaidesoja, 2005, 
p.35; Agar, 2005, pp.34-35). Unlike transcendental idealism and empirical realism, transcendental 
realism regards mechanisms (a priori objects or objects-in-themselves) of science as not directly 
conformed to human reason, but as knowable through the process of scientific discovery (p.35).23 
This is because Bhaskar grounds the possibility of science in the object-in-itself, which he can argue 
is intelligible (that is to say that it is capable of becoming the subject matter of science and 
philosophy). In that regard he has much in common with the empirical realism of Leibniz and Hume, 
but, unlike them (and this is where he can sustain a coherent transcendental realism), he argues that 
the object-in-itself is not transparent to reason (or, reduction of the object is not a way to know it) 
(pp.34-5). This knowableness but non-transparency to reason is attributed to the characteristic 
nature of a mechanism, i.e. its tendencies. What then would be the characteristic tendencies of 
mechanisms?  
Bhaskar argues that the underlying generative mechanisms are best understood as 
tendencies, since ‘[t]endencies may be regarded as powers or liabilities of a thing which may be 
exercised without being manifest in any particular outcome’ (Bhaskar, 1975, p.14).  The mechanism 
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 Agar provides the following figure to indicate the transparency or non-transparency of the real objects in 




Is the Subject Matter of Science 
Transparent to Reason? 
Transcendental Idealism Unknowable Yes 
Transcendental Realism Knowable No 




established as the real gains a status of necessity for its enduring powers, since ‘[n]ecessity is 
ascribed essentially to the activity of the mechanism’ (p.165). Bhaskar explains mechanisms as 
natural kinds, and their way of working or behaving (their tendencies) as natural necessity (p.183), 
since natural necessity is the notion that ‘things have real ESSENCE or intrinsic structures … which 
possess causal powers and constitute them as natural kind’ (Hartwig, 2007, p.320 emphasis original). 
But it is necessary to distinguish between what mechanisms can do and the way they tend to do it. 
Bhaskar suggests that causal laws of mechanisms are better analysed as tendencies than as powers, 
because ‘in the concept of tendency, the concept of power is thus literally dynamized or set in 
motion’ (Bhaskar, 1975, p.50). Thus he makes a distinction between two concepts of tendency: 
tendency₁ and tendency₂.  The first refers to ‘a power which may be exercised unrealised, a power 
normically qualified’ in open systems, while the latter refers to ‘the enduring orientations’ or ‘pre-
formed structure’ of a thing, something toward which a thing ‘is predisposed or oriented’ or ‘a state 
or condition to do it’ of a thing (rather than the possibility of transfactual activities).  Hence 
tendency₂ is a ‘possession of a thing’ (pp.229-230; 235).24 With this distinction it is clear that 
tendency₂ is 
something more than a power. It depends upon distinguishing from within the 
class of actions naturally possible for a thing … in virtue of its being the kind of thing 
that it is, those which are typical, usual or characteristic of that thing as distinct from 
others of its kind. (p.230) 
Therefore, while tendency₁ designates powers of things to exercise, it is tendency₂ that 
designates a condition or ‘realisation’ of a thing in virtue of its intrinsic essence, although the 
realisation is always dependent on other stimuli or intervening conditions (p.232).25 This indicates 
                                                          
24
 For examples of this distinction, ‘Men, but not dolphins, can (i.e. possess the power to) smoke; but some 
men are non-smokers’; or ‘To say Tania pushed the door open completely … implies that she … has the power 
to do it. But to say that she tends to push the door open is to say something more’ (Bhaskar, 1975, p.230, italic 
original).    
25
 Therefore, it can be said that our knowledge of a tendency₂ can differ from judgement about the realisation 
of it, because of other conditions intervening in open systems (Bhaskar, 1975, p.232).  
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one more aspect to be considered: circumstance. When an appropriate set of circumstances is met 
then such a thing acts in open systems and the exercise of tendency₂ will also be qualified as 
normical (p.231).26 Bhaskar accounts for the ascription of the appropriate set of circumstances for a 
thing to exercise its tendency₂ in terms of intrinsic/extrinsic (or releasing/stimulus) conditions to that 
thing. He categorises features such as spontaneity, self-determination and acting for a reason as 
intrinsic causes, while the category of extrinsic causes includes pulls and pushes, ‘structural 
relationships as well as the momenta of other things’ (p.235). 
Drawing on Bhaskar’s own account on tendencies of mechanisms, this thesis argues with 
regard to the ontological realism (of mechanisms) in early CR that reality (thing or being) has four 
constitutive features: 
A. If a thing (being) is explained in terms of tendencies of its mechanisms at the real level, 
which are normically qualified (transfactually qualified without being necessarily exercised 
or experienced), then it can be said that the primary mode of the thing (being) is being 
‘implicit’ rather than being always explicitly actualised or experienced. 
B. What are implicit are the properties of a thing or ways of acting of that thing whether they 
are described as tendencies, liabilities or powers. 
C. When a thing (being) is understood in terms of its primary mode of being implicit, then its 
realisation renders directionality of that thing: from being implicit (potentiality) to being 
realised (both ontologically and epistemologically), so legitimating a logical structure of 
processuality of reality from ‘being to becoming’, a process of realisation.  
D. The process of realisation is dependent on its circumstances, which can either enable or 
constrain the process. 
                                                          
26 Bhaskar provided a brief explanation of the relationship between the two concepts of tendency and their 
circumstance as follows: (i) X has power (or liability) to do (or suffer) Ø ; (ii) X is in enduring condition to do Ø , 
i.e. it is predisposed or oriented towards doing Ø ; (iii) X will do Ø , given an appropriate set of circumstances, in 
virtue of its predisposition, in the absence of intervening (or countervailing) causes (Bhaskar, 1975, p.231). 
48 
 
The intrinsic (releasing) would not be tendency₂ which makes a thing as it is, but can be 
understood as intrinsic powers to realise tendency₂; in other words, it tends to be or do tendency₂. 
But such a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic circumstance seems to be unnecessary, 
because the concept of tendency₂ already contains such tending powers; so what is implicit is not 
static, but is set in motion. This tending power can be understood in terms of the idea of ‘agential’.  
Before moving on to the question of ‘agential’ it should be noted that the four constitutive 
features of reality will be key referent points for further reflections on the later development of CR 
(when it is applied to social beings and to the transcendental being), to which those features seem 
to pertain, with the result, it will be argued, of indifference of ‘otherness’. 
 
3.2. Mechanisms as causal agents 
Having concerned with causal laws (mechanisms) of a thing, Bhaskar gives an account of the 
world of our everyday action and the world of things that we perceive as ‘an incompletely described 
world of agents’ (1975 p. 105, italic original); the world is full of agents but our description of them is 
incomplete or limited. The term agent is assigned to describe things in the world in order to indicate 
their ‘autonomy’, in contrast to regularity determinism (which is only established on the basis of 
constant conjunction of certain events in a closed system). Causal laws or mechanisms as tendencies 
of things are not conceived as describing patterns of events or legitimating the prediction of events 
as in regularity determinism. Rather, Bhaskar argues that they must be conceived ‘as situating limits 
and imposing constraints on the types of action possible for a given kind of thing’ (p.105). Such 
action should be understood as a feature of manifestation of tendencies of a thing. Moreover, it 
should be recognised that in an open system there might be other tendencies operating together or 
intervening so that the action is produced as it is. Thus, actions or events do not occur arbitrarily, but 
they are constrained and necessitated by the tendencies of the laws involved. When the sufficient 
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condition is met, the laws of things as tendencies have powers to cause, necessitate and constrain, 
though not in deterministic fashion, in the actual process of the world (p.105). Therefore 
mechanisms (as tendencies) are causal agents. In this sense Bhaskar provides ‘two concepts of 
cause’: one is the laws as causal agent, and the other is the sufficient condition; in his words, ‘I use 
the term ‘cause’ to refer both to the antecedent event, condition or agent which triggers a 
mechanism and to the mechanism … itself’ (p.252, italic added). Thus science can be said to be 
concerned with answering the question, ‘how can a thing, event or process be controlled by several 
different kinds at once?’ (p.111). However, in an open system, it could also be said that a complete 
explanation is a limited concept in view of the complex determination.  
Thus when Bhaskar describes the world as composed of agents, he means that it is 
composed of causal mechanisms of things working in combination with others in the world of open 
systems (p.105).  
Agents are particulars which are the centres of powers. In an incompletely 
described world of other agents powers must be analysed as tendencies. And laws are 
nothing but the tendencies or ways of acting of kinds of thing. By an agent I mean 
simply anything which is capable of bringing about a change in something (including 
itself). (p.109)  
Now note how Bhaskar explains the relationships between causal agents. When talking 
about the world as an incompletely described world of agents he focuses both on mechanisms as 
causal agents and on their relations with outer circumstance which triggers them to act. This shows 
that he conceives the world in terms of two concepts of cause: causal agent and causal condition. 
Such a distinction is challenged by Collier, who sees a serious problem with Bhaskar’s 
conceptualisation of causation in terms of ontological distinction between cause and condition. 
Although Bhaskar argues for ‘ontologically’ grounded distinction of cause/conditions, Collier points 
out that such distinction is based on ‘practical concerns’ with the cause. In the earth, says Collier, 
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‘there is nothing that is ‘the cause’, only causes; and these include ‘conditions’. The cause/conditions 
model may be termed an interventionist model, i.e. ‘a model of idling conditions suddenly 
stimulated into operation by an agent’ (Collier, 1994, p.125). So, in nature ‘most causal processes are 
almost imperceptible operations of almost indiscernible, and complexly interacting, tendencies’. This 
is also true at the macro-social level, since ‘outstanding human actions may appear like ‘causes’ in 
the midst of ‘conditions’ of which thousands of human (largely routine) actions27 with operation of 
tendencies are composed. Therefore, for Collier the notion of condition is a relative one, since 
conditions themselves always involve tendencies already at work, which will codetermine the 
outcome with the ‘cause’ (p.126). In such an interventionist explanation, conditions can be 
conceived as the background in relation to the intervention of some agent who is concerned with a 
particular object, seeing it as the causal agent. Collier’s critique reveals that Bhaskar’s way of 
conceiving reality in terms of cause/conditions is practical understanding, in that reality is seen from 
the inside of things, while ascribes other as conditions.28 In this sense it can be said that Bhaskar’s TR 
thesis is characterised with a form of ‘being-centred thought’ in its understanding of reality. In fact, 
it should be noted that this practical way of understanding is an inevitable feature of human action, 
including human scientific activities, since humans are not omniscient and can see the world only 
from a certain position at one time. However, it is argued here that there is another point that 
should be taken as significant: that of seeing the world from the ‘agential’ understanding of reality.  
 
3.3. Bhaskar’s ‘agential-centred’ position and the question 
of ‘non-agential’  
                                                          
27
 These ‘thousands of largely routine human actions’ are what construct a social structure. Thus, although 
social structures are ontologically distinctive and irreducible human agency, human powers are integral to 
both categories of social beings. This account will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 2. 
28
 In fact, it should be noted that this practical way of understanding is an inevitable feature of human action, 
including human scientific activities, since humans are not omniscient and can see the world only from a 
certain position at one time. However, it is argued here that there is another point that should be taken as 
significant: the ‘agential’ understanding of reality.  
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As seen earlier, TR is itself an argument for the possibility of access to the real object 
(structures) of a thing. This necessitates the ontological distinction between the domain of real, and 
others. From this Bhaskar postulates his theory, which is first and fundamentally about the 
transcendentally approved ontology of realism.  At its core is the explanation of natural necessity 
(mechanism) in terms of tendencies, which makes possible scientific activities; the TR thesis is 
primarily concerned with mechanisms, then with the relationships between mechanisms. Bhaskar 
focuses first and most importantly on the ontological account of natural necessities (mechanisms 
and their tendencies), which is given in terms of the two dimensions of ‘what’ they are and ‘how’ 
they behave. The explanation of reality is anchored on the properties (tendencies) and autonomy 
(agential) of mechanisms, with additional consideration of the combination with other mechanisms 
in open systems as circumstance; hence it is an explanation only of mechanisms themselves and 
their relations with others. Such an explanation of reality is in a sense characteristic of a form of self-
referentiality, i.e. making explanation of a thing in terms of it being true to itself.29 It is a form of 
explanation of being on the basis of being itself.  However it seems to lose sight of anything other 
than being, ‘otherwise than being’ or ‘non-agential’; hence the significance of non-agential seems 
not to be given sufficient consideration.  
This characteristic of being-centredness30 can be seen more clearly in Bhaskar’s theory of 
tendency and circumstances, in which tendency₂ is mostly ascribed as something that makes a thing 
as it is, ascribing thing as a kind. Hence it can be said that tendency₂ is the ground of the concept of 
agent, because it confers autonomy on a thing. By combining the concept of tendency₂ with agential 
character it can be said that a thing (or being) has an intrinsic power to realise what is implicit in it 
(alethic truth) in a certain way while its circumstances (conditions) may function as enablements or 
constraints on the process. But this process is dependent on the circumstance. With regard to 
                                                          
29 Such self-referentiality is a key issue to understand, and explains the transcendental Self in Bhaskar’s meta-
Reality.  
30
 Since the thesis concerns not only nature but also other realms of reality, the term ‘being’ rather than ‘thing’ 
is used here, because it is an inclusive term referring not only to things in nature but also to beings in the social 
and possibly in the transcendental realm of reality. 
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circumstances Bhaskar distinguishes the intrinsic and the extrinsic; he assigns ‘stimulus’ to ‘extrinsic’ 
circumstance, which can be categorised as outside conditions. At the same time he mentions 
extrinsic circumstance as a cause, but seems to present this outside condition not as agential but 
only as stimulus or trigger. This indicates a way of seeing reality in terms of the intrinsic tendencies 
of a thing: seeing reality from inside a thing. In other words, a thing is defined in terms of what it has, 
its property. A thing ‘is’ what it has and it is the cause. Consideration of a thing’s relations with its 
circumstances, through which it may change, comes only after that thing ‘is’ defined; so ‘to be’ is 
grounded on ‘is’; ‘to be’ is only conceivable from and following ‘is’; more seriously, ‘to be’ is 
originated in ‘is’, seen as realisation of ‘is’. This postulates a logical direction of being to becoming. 
The processuality of a thing is ascribed to its intrinsic nature, while acknowledging the dependence 
of its realisation on conditions. All discussion begins from what being ‘is’. This is why Bhaskar’s 
ontology is called here ‘being-centred’, and the being is always agential with regard to itself. By 
assigning every movement or change from what is intrinsic to being, Bhaskar’s ontology is 
characterised by ‘being initiative’ or ‘agential initiative’. In the case of social reality, as we will see 
later, this could be a form of ‘I (intentional mind) initiative’.31 Therefore, the TR argument seems 
necessarily and initially to drive its discussion to what reality ‘is’, and then moves on to talk about 
relationality with others.32 Therefore here one can see another aspect of the logical structure of TR 
thesis: ‘being then others’.   
The ‘being-centred’, hence ‘agential-centred’ explanation seems to be a constitutive reason 
for the insufficient description of, or loss of interest in, the significance of ‘non-agential’ in early CR. 
It could be particularly so when CR is applied to social reality, where social beings (human agent and 
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 Archer’s explanation of social relations in terms of internal conversation of self can be seen in this point of 
view since the explanative stance is given to the reflexive and mediating function of mind (Archer, 2003). 
32
 It may be related with Bhaskar’s restricted understanding of natural science. Kaidesoja points out that 
Bhaskar’s description of scientific experiment is one-sided, meaning that ‘it deals only with experiments in 
physics and chemistry’, not those in life sciences (Kaidesoja, 2005, p.40). Benton also points out that ‘Bhaskar’s 
conception of natural science is far too restricted’, so that it seems to have led him to ‘adopt an anti-
naturalistic rather than naturalistic conception of the relationship between natural and human world and, 
accordingly, between natural and human science’ (Kaidesoja, 2005, p.40).  
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social structures) are understood as ontologically distinct from each other in terms of intentional 
mind or relatively enduring tendencies respectively, and where further ontological distinction is 
attributed to the relations between the two social beings. There seems here to be a repetition of 
being-centred thought or explanation, in that insufficient attention is given to the significance of 
non-agential moment occurring between persons, with a possible result of the discovery of ‘other 
than being (intentional)’ as Levinas points out,33 which may render the notion of ‘otherness’ in CR. 
Therefore, while this point of critique would not invalidate Bhaskar’s ontology of beings as natural 
necessity, it is valid and helpful to the extent that it reveals the characteristic of being-centred 
thought in Bhaskar’s early CR, which in turn could result in missing the significance of non-agential 
moment in reality, particularly in social reality. As such the question of ‘non-agential moment’ is a 
question about the other.  By extension it can be a question challenging the validity of the logical 
order of being to becoming and being to others. 
Now, how can ‘non-agential’ possibly be conceived or established within the terrain of 
critical realism without invalidating the key tenet of ontological realism? Although this is a task to be 
engaged with in Chapter 2, it should be noted here that RTS does contain some glimpses of what 
non-agential moment would be like. First, Bhaskar states that with the intervention of other causal 
laws in open systems it is plausible that powers may wane and disappear and mechanisms may be 
transformed. ‘Such transformations must themselves be analysed as events in open systems’ and 
such event is non-enduring thing, a mere event, a totally affected mechanisms incapable of 
production’ (Bhaskar, 1975, p.236). Bhaskar’s ascription of such transformation as an event is 
remarkable because event or moment is the only way to conceive ‘non-agential’ as its mode if it is 
not a thing (or being), since thing is conceived here as agential. Consider what would be otherwise 
than being: one could think of non-being as the case of non-agential, but when Bhaskar ascribes 
non-agential as event it must be something that happens rather than simply non-being. In fact, the 
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 After establishing the possibility and necessary ground of ‘non-agential moment’ in social reality within CR in 
Chapter 2, it will be Levinas’s philosophy of the other that is taken as providing sufficient accounts of the ‘non-
agential moment’.  
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term ‘non-being’ is a key term in his later work, Dialectic, but there it denotes a middle stage 
(passing away or begoing) pertaining to the process of being to becoming (Norrie, 2010, p.13), in 
which the genuine sense of non-agential is hardly contained. However there is another passage 
which touches upon a sense of non-agential. In his distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
conditions of circumstance for mechanisms to act, Bhaskar explains the extrinsic category as 
including pulls and pushes, ‘structural relationships as well as the momenta of other things’ (Bhaskar, 
1975, p.235, italic added). From this passage it can be inferred that the existence of others, other 
than oneself, is the very condition of such non-agential moment, and that the mode of encounter 
with the outer world can either be one of enduring relationships (with structural others) or one of 
moment of encounter with other person. Drawing on those passages it is possible to assume the 
non-agential as moment (event) aroused by extrinsic causes (others).  
 
Critical realism presents a strong argument for the re-vindication of ontology, and it seems 
that it successfully defends its key argument against epistemic fallacy rooted in empirical realism, 
which prevails in modern philosophy and discourses. As a result, it has become firmly established 
with increasing acceptance among various disciplines. The phenomenon of increasing acceptance 
has proved its high applicability. One may find reasons for the applicability of CR not only from its 
relevance as the remedy to empirical realism, but also from the fact that it is a kind of a meta-theory 
or meta-philosophy, defined by its underlabouring for sciences, meaning ‘a philosophy of and for 
science and cognate practices, aspiring in the case of the social sciences to supply the general 
conceptual schema they currently lack, which is indispensable for the general flourishing of research 
that would make them effective agents of emancipation’ (Hartwig, 2007, p.490).  However, its scale 
as a meta-theory might lead us to lose sight of the fact that CR is itself at the fundamental level a 
form of explanation which is postulated in Bhaskar’s earlier work as transcendental realism. 
Transcendental realism is the fundamental tenet of critical realism, persistent over and integrated 
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into subsequent developmental stages of this philosophy. The explanatory form taken by TR is ‘a 
causal explanation’ of a phenomenon which attempts ‘to identify aspects of, or otherwise elucidate, 
its causal history’ by ‘uncovering of structures, powers, mechanisms and tendencies that facilitates 
or produce the phenomenon to be explained’ (p.195). Since all stages of critical realism contain TR as 
the first moment (called IM in Bhaskar’s Dialectics [2008]) from which other aspects are 
incorporated or integrated to form a specific stage of critical realism, it can be said that the 
characteristic features of transcendental realism are also persistent in all the stages, and that, more 
importantly, TR is itself a significant causality in forming each stage as such.  
This chapter has identified transcendental realism as a special form of explanation, pointing 
out a characteristic feature in terms of its explanatory stance, viz. ‘agential-centredness of being’: 
the intrinsic tendencies of a thing are qualified as transfactual so that they are regarded as the 
agential causal powers of that thing. Thus transcendental realism is the way to re-vindicate ontology 
in terms of the intrinsic tendencies of being, taken as the explanatory stance from which that being 
and its relations with the circumstances are explained. More specifically, TR as a form of causal 
explanation is defined by its explanatory stance: it is the agential intrinsic tendencies of a being; that 
is, it explains a being fundamentally from the agential causal powers of that being. Therefore, the 
chapter designates the term ‘agential-centred’ explanation to describe the characteristic feature of 
transcendental realism, because ‘agential’ highlights the key point of the argument that TR as a 
causal explanation finds the causal powers primarily from inside a being and its relationality, rather 
than from something outside of a being. This raises the question of the non-agential moment, which 
in turn gives rise to another question of exteriority or the other. Though these questions might be 
only a marginal interest in Bhaskar’s work, it is possible to draw certain features of the non-agential: 
the ‘non-agential’ as extrinsic cause and in the mode of moment (event).  The following chapter will 
attempt to discover whether this characteristic feature of explanation is persistent in Bhaskar’s 




















Chapter 2 Ontology: Society and Human Agency 
 
Introduction  
In the previous chapter, it was shown that transcendental realism lies at the heart of critical 
realist re-vindication of ontology. It was argued that transcendental realism, as a form of causal 
explanation, is characterised by agential centredness: to explain a thing according to the intrinsic 
tendencies of a thing. This is because tendencies defined as transfactual (or normical) make possible 
knowledge of a thing. The intrinsic tendencies are natural and necessary to a thing for it to be such 
as it is, so they are understood as autonomous, working as agential causal powers for the existence 
and manifestation of a thing through its relations with the circumstances.  
The main objective of this chapter is to examine whether agential centredness is persistent 
in Bhaskar’s theory of social reality. In order to meet the objective, the chapter takes into account 
two stages of Bhaskarian critical realism: critical naturalism and dialectical turn. Critical naturalism is 
the result of the application of transcendental realism to social science, as shown in Possibility of 
Naturalism (1998, first printed 1979) and in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (1986). In 
the first book, as the title indicates, Bhaskar explores the natural necessities of each of two social 
beings (society and people) in terms of ‘knowable structures at work in the social domain’, which are 
‘particularly analogous, but irreducible, to those identified in nature’, in that ‘the characteristic 
modalities of explanation may apply equally well’ to both spheres (Hartwig, 2007, p.196).34  Then, 
from the relationship between those two ontologically distinct social beings he derives an 
explanatory model of social relation, the Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA).   
Corresponding to this model, in the second book he further explores how a specific form of social 
                                                          
34
 The term ‘naturalism’ is taken to stress ‘the specificity of the ways in which the movement from manifest 
phenomena to explanatory structures is achieved in different domains’ (Hartwig, 2007, p.196).   
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relation, transformation rather than reproduction, is possible in the ongoing social relation. He 
integrates the axiological dimension into the theory of social transformation by postulating the 
theory of explanatory critique, making the point that transformation is not simply a change of any 
kind, but is necessary for human emancipation. Crucial for our argument here is the pivotal role 
given to human agency, rather than social structures, who undertakes such critiques for 
emancipation. We will examine  whether Bhaskar’s social theories, particularly in his Possibility of 
Naturalism,35 share the same characteristic of ‘agential centredness’, and will give particular 
attention to their account of the human agent, because the non-agential moment, raised as a key 
question in the previous chapter, can only be conceived in her particular type of relation with the 
other person. Following this, we need to go further, beyond this development stage and into 
Bhaskar’s dialectical turn, presented in his book, Dialectics: The Pulse of Freedom (2008, first printed 
1993). It is there that he integrates the transcendental realist account of human agent with the 
dialectical nature of reality, providing a fuller account of social reality in that the human agent is 
established as an ethical agent. In examining his dialectical turn, it will be shown that Dialectics also 
shares the same characteristic features of the agential-centred form of explanation. Furthermore, 
through critical analysis of the pivotal concepts of absence and alethia, it will be argued that the 
accentuation of agential centredness has resulted in attenuation of the significance of the non-
agential moment so that it has produced a lacuna in critical realism, viz. the dimension of otherness 
of the other, which needs to be articulated in an appropriate manner.   
 
1. Critical Naturalism  
1.1. Ontological journey from Nature to Society: The 
problem of dichotomy  
                                                          
35
 The other book, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, is taken into account only with regard to the 
theory of explanatory critique in section 2 of the chapter, in relation to Bhaskar’s dialectical turn.  
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As noted earlier, Bhaskar’s initial concern was a social one: the irrealist problem of 
application of economic theories to underdeveloped countries. Recognising the inability of those 
theories to talk about the real world of those countries, he moved to examine the philosophical 
background of the social science underpinning them. There he found a taboo on ontology that 
negates any questioning of the real world as irrelevant. This realisation led him into further inquiry, 
from philosophy of social science to the philosophy of science itself, since nature (materials) is 
ontologically more basic than and prior to society; from there he re-vindicated ontology in terms of 
transcendental realism.  Subsequently Bhaskar embarked upon the next stage of the ontological 
journey, back to society, with the conviction that social science can be established on the 
transcendental realist ground while also recognising peculiarities of social beings (structures and 
human agents)36 and their relationships with each other. By carrying forward the key tenet of 
transcendental realism he theorised the possibility of naturalism of the real causal powers (natural 
necessities) of the two social beings and postulated an explanatory model of their relationship. 
However, in doing so he had to overcome the same pattern of problem he had faced earlier: the 
problem of empirical realism persistent in theories of social science in a form of dichotomy between 
two types of determinism, viz. collectivist and individualist reductionism or hermeneutics and 
positivism. Let us begin from that point. 
It has been noted that Bhaskar identified empirical realism as the root problem of 
philosophy of science, owing to its inability to talk about the real world. In the application of the 
transcendental realist thesis to social science he diagnoses the same pattern of problem. The effects 
of positivism on the philosophy of social science have been hegemonic in the forms of ‘an ontology 
of experience, empirical realism, and a sociology of man, sociology of individualism; all incorporating 
transcendental idealist and collectivist variants’ (Bhaskar, 1998, pp.19-20, emphasis original). This 
coupling of empiricism and individualism together with the tacit dominance of positivist thought are 
                                                          
36




diagnosed by Bhaskar as responsible for the social scientific ‘malaise’. The ‘acceptance of the 
actualist presupposition that laws fully describe, and so completely control, the everyday world of 
perceived things’ is nothing but ‘positivism’s blanket determinism’, which leaves no room for human 
agency in social life, so that it has brought into being a contrasting form of determinism, total 
voluntarism, as the simple inverse.37 In the case of hermeneutical tradition, the acceptance of the 
positivist view has resulted in the misconception of objects of knowledge as events, which in turn 
has encouraged ‘the definition of the social by reference to the category of behaviour’ (p.20, 
emphasis original). This individualist, empiricist and positivist view in social science is also marked 
out for the production of hermeneutical dualism between agent and structure, theory and history, 
and the universal and the unique (p.20). This dualism indicates the dichotomy, characteristic of the 
social sciences, which implies a choice between determinism and freedom and is expressed in the 
debate between the different social scientific positions of Durkheim’s collectivism (stressing 
structures) and Weber’s voluntarism (stressing agency) (Dean et al., 2005, p.9). According to 
Bhaskar’s diagnosis, Durkheim’s approach combined ‘a collectivist conception of sociology with 
positivist methodology’ so that it falsely attempted to ‘sustain a concept of the social on the basis of 
the category of the group’, while Weber’s combined ‘neo-Kantian methodology with a[n] … 
individualist conception of sociology’ so that it too made a futile attempt to ‘sustain a concept of 
necessity on that of experience’.38 A residual empiricism is found in both cases, preventing a real 
scientific approach concerned with the real relations between those social necessities (Bhaskar, 
1998, p.31). 
With regard to the dichotomy and the consequent reductionism, Bhaskar tried to synthesise 
the two positions in a critical realist way.  He did so first by drawing distinctive points from each: the 
human being as meaning-producing agent (from Weber and the hermeneutic position), and humans’ 
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 ‘Sartre’s (or Goffman’s) freely chosen selves and Durkheim’s (or Parsons’) internalized values reflect in the 
last instance the same mistaken notion of law.’ (Bhaskar, 1998, p.20) 
38
 Bhaskar is aware of the existence of non-, or even anti-individualist tendencies in Weber’s thought, and of 




necessary relations with transfactual and enduring structures (from Durkheim and the positivist 
position); then by postulating a theory of an explanatory (not predictive, as it presupposes a 
closure)39 model of social relations (Dean et al., 2005, p.9; Bhaskar, 1998, p.21). However, it should 
be noted that the synthesis is possible on the ground of other ontological features of reality: 
stratified reality and emergence.  
 
1.2. Stratified reality and the theory of emergence  
In open systems of the world myriad mechanisms interact and interfere with each other. 
Reality of things is structured with various strata; for example, one can see a distinction between the 
material basis of organic life and that of human social life, the former as prior to the latter. In the 
case of human beings, different layers, such as chemical, biological, psychological, socio-economic 
and cultural, can be considered with their specified predicates, and together constitute the totality 
of those human beings. Those predicates ‘ought not to be regarded as differentiating distinct kinds 
of events or things but as differentiating distinct kinds of mechanisms’ (Bhaskar, 1975, p.119; Collier, 
1994, p.108). Each layer or stratum of reality is attributed with different mechanisms at work at that 
level. A higher level stratum (or a less basic layer) of the structure can be explained as being 
emergent from a lower or more basic layer, or antecedent level of stratum (Bhaskar, 1975, pp.169-
170). Thus they are not arbitrarily composed structures, but ordered series of generative 
mechanisms. 
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 It is argued that there are causal laws or generalities working at the structural level rather than at the level 
of event in social life, and that those structures mesh in the open situation so that it is impossible to make 
decisive test situations for predictions of specific social events. To say that it is possible to predict social 
behaviour is similar to claiming the reducibility of those causal laws to empirical regularities, which is only 
possible in a closed situation under the control of experimenters whose intentions may bring differences in 
their findings. As seen before, this kind of empirical realism is rejected successfully in transcendental realism, 
and the same principle is applied here in PN. Therefore social science cannot be predictive, but must be 
‘exclusively explanatory’ (Bhaskar, 1998, p.21 emphasis original). 
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Although some theorists propose a reductive materialism, whereby a fully developed 
science of material is considered as being able to explain everything, theories of emergence refute 
this position in terms of the irreducibility of a higher level from a lower one (Collier, 1994, p.46). In 
fact, with his theory of emergence Bhaskar stands against two fronts: ‘against dualist or pluralist 
which assert the complete independence of higher strata on lower, and against reductionists who 
assert the ultimate unreality of the higher strata’. Instead he explains the ordered mechanisms or 
the relation between higher and lower levels of mechanisms in terms of rootedness and emergence. 
The higher level is rooted in and emergent from (out of) the composition of the lower levels 
(p.110).40  Such theory takes two compatible forms of explanation: diachronic explanatory reduction 
and synchronic emergence. While diachronic explanatory reduction enables us to reconstruct ‘the 
processes of the formation’ of the higher-order entities and to explain them by ‘the principles 
governing elements out of which they are formed’, in the case of synchronic emergence it is shown 
that ‘the higher-order principles cannot be completely explained in terms of lower-order ones’ 
(Bhaskar, 1998, p.98).41 The incomplete explanation of a higher-level mechanism by a lower-level 
one is due to the irreducibility of certain principles of the higher-level mechanism because they are 
emergent powers, emerged out of the composition of mechanisms of the lower level. Therefore, ‘by 
emergence is meant a process whereby a new power or entity results from the coming together of 
existing powers or entities’ (Dean et al., 2005, p.9).  
Bhaskar’s theory of emergence reveals the complex relationship of objects in the world of 
open systems, where causal laws or principles of each object are in complex relations with each 
other, not only within the same level but also across different levels. Higher level entities 
(comprehensive entities) are capable of acting back on the materials out of which they were formed. 
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 Collier adds an aspect of composition to this process, since a higher level mechanism is not simply rooted 
and emergent, but out of composition of many cases of rootedness (Collier, 1994, p.116). 
41
 Bhaskar points out the ambiguity contained in the notion of reduction, because there are three possible 
senses of reduction: as basis, explanation or prediction: ‘If it is asserted that B can be ‘reduced’ to A it may be 
being claimed merely (1) that A provides a basis for B; (2) that A explains B; or (3) that knowledge of A enables 
us to predict the behaviour of B’ (Bhaskar, 1998, p.98). Out of those three, Bhaskar argues for ‘explanation’ as 
the acceptable sense of reduction (Collier, 1994, p.112).  
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From this capability is derived the function of the higher level entities to set boundary conditions for 
the lower levels. The irreducibility and emergent character of higher-order levels shows that they 
are ‘open in respect to … the principles and description of lower-order level’ (Bhaskar, 1975, p.112). 
In such complex relations, however, each level of reality keeps its autonomy, since agential 
mechanisms of each level provide ‘liberty of spontaneity’42 to themselves; while it is also true that 
they come to work together with the possible result of the emergence of new entities or powers.  
Therefore, it is important to note that if those mechanisms are real in the transcendental realist 
sense then their complex relations themselves are also real, and that emergence as a form of 
complexity is also ‘an irreducible feature of our world, i.e. it has an irreducible ontological character’ 
(p.113). A new property emergent out of such complex relations will thus require a new category to 
be conceived, as it is ontologically irreducible and distinct from that whence it has emerged. 
With regard to human agency, there is a particular point to be noted in Bhaskar’s theory of 
emergence. As will be seen later, Bhaskar establishes human agency on a transcendental realist 
ground in terms of humans’ intrinsic causal powers (reasons in mind acting in freedom). The point in 
question regards their origin: where do the powers come from or where are they located? This is a 
metaphysical question since Bhaskar himself asks ‘whether there is a bearer or substance whose 
powers they are; and, if there is, as to what its identity is’. Exploring these questions, he first argues 
that human powers are sui generis real, rendering the organisation to operate with radically new 
principles in an emergent level, which is traditionally known as mind. Then he advocates a position 
of ‘synchronic emergent powers materialism’ (SEPM, henceforth) (Bhaskar, 1998, pp.97-98). As a 
theory of emergence SEPM is materialist only in the sense that those mental powers are emergent 
powers, ‘not occurring in the absence of matter, but not reducible to material powers’.43 This theory 
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 This means that each level has a freedom to use the power to act according to its own nature ascribed to 
agential mechanisms of that level (Collier, 1994, p. 119). 
43
 But it should be noted that although his theory of emergence does take matter as a part of the chain of 
emergence so that higher-order entities can be explained by it, he certainly does not accept reductive 
materialism, which he calls central state materialism, in that entities in all levels are somehow completely 
explained by material (Bhaskar, 1998, p.97). 
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of ‘synchronic’ emergence is not incompatible with diachronic explanations of emergence (Collier, 
1994, p.156), but it goes beyond the latter by dubbing emergence ‘synchronic’ in nature. In 
diachronic explanations, an emergent stratum is explained in terms both of the time it happened 
and of its conditions, otherwise it could not have happened; this means that emergence is 
characterised with temporality. But under the synchronic principle, an emergent stratum is 
conceived such ‘that it could have existed from all eternity alongside the one in which it is rooted, 
just as for Thomas Aquinas it was in principle that the universe could have existed for all eternity 
alongside of Creator’ . Thus SEPM is, on one hand, a characteristic explanation of human powers of 
mind, though tentative, and on the other hand it raises a question about causal criteria of the 
existence of that which holds the capacity to produce effects on matter. Bhaskar himself asks 
‘whether there is a bearer or substance whose powers they are; and, if there is, as to what its 
identity is’ (pp.156-157, italic added). Though he leaves this question open, he provides a set of 
possible answers to be considered (Bhaskar, 1998, p.98).44 Whatever the answer may be, it is 
interesting that in his attempt to theorise emergence, by refuting reductive materialism and by 
dubbing emergence ‘synchronic’ in nature Bhaskar seems to open the possibility of explaining how 
emergence occurs in terms of what is beyond material, time and space. Yet whilst at this stage his 
theory of SEPM would be seen as permissive (Collier, 1994, p.156), it can be considered as a seed or 
a premature explanation of ultimate (or eternal in the sense referred to above) cause of emergence, 
which he develops later fully in his meta-Reality; there, what is traditionally known as the 
transcendental reality is taken as the answer, but explained rather differently in terms of the cosmic 
envelope. To this point we will attend in another chapter of the thesis. For the time being, it will be 
sufficient to mention that his explanation of mind in terms of SEPM is compatible with the 
                                                          
44
 With regard to the questions of whose powers, or where powers come from, Bhaskar provides the following 
possible answers: (a) mind is not a substance but ‘a complex or set of powers … historically emergent from and 
present only in association with (certain complex forms of) matter; (b) an answer based on the possibility of 
existence of a substance as the bearer of the powers but whose nature is at present unknown. Answer (b) 
entails two further possibilities if it is correct (meaning that mind consists of the powers of a substance): (b-1) 
the substance must be matter, which reduces SEPM to a form of materialism indicated by neurophysiological 
evidence; and (b-2) the substance is of an immaterial kind, so that SEPM is reduced to a species of dualistic 
interactionism indicated by work on paranormal phenomena (Bhaskar, 1998, p.98). 
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characteristic features of his ontological realism explored in the previous chapter; the reasons for 
this will be explored later in the section on human agency.  
A point peculiar to this theory of emergence should be addressed here, with regard to the 
question of non-agential moment. The theory of emergence signifies the non-agential moment. It is 
a form of explanation for an emergent property which cannot be explained by any lower level 
mechanisms but only by the ‘coming together’ of different mechanisms. The term ‘coming together’ 
presupposes both the other mechanism, different from one kind, and a moment of being together 
(in whatever  way it is). This means that emergence as an ontologically distinct feature does confirm 
the impossibility of explaining it solely from agential causal powers of entities at the lower level. 
There is non-agential moment for those entities which may be like open space, or which may be 
termed synergic moment, but whatever the case it is ‘non-agential’ moment to the intrinsic 
tendencies of those entities. Moreover, the property emergent out of the composition of those 
entities is independent of the lower level entities to the extent that it is not completely explained by 
them; the emergent property is not completely attributed to the intrinsic causal powers of the lower 
level components. It is independent of their agential movements. Thus it can be said that the 
existence of emergent property signifies the non-agential moment beyond the agential-centred 
explanation.   
 
1.3. A non-reductionist theory of social science: TMSA 
Standing on his ontological position, Bhaskar faced a form of dichotomy prevailing in 
theories of social science. The problem of dichotomy was diagnosed as rooted in reductive attitude: 
either reducing agency to structure or vice versa. Bhaskar refutes three types of social theory for 
committing such fallacy: Weberian voluntarism, Durkheimian collective determinism and Berger’s 
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dialectical connection of these two types.45 Against those reductive failures, Bhaskar sets out a 
fourth model by establishing naturalism of social necessities of agency and structure and 
synthesising them in the way of irreducible relationality.  He calls this model a ‘transformational 
model of social activity’ (TMSA, henceforth). Human agency is characterised with a kind of natural 
necessity, viz. intentional mind (acting on reasons with causal efficacies), while social structures, 
although they are concept- and human activity-dependent, always pre-exist before people and are 
necessitated by their relative endurance, making them irreducible to human agents (Bhaskar, 1998, 
p.34). Bhaskar draws necessities from the extremes of voluntarism and determinism, by attending 
the ontological distinctiveness of each. In contrast to positivism he draws the transfactual and 
conceptual-dependence of social reality, while in contrast to hermeneutics he sustains the 
intransitivity (relative endurance) of both beliefs and meanings, but also their susceptibility to 
scientific explanation, and hence to critique. Together they constitute a spiral moment in the process 
(pp.21-22); ‘neither individual nor society is a “thing” which can stand alone. In the absence of 
society there are no individuals, in the absence of individuals there is no society’ (Dean et al., 2005, 
p.10). In their constant relations, ‘people, in their conscious activity, for the most part unconsciously 
reproduce (and occasionally transform) the structures governing their substantive activities of 
production’ (Bhaskar, 1998, p.34). So the relationship between human agency and society has a dual 
character.  As Bhaskar explains: 
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 As a brief introduction to the three types:  
The first, described by Bhaskar as a voluntaristic ‘Weberian stereotype’ sets up a distinction 
between society and the individual and considers the former to be the unintended consequence 
of the free activity of the latter. The second, described as the ‘Durkheimian stereotype’ of 
‘reification’, begins with the same distinction but views the individual as the outcome of a 
necessary encounter with society. In the first case, the causal arrow runs from individual to 
society; in the second case, from society to individual. In both cases there is a reductive logic at 
work: with voluntarism, society becomes a kind of accidental artefact of individuals’ free activity; 
with reification (or determinism) the individual becomes an artefact of society. A third dialectical 
model which is intended to avoid both of these extremes, is, from Bhaskar’s point of view, a 
failure because it encourages both voluntaristic idealism in relation to the understanding of 
social structure and a mechanistic determinism in relation to the understanding of individuals. 
(Dean et al., 2005, p.10) 
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 [S]ociety and human praxis must possess a dual character. Society is both the 
ever-present condition (material cause) and the continually reproduced outcome of 
human agency. And praxis is both work, that is, conscious productions, and (normally 
unconscious) reproduction of the conditions of production, that is society. One could 
refer to the former as the duality of structure, and the latter as the duality of praxis. 
(p.35, emphasis original)  
 





                      Socialisation 
  Ι 
  Ι 
  Ι 
↓ 
  Ι 
  Ι 




  Ι 
  Ι 
  Ι 
↑ 
  Ι 
  Ι 
  Ι 
     reproduction/ 
     transformation 
----------------------------------------> Individuals ----------------------------------------> 
(The Transformational Model of the Society/Person Connection, Bhaskar, 1998, p.36) 
 
Let us consider Bhaskar’s TMSA from the point of agential centredness. We see in TMSA a 
synthesis of two different types of explanation. Bhaskar’s claim of ontological hiatus between people 
and societies renders not only their mutual irreducibility but also the need for two different kinds of 
explanation, appropriate to each. However, though synthesised in a way that consists of dual 
character, each type of explanation in TMSA retains difference from the other by keeping its 
peculiarity in response to its explandum.46 So Bhaskar insists that one type of explanation is limited 
and marginal for the explanation of the other, otherwise it will fall short of reductionism. In spite of 
their difference, however, as Collier points out, the two types of explanation are analogues because:  
people and societies look in many ways analogous. Both are structurata whose 
powers are explained by their structure; both have a conatus to persist in their being; 
                                                          
46
 The Latin term explandum means the thing to be explained, while explanans means that which explains 
(Hartwig, 2007, p.193). 
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both are laminated structurata with a material ‘base’ and a spiritual ‘superstructure’ 
(ideology, mind). (Collier, 1989, p.103, emphasis original) 
Now we can argue that TMSA is itself an extended version of agential-centred explanation, 
while acknowledging that it takes as its explandum complex relationality, which as an emergent 
reality may contain moments of the non-agential. It is composed of the two types of explanation of 
people and societies. Each type of explanation finds the causal powers from the intrinsic structures 
and persistent conatus in its explandum; each of the components (people and societies) of TMSA is 
explained in terms of its intrinsic structures and conatus which make the component agential for 
itself, as seen in transcendental realism.47  This indicates that the two types of explanation 
composing TMSA are analogues in terms of their characteristic agential-centred form of explanation. 
More importantly, the fact that TMSA is composed of the two different but analogous explanations 
indicates that TMSA is a higher level explanation than the first two types. The synthesis of societies 
and human praxis in terms of a dual character can be seen as an intrinsic nature of the complex 
relationality, composed of the two agential components. Thus the complex relationality should be 
conceived as an emergent reality that has dual character as its intrinsic nature; it can be partly 
explained by agential movement of each of the components, but cannot be wholly explained in 
these terms because there might be emergent property in the complex relationality, remaining 
independent of, hence irreducible to, those agential-centred components of people and societies.48 
The emergent property of the complex relationality, as argued above, is a proof of the pre-existence 
of the non-agential moment before or outside of the agential movement of either component. 
Therefore it can be said that TMSA, from its intrinsic dual character, is itself an agential-centred 
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 For example, in accounting for human agents, the explanation should take ‘agent-talk … about desires, 
purposes and intentions, about means and ends, success and failure, and … unconscious wishes, repression, 
displacement, sublimation’ but the other explanation, ‘in accounting for the way societies are 
reproduced/transformed by human actions’ should use quite different concepts, like ‘forces and relations of 
production, exploitation, classes, base and superstructure, accumulation, crisis, etc.’ (Collier, 1989, p.92). 
48
 Collier explains the independence of ‘relation’ from any specific subject by using wind as a metaphor for 
relation; ‘wind is “a process without subject” … there is no concrete agency that produces the wind; it is 
caused by a relation of inequality between atmospheric pressures’ (Collier, 1989, p.78).  
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explanation; at the same time it is conceived as an emergent reality that signifies the existence of 
the non-agential moment to the agential inner or lower components.  
This non-agential moment is a kind of indeterminable moment in the sense that the agential 
movement of reproduction (of structures) or conditioning (or constraints upon human agents) may 
slip away or lose its significance; rather it is open space where a new change becomes a possibility. 
For Bhaskar it would be the moment where transformation (that is emancipative in nature) of 
structures begins; for Collier such transformation is not necessarily commenced at the level of 
structures, but rather from groups, because ‘structures can only be transformed by collective action 
on a scale adequate to the structure’, which is evoked first by certain groups that are ‘consciously 
formed by its members in order to realise some common aim’ (Collier, 1989, p.106); for Levinas, as 
will be seen in the next chapter, the non-agential moment is the moment of birth of ethics.  By 
facing the other, ethics becomes the very pulse or causal power of goodness, so that it may drive 
human intentional consciousness towards social transformation and emancipation (Levinas, 2007; 
1991). Crucial to note here is that the non-agential moment is conceived necessarily in relation with 
change, but it is ethical change, including social transformation. More importantly, with regard to 
the very place of the non-agential moment, it is arguable that it happens in relation between people, 
not between people and structures; or, according to Levinas, the place is the face-to-face relation. 
Whether it is between people or in the face-to-face relation, the non-agential moment requires the 
other as the condition of its possibility, and the (ethical) significance of the moment seems only to 
be captured in the personal relation of human agents with the other. Thus, if human agency, as 
Bhaskar states, is necessarily ‘the last instance’ of social life ‘via its intentionality’ (Bhaskar, 1998, 
p.34), then human agency should be considered as the way through which meaningful 
transformation can come to social reality as a whole, alongside production and reproduction.  
However, this raises the question of whether such meaningful change by agents contains the 
necessary dimension of ‘the non-agential moment’, and whether it acknowledges the necessary 
condition of ‘the other’. Therefore, if the non-agential moment is the focus of our concern in regard 
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to Bhaskar’s ontology, then it is crucial to take account of how he postulates human agency on the 
ontological ground. In order to examine whether Bhaskar’s theory signifies the non-agential moment, 
we must focus on his theory of the human agent.  
  
1.4. Human agency and  its powers: Acting on reasons in 
freedom 
From his standpoint of transcendental realism, Bhaskar explores natural necessities of 
human agency. He argues that the intrinsic powers of human agency are of mind, which in turn is 
characterised by reasons as causal powers for action in freedom. He argues that human mind as 
intentional agency is an emergent property out of a certain kind of physiological matter but 
irreducible to that matter; he then provides a general theory that explains causal relations of human 
agency with society (Collier, 1994, p.115). For him, to sustain the concept of human agency ‘it must 
be the case that we are responsible for some but not other of our actions’. Those actions are 
analysed as intentional since they are caused by reasons. Carrying forward the transcendental realist 
thesis he defines human agents in terms of their ‘intrinsic tendencies and powers’, which are 
reasons for acting. He argues that reasons must be interpreted as causes because a real reason is a 
necessary condition for actions that purpose to make a difference in states of affairs. This indicates 
that reasons can be regarded as causal efficacy (Bhaskar, 1998, pp.92-93).  
How then can reasons be construed as causes? Bhaskar provides explanations of how 
reasons can be causes in the social sphere in three steps: (1) in social life a lever or a generative 
condition itself is a cause for things to happen, and (2) the second-monitoring powers of the mind 
are also causes, because through them we can supply reasons for action. The human agent has 
powers to rationalise reasons (to act in a certain way with expectation of causal efficacy in states of 
affairs) through negotiation in dialogue and coherence with the rest of the agent’s behaviour. (3) 
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States and dispositions may properly be causes since the possession of a reason can be conceived as 
a result of a more or less longstanding disposition or orientation to act in certain ways. Thus 
generative conditions, the second-monitoring powers of mind and longstanding disposition (or 
states) of agents are constitutive parts of reasons as causal powers for certain actions of human 
agents (p.93). 
It should be noted however that Bhaskar makes a distinction between reasons and action, 
each of which operates in ontologically different levels.  While regarding belief and desires as a sort 
of reasons, he then completes his naturalism human agency by drawing ontological distinction 
between beliefs (as reasons), wants and action. This distinction is rooted in the transcendental 
realist understanding of reality. According to Bhaskar, reasons as a longstanding disposition or 
orientation to act in certain ways work in the real level while action is assigned in the actual (physical) 
level of the world; reasons are prior to and manifested by actions: ‘Reasons, then, are beliefs rooted 
in the practical interest of life. And a person’s essence consists just in what she is most 
fundamentally disposed to do (or become); it is the set of effective beliefs that determines her 
psychic (and behavioural) identity, and fixes her in her particularity as a kind’ (p.96). In this 
naturalism of human powers (intentional mind acting on reasons), reasons (beliefs) correspond to 
tendencies possessed (the real level; implicit), wants to tendencies exercised (the actual) and action 
to its manifestation (empirical level) in the physical state of the world whether or not the want is 
realised (p.95). Thus reasons are ‘possessed even when unexercised, and only exercised under 
suitable conditions’. This indicates that reasons are in normical condition so that they have to be 
analysed as tendencies (pp.92-93, emphasis original). Since the conception of normical condition 
denotes transfactual quality of mechanisms (tendencies), when applied to human agency it means 
that reasons as tendencies are characterised with transfactual quality, existing at the real level but 
working through all other levels of the actual and the empirical. 
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Now let us turn to Bhaskar’s theory of action, since action is also a crucial feature of human 
powers. Action of agents is analysed as intentional, since it is caused by reasons. Bhaskar makes a 
distinction between intentional action and accordion effects of action; there might happen things 
other than what we intend to do in a series of actions.49 Thus there might be no single correct 
description of action in open systems, ‘but there is always in principle a correct decision in principle 
as to whether a piece of behaviour is an action or not’, viz. intentionality (p.82). This concept of 
action presupposes ‘freedom’ of agents in an open world; to say that an agent could have acted 
otherwise means that the agent ‘is only free to the extent that s/he is capable of realising his or her 
real interest (which means knowing, acting on and bringing about a state of affairs satisfying them)’, 
though not all actions are free (p.114).50 Moreover, freedom of agent in acting with reasons 
presupposes the capacity of second-order monitoring (or reflective monitoring): the capacity to refer 
to its own states of consciousness. Thus a person’s activity can be characterised as praxis since praxis 
consists of two dialectical stages: (1) reasons as causal intervention in the natural and (2) reflective 
monitoring of one’s own causal intervention and monitoring the monitoring of one’s activity (pp.81-
82).51 Thus reasons and freedom to act are powers specific to the human agent, and make it possible 
for her to have relations with society; reasons causing intentional actions involve beliefs and desires 
to which tendencies of deeper structures of the society are linked, or reflected consciously or 
unconsciously whether they ‘can exist unexercised or be exercised unrealized’. Such reasons belong 
to ‘the causal order, cohabit and interact[s] with other causes in the open system of the world’ so 
that they are explicable in terms of deeper strata of the social world, although they are irreducible 
(Collier 1994, p.155). Therefore, according to Bhaskar’s theory of human agency, human agency can 
be explained by its transfactual intrinsic powers of reasons: ‘human agent acting on reasons in 
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 Using other terms he distinguishes between perlocutionary action (what is done by a human agent) and 
illocutionary action (what is done in an action) (NP, p.83). As will be argued later, this distinction is limited in 
the sense that it does not take account of what happened by ‘others’. 
50
 This sense of freedom of agent indicates a distinctive character in social science, whereby the human agent 
is conceived as having the possibility of genuine self-determination, though subject to constraints in open 
systems of the world (Bhaskar, 1975, p.111). 
51
 This is ‘intimately connected with our possession of a language, conceived as a system of signs apt for the 
production and communication of information’ (Bhaskar, 1998, p.82). 
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freedom’, and at the same time, according to his theory of TMSA, the human agent is the site of 
‘transformation’ of the society.  
1.5. A Reflection: Agential-centred explanation and the 
problem of the other  
In the previous chapter, it was shown that Bhaskar’s transcendental realist ontology is 
characterised by ‘being-centredness’, since it is first and fundamentally anchored on what is real of a 
thing at the real level and how it behaves. In other words, it is established on the basis of concepts 
of normically qualified properties (tendencies of mechanisms) of a thing and its causally agential 
character. Such ‘being-centredness’ was argued to have four ontologically characteristic features: (1) 
The primary mode of being is ‘implicit’; (2) What is implicit is the intrinsic ‘properties’ of that being 
(3) That renders the logical processuality of ‘being to becoming’ (realisation of what is implicit); and 
(4) The process of realisation is dependent on its circumstances in the open world. Those 
characteristic features are also found in critical naturalism, particularly in the account of human 
agency. First, Bhaskar argues that reasons of mind as a longstanding disposition or orientation to act 
in certain ways are tendencies, distinct from wants and actions, so that they are normically qualified; 
reasons determine a person’s ‘psychic (and behavioural) identity, and fix her in her particularity as a 
kind’ so that they are what could be called ‘a person’s essence’, which fills and drives mind with 
certain intentionality in actions that may or may not be exercised at the actual events of actions 
according to intervening circumstances (Bhaskar, 1998, pp.95-96).52 Thus, as normically qualified 
tendencies, the primary mode of reasons (the essence of oneself) can be said to be ‘implicit’. 
Furthermore, this ontological characteristic seems also to be found in his tentative theory of SEPM 
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 Although the point here is the primary mode of being as ‘implicit’, it is worth mentioning in advance another 
particularly important point that will be properly explored in the next chapter when the philosophy of Levinas 
comes under discussion: to see a person from its ‘essence’ and to understand that essence as intentionality. As 
will be argued, Levinas critiques the traditional Western ontology for its essentialism of being (for the 
fundamental ‘interestedness’ in itself) which violates or kills the others. Although this is not the case in 




(synchronic emergent powers materialism). By understanding emergence in synchronic principle, an 
emergent stratum is conceived such ‘that it could have existed from all eternity’ implicitly until it 
emerges in actual form (Collier, 1994, p.156). Such theory of emergence supports the argument that 
things (beings) exist primarily in the mode of being ‘implicit’, then come to a form.   
Second, once reasons are understood as tendencies then they should also be understood as 
possessions of the agent as a person. Although a person’s reasons are conditioned by society from 
the moment of her initial disposition and arrangement into that society, there is also distinctiveness 
of personality which cannot be reduced and exhausted by society.53 Reasons should be considered 
as not only socially conditioned but as personal construction; hence the second characteristic 
feature of critical realist ontology is approved as the case in critical naturalism, since reasons 
(tendencies) are ‘properties of’ the human agent as a person.  
Now, the third characteristic feature of critical realist ontology, viz. the directionality of 
being to becoming, is also true of critical naturalism. With the secondary monitoring powers and 
intentional reasons, human action is defined as praxis (Bhaskar, 1998, pp.81-81). Thus, being 
conscious of her own reasons a person’s activity is fuelled and driven by the inner causal powers of 
reasons (intentions or wants constituted out of reasons) to certain ways to realise them while 
interacting with her circumstances so that the person may become the one who she essentially is, 
though constrained or enabled in the given situation. This process reveals the point that critical 
naturalism, by understanding a person from her essence, is characterised by an ontological feature 
of processuality (directionality) of ‘being to becoming’.  
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 Though constituted socially and historically, the human agent cannot be exhausted by historical and 
structural explanations of society. What makes the human agent ontologically distinct from and irreducible to 
structures is the fact that the human agent is a person. Bhaskar’s conception of person is derived from the 
stratification of mind: person is defined by the articulation of a psychic (non-material cause or power as 
indicated in SEPM); a psychic is defined by the stratification of reasons (beliefs); and the depth stratification of 
reasons, together with the vertical integration of purposes, defining a project) from circumstance, constitutes 
the stratification of mind (Bhaskar, 1998, p.112). Thus a person is conceived as having dual components or 
predicates (non-material and material including beliefs), working continually with its circumstance in pursuing 
projects for life (Bhaskar, 1998, pp.81, 112).  
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Finally, the fourth feature of transcendental realist ontology is also true of critical naturalism: 
the process of ‘being to becoming’ of a person is dependent on her circumstances. In Realist Theory 
of Science, Bhaskar provides two concepts of cause: one is the laws of a thing as causal agent and 
the other is the sufficient condition (Bhaskar, 1975, p.252). In the same way he provides two 
concepts of cause in Possibility of Naturalism: reasons as the cause and circumstances as the 
condition. In the continual relation with her circumstance, the human agent is capable of realising 
her reasons through negotiation in dialogue and coherence with the rest of her behaviour (Bhaskar, 
1998, p.93). In that process her circumstances may work as enablements or constraints (Archer, 
2003).   
Table 2.1. Four characteristic features of being-centredness in TR and CN 
 
Transcendental Realism Critical Naturalism 
(1) ‘Implicit’ as the primary mode of being 
(2) Tendencies as ‘properties of’ being 
(3) Processual structure from ‘being to 
becoming’:  a process of realisation  
(4) Dependence of the realisation-process 
on ‘circumstances’ 
(1) Reasons (tendencies) as primarily 
‘implicit’  
(2) Reasons as ‘properties’ of a person 
(3) Realisation of a person’s reasons 
through actions or internal conversations  
(4) Circumstances of a person as 
enablements or constraints to the realisation 
 
In addition to the four characteristic features, there are other points to be addressed as 
signifying critical naturalism as an agential-centred explanation in relation with the other person. 
Bhaskar’s account of the natural necessities of the human agent is established by two dialectically 
linked stages: (1) reasons as causal intervention in the circumstances, and (2) reflective monitoring 
of one’s own causal intervention and monitoring the monitoring of one’s activity, 54  which 
presupposes the capacity to refer to its own states of consciousness55 (Bhaskar, 1998. pp.81-82). But 
                                                          
54
 This is intimately connected with our possession of a language, conceived as a system of signs apt for the 
production and communication of information (Bhaskar, 1998, p.81). 
55
 This is because ‘any entity x that lacked the capacity to refer to its own states of consciousness (and to 
interiorize references to itself in the third person) could not use those states of consciousness for the 
production and communication of information, and so could not be said to possess a language. Conversely any 
x which could so use its states of consciousness must possess the capacity to make its own past and 
anticipated states of awareness the present objects of its awareness. Such reflectivity over time would seem, 
then, to be a necessary condition for any discursive (non-intuitive) intelligence.’ (Bhaskar, 1998, p.82) 
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by defying mind with such reflective capacity the other is always placed in the ‘past’ tense as an 
object of its reflection; the other is already experienced so that genuine sense of the presence of the 
other is not possible; the other is only presented to the consciousness of the reflective agent. To 
define mind as reflective, intentional and causal is to define the human being as the master of her 
consciousness while placing the other as an object of reflection, who has already been experienced 
and now comes under reflection. In that identification the reflective self comes to the centre, acting 
in the present tense while all the others becomes objects of reflections of that agential master, 
existing in the past tense; the others cannot be co-present except in a ‘reflected’ form. If one defines 
a human being with such agential mind, and sees her only from this agential position, then all the 
others would be always in a past tense.56 However, if we turn our sight the other way, it can be seen 
that there is moment of ‘coming’ of the other to oneself and there is no way to attribute such a 
moment of ‘coming’ to the agential or intentional mind of oneself. It is simply the coming of the 
other, a non-agential moment for oneself. But it would still remain in the agential-centred (or being-
centred) mode to say that there ‘were’ those moments. This means that the intentionally, 
consciously and reflectively ascribed mind is limited in the sense that it is unable to signify a non-
agential moment caused by the other. Though it is still possible to speak of the other within the 
agential parameter in terms of the past tense, however they are already comprehended and 
coloured by my intentional mind; and moreover, within the parameter of the agential totality there 
would be no genuine (or radical) sense of ‘otherness’. For Levinas, to understand a person only by 
the self-interested (in her reasons) reflective mind is to ascribe her as Totality, in contrast to the 
Infinity that transcends the intentional mind of the I in the moment of the present tense of the other. 
But in most cases, the other is already placed in the parameter of agential powers in the past tense. 
This is very much an agential-centred explanation. Therefore, to see a being from its agential powers 
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 Similarly, Archer, as an ally of critical realism, also understands human agency as taking the crucial role in 
social relations for the capacity to mediate social structures through internal conversations (Archer, 2003). In 
this case, structures (as a form of the other) are understood as activity dependent in the past tense. As a 
longstanding construction, structures have their own causal powers and come into play as enablements or 
constraints in an agent’s internal (reflexive) conversations, but do not determine agency in the present tense 
(Cruickshank, 2004, p.576) since the reflective mind is the master of her present time.  
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is to explain that being from the point of the causally agential (autonomous) powers possessed by 
that being. In the case of the human agent, it is to explain her first and primarily in terms of her 
capacity to be autonomously agential in freedom whilst recognising her ever-existing conditionality 
(materially or socially). It is what ‘agential-centredness’ means by, derived from ‘being-centredness’ 
of transcendental realist ontology, in that the question of ‘non-agential’ is subsided, nonetheless. 
Such agential-centredness presupposes the primacy of the ‘I’ (the agential ‘I’ initiative), which seems 
to result in putting the circumstances (including other persons) as secondary, placed in the past 
tense (as what the I experienced) so that they have to be brought back into reflective mode by the 
active agent: more simply, the subside of the significance of ‘non-agential’ and the conception of the 
other person as in the past tense and secondary. 
Based on transcendental realism, Bhaskar has established the intrinsic tendencies of the 
human agent on the natural ground. The natural necessities of human agents, like all other kinds of 
natural necessities of different kinds of being, are not static; rather they are dynamic and responsive; 
they move and vibrate from inside and realise their intrinsic tendencies as much as is possible in 
relation with the circumstances.  This is an agential-centred explanation of the human agent. 
Although this form of explanation takes account of the relationality of human agents with the 
circumstances (whether structures or other people), the explanatory stance of the relations is given 
to the agential action of the human being on reasons; relation is of the human agent. But the non-
agential moment, considered as a happening outside of intentional action, does not seem to be 
taken into account, and as a result the significance that the non-agential moment would bring 
cannot be grasped. If ethics takes its birth in the non-agential moment, as will be argued later with 
Levinas, then the latter point will be a serious remark on Bhaskar’s theory of ethics and ethical agent. 





2. Dialectics  
2.1.  Bhaskar’s dialectical turn and MELD  
We have discussed the first stage of critical realism in terms of its characteristic of agential-
centred explanation. In discussing Bhaskar’s dialectical turn we will continue to explore the question, 
‘is agential centredness persistent here or is there increased significance of the non-agential 
moment?  
The original critical realism (transcendental realism and critical naturalism) stresses the 
central role of ‘being (ontology) … in our understanding of how knowledge (epistemology) is possible’ 
in terms of the causal powers of natural necessities in natural and social beings. To take a being’s 
essence and the ways of being as the ground of possibility of knowledge is sometimes termed by 
Bhaskar ‘the reality principle’. So, it is a form of explanation that takes being as central (Norrie, 2010, 
p.7), called here an agential-centred explanation of being. But the agential-centred being should not 
be understood as static or confined in itself. Rather, it is dynamic and characterised by change; 
change not in the sense of Plato’s difference but of a real change. Thus, having established his 
philosophy on ontology of being, in his dialectical turn Bhaskar’s major task is to explain the real 
change of being to becoming.57  
Here, one should note that the third characteristic feature of being-centredness of 
transcendental realism shown in the above table should not be considered as the simple process of 
realisation of what is implicit in being, as in a case where the focus and possibility are given entirely 
to being itself, or a case that is eventually concerned with the realisation of that being in spite of 
those negative constraints; or as in a process in which identity is achieved in its totality through 
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 At the outset of his Dialectics, Bhaskar indicates the three objectives of the book: ‘the dialectical enrichment 
and deepening of critical realism’, to develop a general theory of dialectic through engagement with critical 
realism, and to outline ‘the elements of a totalizing critique of western philosophy’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p.2).  With 
the discovery of the concept of absence or negation which renders dialectical exploration of ‘being to 
becoming’, Bhaskar is able to take these three objectives in his dialectical work (Hartwig, 2007, p.26). 
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dialectical course. This type of process is a typical form of Hegelian dialectics of thought, not the real 
dialectic, which consists of three elements: identity, negativity and totality (p. 12). 
It starts with the identity in a concept or a thing, that which makes it itself, this 
thing in distinction from something else. It shows how criticism of that identity leads it 
to fall into contradiction, but then how the contradiction can be resolved and identity 
restored in a further move to a higher level in Hegel’s thought system. Hegel thus starts 
with identity, submits it to a negative critique, and then shows how the results of this 
negativity can be addressed when viewed in the context of the whole, the rational 
totality. Identity, negativity and totality are thus the three terms of the Hegelian 
dialectic and the drive is to secure identity against the results of negative critique by 
viewing them from the perspective of (rational) totality. (Norrie, 2010, p.12) 
Contrary to Hegel, Bhaskar’s dialectics has four terms: non-identity, negativity, totality and 
praxis (or agency). Thus Bhaskar’s dialectics begins,  
as its ‘first moment’ (abbreviated to 1M), with the sheer, real difference that 
exists in the world (what he calls non-identity). He then moves to what he calls a 
‘second edge’ (2E) of real negativity and contradiction that things in the world disclose. 
He locates such negativity in the world at the ‘third level’ (3L) of real, open, unfinished 
whole (his version of totality) and then stresses the importance of a ‘fourth dimension’ 
(4D), the capacity for practical human agency to change the world. (Norrie, 2010, p.12) 
Brought into an ontological-axiological or causal-axiological chain, those four terms comprise 
four degrees or stadia of Bhaskar’s dialectic critical realism, which he calls MELD. Among them 1M 
and 3L are especially affinitive to causal powers (transfactual powers and holistic causality), while 2E 
and 4D are so to the exercise of those causal powers (transformative negation and agential praxis). 
But in their development, ‘each successor presupposes or preservatively sublates its predecessor: 4D 
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> 3L > 2E > 1M’. Important to note is that ‘2E is the hub of this chain’ because the key concept at 2E, 
negativity or negation (absenting absence), is what drives and unites ‘the whole circuit of 1M-4D 
links and relations’ (Hartwig, 2007, p.296). Hartwig provides a brief introduction to MELD with their 
central concepts:  
Moment signifies something finished, behind us, determinate – a product: 
transfactual (structural) causality, pertaining to NON-IDENTITY; first is for founding. 
Edge speaks of the point of transition or becoming, the exercise of causal powers in 
rhythmic (processual) causality, pertaining to NEGATIVITY. Level announces an 
emergent whole with its own specific determinations, capable of reacting back on the 
materials from which it is formed – process-in-product: holistic causality, pertaining to 
TOTALITY. Dimension singles out a geo-historically recent form of causality – product-in-
process: human intentional causality, transformative AGENCY or praxis. (pp.295-296, 
emphasis original)  
In his move on to dialectics Bhaskar was aware of ‘a longstanding and deep-seated mistake 
in western philosophy: ontological monovalence, which takes purely positive account of reality while 
the negative underplayed so that it is unable to say the genuine sense of change or becoming, a real 
negation of subversive or transformative change (Norrie, 2010, p.14). This is a philosophical legacy 
that can be traced back to Parmenides, whose notion of reality was ‘a purely positive, 
complementing a purely actual’ (Bhaskar, 2008, pp.4-5). This purely positive and actual notion of 
reality was bequeathed to Hegelian dialectic, which starts with identity, ‘a concept of a thing, that 
which makes it itself, this thing in distinction from something else’ (Norrie, 2010, p.12 emphasis 
original). It is the second and third movements of the Hegelian ‘understanding-dialectic-reason triad’ 
(Bhaskar, 2008, p.21) that submits identity or understanding to a negative critique and then 
addresses the results of the negativity under the light of the rational totality. The driving force in this 
dialectic is ‘to secure identity against the results of negative critique by viewing them from the 
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perspective of (rational) totality’ (Norrie, 2010, p.12). This Hegelian totality is ‘constellationally 
closed’, a theory of ‘an achieved identity’ (Norrie p.24) through rational reason. Contrary to Hegel, 
Bhaskar starts his dialectic from non-identity as real and sheer difference that exists in the world 
independently of our understanding of it. Non-identity is a kind of natural necessity, as it is 
associated with the ‘necessary stratification and differentiation of the world’, and with ‘causal 
powers and generative mechanisms’ (Bhaskar p.392). Non-identity as sheer difference in the world is 
what is entailed by transcendental realism with transfactual quality and is the starting point of 
Bhaskar’s dialectic, called first moment (1M) of dialectical critical realism.  
But crucial to note here is that non-identity involves real determinate absence as a kind of 
causal power that exists in things as part of their natural necessity. We can see a development from 
original CR in the way that it takes natural necessities into the thought of how being can be 
understood in terms of its processuality, or change, and how philosophy can explain what ties being 
to becoming, that is, ‘the inevitable, ontological processual quality of being’. Bhaskar finds the 
ground of processuality in the ontological feature of real determinate absence, which necessitates 
the process of negation as absenting absence since ‘becoming is the absenting of what was in favour 
of the emergence of what now is’ (Norrie, 2010, pp.13-16). Hence, negativity at 2E is basically the 
process of absenting of the absence found in 1M.  
Then, what is absence? Absence is the pivotal category in Bhaskar’s theory of dialectics: ‘If 
Bhaskar’s earlier work revindicates ontology, Dialectics revindicates negativity’ (Hartwig, 2007, p.9). 
Bhaskar conceives absence with a product/process bipolarity, which is retained in all stages of the 
dialectical movement (his MELD), issuing different types of association of them to each stage: ‘(1) 
product (simple absence) [at IM]; (2) process (simple absenting) [at 2E]; (3) process-in-product [at 3L]; 
and (4) product-in-process [at 4D]’ (Hartwig, 2007, p.9, emphasis original). While absence at 1M is 
identified with the primary meaning viz. ‘real determinate absence or non-being (i.e. including non-
existence)’, Bhaskar argues that absence should be conceived not only with the primary meaning but 
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also with its connotation to ‘a process of mediating, distancing or absenting’ as more or less 
determinate58as the primary absence. This process is articulated in terms of transformative negation 
working at other stages as absenting absence (Bhaskar, 2008, pp.5-6).59 Transformative negation is 
explained as the key to social dialectics, of which a special case is radical negation as the pivotal 
concept in self-emancipation (Hartwig, 2007, p.6). Transformative negation is basically a process of 
absenting absences. For example, hunger is a real determinative absence (absence at IM), so 
absenting hunger is a transformative negation. But I may be hungry out of the inability to provide for 
myself due to my unemployment and my unemployment may be a result of my incompetence or of 
economic crisis in society. Here radical negation comes into play either as a form of self-critique of 
individual incompetence or as a form of social, economic, or ideological critique of the economic 
crisis; both are aimed at and essential for transformation, hence eventual self-emancipation. Thus 
the real absence, like biological hunger and structural crisis in society, is part of natural necessities 
qualified its determinate causal power of change through transformative negation, particularly 
radical negation.  
To understand being in terms of non-identity and negativity does not mean that the 
processuality of being is a kind of arbitrary movement. There is another principle or level, called the 
third level of totality (3L), in which all things mentioned previously are integrated and 
constellationally related into a holistic causality.  Thus totality is itself an internal system ‘which may 
assume various forms of intra-activity and operate via holistic causality’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p.405). 
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 Unlike and against Hegelian dialectic where the real, the transformative and the racial negations are all 
identified, resulting in a linear self-generating process, e.g. the unfolding of the concept in the Logics (Bhaskar, 
2008, p.6), for Bhaskar each of them is considered as determinate alone in making difference, and as a result 
the process of dialectics can be diffracted at any level. With the concept of diffracted dialectics Bhaskar is able 
to set dialectic on the critical realist ground rather than the Hegelian idealist, linear dialectics. For a detailed 
introduction to Bhaskar’s diffracting dialectic see Norrie, 2010, chap. 3. 
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 Transformative negation is explained as the key to social dialectics of which a special case is radical negation 
as the pivotal concept in self-emancipation (Hartwig, 2007, p.6). Transformative negation is basically a process 
of absenting absences. For example, hunger is a real determinative absence (absence at IM) so absenting of 
that hunger is a transformative negation. But I may be hungry out of an inability to provide for myself due to 
my unemployment and my unemployment may be a result of my incompetence or of economic crisis in society. 
Here radical negation comes into play either as a form of self-critique of individual incompetence or as a form 




However, it is a diffracted totality open to change entailed by negativity and real negation. Even the 
thinking of an entity of totality is involved in the make-up of the totality. Concerning this diffracted 
but internally related, unfinished nature of totality, Bhaskar distinguishes two types of totality: 
partial totality and sub-totality. Sub-totality, linked to the idea of detotalisation, denotes the site of 
‘discontinuities, hiatus, spaces, binds, barriers, boundaries and blocks between totalities’, while 
partial totality as the broader term includes not only sub-totality but also both the necessity of 
thinking totality and the impossibility of thinking its completeness in an open, diffracted world 
(p.126). Therefore ‘the only plausible concept of a totality is that of a partial totality’ in which 
elements and structures co-determine each other causally so they become co-constitutive of the 
whole (p.270, emphasis original). Through such causality, called holistic causality, all the four 
degrees (1M-4D) are linked; in Bhaskar’s words, ‘partial totalities operate in conditions of social 
stratifications, emergent rhythmics, multiple binds reflexivity, openness and transformative agency’.  
The human agent is understood as an emergent, partial totality situated in constellational relations.  
Peculiar to the idea of totality is the derived idea of individual human agency as ‘concrete 
singularity’. Situated in the middle of constellational relations ‘concrete singularity consists in a core 
species-being, particular mediations and rhythmics, uniquely individuating her or him as in effect in a 
natural kind sui generis’ to its related totalities (p.395). This concrete singular or individual in a 
multiply conditioned world is a ‘four-planar social being’ or social cube, a notion that encompasses 
his or her multiple relations at different levels: the levels of the material, other people, social 
structures and its own stratification of personality (Norrie, 2010). In this sense, the individual planes 
are seen as ‘embodying all the moments of the concrete universal’ (p.160). Although agents are 
thrown in the world, they can act rationally in their conditions; they act where they are, out of their 
four-planar concrete singularity (p.117). Bhaskar calls this judgemental rationality, through which 
ethical practice becomes a real possibility to human agency. This is why he considers the concrete 
singular as the very condition of freedom and abolition of human heterology. He states that,  
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our totality ethically prioritizes the individual – the concrete singularity of each 
is the condition for the concrete singularity of all – while recognizing the determining 
role played by material circumstances (including, of courses, ideas), particularly in the 
form of structurally sedimented institutions interlocked with discursively moralized 
oppressive power₂ relations. (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 273)  
Let us turn finally to Bhaskar’s theory of ethical agency at the fourth dimension. But, as the 
linking point to the next chapter it needs to be considered in a separate section. 
 
2.2. Ethical agency: Dialectical rationality and ethical 
alethia  
Bhaskar argues that the human agent and her participation in the totality of the world are 
fundamentally and naturally ethical. How could this be so, and how far can it be justified?60 
Fundamentally what makes a human being an ethical agent is her dialectically constructed ethical 
rationality or simply dialectical rationality. For Bhaskar, a human agent is naturally capable and acts 
on the dialectical rationality, although limited or constrained in any given situation.  A possible 
structural explanation of the dialectical rationality starts from Bhaskar’s conception of 
constellationality, developed in relation with his notion of totality.   
To designate the relationship at the level of Bhaskar uses the term constellationality.  
Constellationality is an ‘over-reaching term to denote a figure of dialectical containment’ between, 
for example, epistemology within ontology or reasons within causes, some of which ‘may be 
diachronically or synchronically emergent’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p.395). What is peculiar to this notion of 
constellationality is a kind of constellational relation, i.e. constellational unity, which is distinctively 
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 The section will answer to how Bhaskar assigns human agency as ethical agency, but the question about its 
justification will be addressed both in the conclusion to this chapter and in the following chapter.  
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distinguished from (Hegelian) constellational identity where other things, sheer difference or 
heterology, are subsumed to the idealist identity. Bhaskar calls this constellational containment, or 
constellational closure. But in contrast, he supports the more open idea of constellational unity, 
where there is co-constitution between epistemology and ontology, between dialectical and 
analytical reason, between reasons and causes or mind and matter and between human beings, 
where ‘[m]utual intra-action and co-mediation in a constellational state … is stressed’ (Norrie, 2010, 
p.100). One characteristic of constellational unity is that it is only possible through human rationality 
by its dialectical use. For example, in the case of the duality of structures and agency, Bhaskar 
maintains heterology (sheer difference) between them by arguing for what he calls the hiatus, or 
hiatus-in-the-duality, which denotes a gap or moment of discontinuity between them but because of 
which reductionism is avoided. However, human agency has an ability to switch between two 
different perspectives, what Bhaskar calls perspectival switch. ‘Perspectival switch is rendered valid 
and necessary by virtue of the need to see things from both sides in a dual or constellated relation’ 
(p.103). Bhaskar argues that the possibility of perspectival switch leads the human agent to have 
reflexivity on her broader context up to what Bhaskar calls a meta-reflexive situation where, for 
example, a kind of stalemate is found in which ‘both sides accuse the other of self-referential 
paradox’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 147) but they can have a way out of the stalemate through ‘the concept 
of a meta-reflexively totalising situation - another dialectical perspectival switch in the key of 
constellationality’ (p.273). Put more simply, the human agent, through his ability of perspectival 
switch, can place himself in another’s shoes, reach to understand another’s situation and make 
(trustworthy) judgement of betterment for others’ freedom, and others’ concrete singularity, just as 
he does for himself. Thus the concept of constellationality is crucial for Bhaskar’s ethics because with 
this relationality he can argue for the possibility of perspectival switch through which one can be in 
ethical relation with and for the other in the form of solidarity.  
One can notice the stress on the human capacity for thought, expressed here as reflexivity 
taking the mediating role from my perspective to that of the other, and also as the extensional or 
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processual quality of ethics from my freedom to the freedom of the other. This is the key aspect of 
dialectical rationality or ethical dialectics.  As Bhaskar argues: 
Ethical dialectics will take us, via ethical naturalism and moral realism, from the 
primal scream induced by the absent parent(s) through (to use slightly archaic language) 
the education imposed on desire by the reality principle or axiological necessity, in a 
dialectical of truth and freedom, mediated by wisdom to universal human emancipation 
in a society in which the free flourishing of each is the condition of the free flourishing 
of all. Absolute reason or dialectical rationality, alethia, theory/practice consistency and 
dialectical universalizability impose a tendential directionality to this rhythmic absenting 
of constraints on wellbeing and possibilities. (p. 98) 
Here we can see a dialectical logic or rationality of ethics. It starts from the primal existential 
situation of the human being, like the primal scream of a baby at the separation from the mother’s 
womb, which constitutes desire or need that is fundamentally absence of something else (such as 
parents, separation, loving touch or safety). The desire or need is governed by necessity but at the 
same time it pushes the human being to freedom from the needy situation by absenting absence. 
Thus searching for freedom is our first desire, viz. desire to freedom. Now, over the course of 
constellational relation which renders people capable of perspectival switch, the human being is 
able to sympathise with the needy situation of the other. Here we can see another existential 
component of ethics, viz. solidarity: a desire for freedom. This is a process of dialectical logic or 
rationality that ‘proceeds from our first desire to be free from material need to an eventual desire by 
extension for freedom of a most complete form’ (Norrie, 2010, pp.121-122). What we can see is an 
extension from freedom for oneself to freedom for the other and for all. Thus Bhaskar argues for the 
possibility of ethical universalisability (universal human emancipation), the starting point of which is 
the ethical concrete singularity, often expressed in terms of eudemonia society, ‘a society in which 
the free flourishing of each is the condition of the free flourishing of all’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p.98). 
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This ethical realisation, however, is contingent, since it is dependent upon human agency. 
That is why Bhaskar argues for the need for education: ‘the education imposed on desire by the 
reality principle or axiological necessity, in a dialectical of truth and freedom, mediated by wisdom 
to universal human emancipation in a society’ (p.98). Of course, education here is a broad term that 
indicates the need for effort and struggle for freedom in a right way; the human agent needs to be 
informed and guided by objective values that Bhaskar calls ethical alethia. Bhaskar claims for 
objective values, stating that: 
As a moral realist I hold that there is an objective morality. But how can it be 
known? This is where ethical naturalism comes in. It lies in the transition from fact to 
value (and theory to practice). So there is an ethical alethia, ultimately grounded in 
conceptions of human nature, in the context of developing four-planar social being, 
with the moral consciousness of the species in principle open. (p.211) 
The above statement indicates the fact-to-value formula as the starting point of Bhaskar’s 
ethical naturalism. In fact the formula itself is drawn from his theory explanatory critique. Elder-vass, 
in his critical study of Bhaskar’s ethical naturalism, provides the following seminal statement about 
explanatory critique, which he found in Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation: 
Let a belief P, which has some object O, have a source (causal explanation) S. I 
am going to contend that if we possess: (i) adequate grounds for supposing P is false; 
and (ii) adequate grounds for supposing that S co-explains P, then we may, and must, 
pass immediately to (iii) a negative evaluation of S (CP); 61 and (iv) a positive evaluation 
of action rationally directed at the removal of S (CP). (Elder-vass, 2010, p.35, opt. 
Bhaskar, 1986, p.177) 
The adequate ground for supposing a belief as false is to make factual statements of it. The 
production of factual statements about ideas and beliefs that we have and live by is the work of the 
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 CP in the text is ‘ceteris paribus’ meaning ‘other things being equal’.  
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social sciences. Therefore, such sciences always have critical potential, because in making factual 
statements they pose ‘the questions of the causation and function of an idea together with that of 
its truth or falsehood, in such a way that the causal accounts show why we tend to have certain 
kinds of false belief’ (Bhaskar et al., 1998, pp.385-386). Whenever we can show falsity of a belief 
from factual statements of it, and expose ‘a prevailing social structure as an important causal factor 
in sustaining the prevalence of this false belief’, this is immediately followed by negative ethical 
valuation of the belief and the structure (Hartwig, 2007, p.197). Here we can see the fact-to-value 
formula; as Dave put it, ‘whenever we can show that P is false (a fact), then this provides all the 
grounds we need to say that P is wrong (a value) and so is any action based on P’ (Elder-vass, 2010, 
p.35). Bhaskar calls this work explanatory critique that produces critical knowledge so that it can 
‘expose not just false beliefs, but the false beliefs by which oppression and injustice are disguised, 
whether consciously or not, and perpetuated’ (Bhaskar et al., 1998, p. 389). Thus explanatory 
critique is taken as essential to transformative negation, not only in the sense of cognitive 
explanatory critique, but extended to a ‘needs-based explanatory critique’ so that it can do 
absenting absence in the real world (Elder-vass, 2010, p.36).  Hence it becomes an imperative for 
universal emancipation (Bhaskar et al., 1998, ibid). From this position Bhaskar moves on to claim 
ethical naturalism not in the sense of Platonic ideas or Kantian noumenal, but in the sense of 
naturalistic, intransitive, objective value that is discovered in the real world that we all inhabit (p. 
389). Here the holy trinity of critical realism can be equally applied: the transfactual quality of 
morality or ethics does exist so that it makes possible our access to it (ontological realism) through 
explanatory critique. However, because of our limitedness in time-spatial, geo-historical condition 
(epistemic relativism), our knowledge of morality should be always subject to refinement through 
rational judgement (judgemental rationalism) in order for us to be true, as much as we can, to the 
ethical real. This whole process requires us to be committed to truth: alethic truth or alethia 
including ethical alethia.  
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Here we reach the final point before we move to make the concluding remarks of this 
chapter. The point is about alethic truth. Although it is the last point, it is no less important than any 
other, because the idea of alethia may be the most fundamental to critical realism and, if so, it may 
be the kernel to which all our concern regarding the agential centredness of critical realism and the 
question of the non-agential moment are attributed. In fact, as Bhaskar acknowledges, alethia is ‘the 
second great discovery’ in his dialectical work ‘after the adequate concept of absence’ (Hartwig, 
2007, p.26). The basic idea of alethia is truth of a being, not a propositional truth as in the Kantian 
sense that humans bring truth to the world; rather it is truth that the world imposes on us: ‘it is true 
to, for, in and of itself’, hence ‘contingently true knowledge of the world is not only possible, but also 
an AXILOGICAL necessity. Thus Bhaskar’s idea of alethia is ‘identical to the REALTY PRINCIPLE or 
epistemologically mediated axiological (natural) necessity’. Although epistemologically mediate and 
recursively discovered it is not necessarily justified by the realist way because it goes beyond the 
‘real’; it is not necessarily confined truth at 1M degree, but also goes beyond this, in the sense of its 
very original and ultimate teleological meaning. The last point can be understood more easily in the 
light of Bhaskar’s later, tentative claim, which as Hartwig points out is without evidence, of meta-
Reality as the alethia of all beings (pp.26-29, emphasis original); all beings are already therein 
eternally before they come to be real, the idea that we have seen in SEPM, or put another way, as 
meta-Reality, the alethia is ‘implicit’ in all beings, guiding and setting beings on tendential 
directionality toward emancipation: 
The ultimate moral or ethical alethia of the human species is universal freedom. 
This is not a causal claim immediately, but a claim that such a goal (alethic morality) 
logically is implicit at the level of the real in human discourse and practice. … However, 
our NEED for freedom is a form of axiological (natural) necessity, and tendential 
DIRECTIONALITY toward such a goal is a causal process (since reasons, norms, etc., are 
causes) whereby directionality is inscribed in the struggle for freedom by the REALITY 
PRINCIPLE, i.e., alethic truth. (p.29, emphasis original)  
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Therefore, for Bhaskar the human being is an ethical agent in a dual sense: in the sense of 
alethic truth, the human agent is ethical since the ultimate ethical alethia is inscribed in her being 
implicitly from the outset. At the same time, in the realist sense, in spite of all the possibility of split, 
hatred, contradiction, absence, etc., the human agent is capable not only of desiring freedom for 
herself from limited situations but also of desiring for freedom of the other by the ability of 
perspectival switch and through the exercise of absenting absence (transformative negation). 
Moreover, the ultimate ethical alethia as the inscribed goal sets implicitly the tendential 
directionality of the agent’s life of four-planar social relations toward universal emancipation. That is 
why Bhaskar can say that, ‘the project of universal emancipation may be implicit in every free action’ 




3. Concluding Remarks: A lacuna – the dimension of otherness 
We began this chapter with the question of whether the agential-centred explanation of 
reality is persistent in Bhaskar’s explanation of social reality, particularly his explanation of the 
human being. To answer this question, we have taken into account Bhaskar’s critical naturalism and 
dialectic. Our reading of his critical naturalism, particularly in Possibility of Naturalism, has shown 
that the form of explanation of social beings (structures and people) and their relationship (TMSA) is 
also characterised with agential centredness. Paying particular attention to the account of the 
human agent, because of its peculiarity as the site of transformation of society, the chapter has 
shown that the ontology of the human agent has the same pattern of characteristic features as that 
of natural things, and has pointed out that this gives rise to the question of the non-agential 
moment. Our reading of Dialectics has shown that Bhaskar deepens the critical naturalist account of 
human agency by establishing the human agent as ethical agent in the dialectically changing world of 
reality through an ontological-axiological chain in which absence and alethia come to take a pivotal 
role. However, the chapter has not yet answered the question, ‘is agential centredness persistent in 
Dialectics or is the non-agential moment is greased here with its significance? In these concluding 
remarks we will answer that question in the following five points.  
First, Bhaskar’s dialectics can be seen as sharing the fundamental character of agential-
centred form of explanation. Based on the four characteristic features of agential centredness given 
in Chapter One, it can be said that alethia is ‘implicit’ in all being as the primary mode of being; the 
causal powers at 1M (natural necessities) and 3L (the holistic causality) are ‘properties’ of being and 
totality, respectively; the process of transformative negation (absenting absence) at 2E and 4D as 
exercise of ethical agency under the tendential directionality inscribed in the agent signifies the 
directionality of ‘being to becoming’; and the circumstance is understood in terms of the 
constellational relation through the four planar social levels (the material, other people, the 
structural and personality), rendering a partial (open) totality (conditioned but not exhausted by 
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ever potential for freedom). Preserving the key characteristic features of agential centeredness 
rooted in and generated from transcendental realism, therefore, Bhaskar’s Dialectics can also be 
seen as explaining the dialectical nature of reality from the stance of agential centredness, as seen in 
the table below.  
Table 2.2. Four characteristic features of Being-centredness in TR, CN and Dialectics 
 
Transcendental Realism Critical Naturalism Dialectics 
(1) ‘Implicit’ as the primary 
mode of being 
(2) Tendencies as 
‘properties of’ being 
(3) Processual structure 
from ‘being to becoming’:  
a process of realisation   
(4) Dependence of the 
realisation-process on 
‘circumstances’ 
(1) Reasons (tendencies) as 
primarily being ‘implicit’  
(2) Reasons as ‘properties’ 
of a person 
(3) Realisation of a 
person’s reasons through 
actions or internal 
conversations  
(4) Circumstances of a 
person as enablements or 
constraints to the 
realisation 
(1) Alethia as primarily 
‘implicit’ in all beings 
(2) 1M non-identity and 3L 
totality as ‘properties’ of 
being  
(3) ‘Being to becoming’ 
through exercise of real 
negation at 2E and 4D 
(4) Constellational 
relations (including 
perspectival switch) with 
circumstances 
 
Moreover, Bhaskar’s Dialectics is an agential-centred explanation particularly in the sense 
that the pivotal concepts of absence and alethia should be seen as what make the dialectical 
movement of reality agential movement. Both concepts are essentially connected with agency. Let 
us consider the concept of absence. The usage of the concept in Dialectics is dualistic: absence as 
noun and absenting as a verb form. The first denotes what is absent in beings, hence it is real 
determinate absence in being so that it necessitates the second, verb form of absenting. So let us 
say that I am hungry: the hunger as a form of absence pushes me to take action to absent the 
hunger (transformative negation). In doing so I am assigned as agency of the action for myself. This 
is obviously natural and necessary for a human being. Not only in this moment, but in all stages of 
the dialectical process is my agency present; from the prime existential moment of an infant’s cry for 
the absence of parents to the pursuing of universal emancipation in solidarity with the others; from 
desire of my freedom to the point of desire for others’ freedom; from the very first natural 
judgement of absenting absence for my freedom to the ethical judgement of absenting absence for 
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the other’s freedom. Agency is always present in the process. Thus dialectics is fundamentally seen 
from, and articulated for, the agential-centred explanation. Alethia makes the argument stronger. 
Let us talk about hunger again. Absenting hunger is natural. But for Bhaskar, it is not only natural but 
also ‘true’ to alethia of being. All our judgements that we make in the process of transformative 
negation may be necessary, but are also true to the factual situation of the context. This does not 
mean they are eternally true, because of the time-space and geo-historical conditionality of the 
judgement in the context. They may be necessary to the context but may be contingently true and in 
need of continual subjection to further investigation when necessary. What this denotes is that 
there is alethic truth beyond the ‘real’ truth that we find in the context that we inhabit. Thus when 
Bhaskar says that the world is an open totality this is not only because of the ever present absence in 
the world, but also because of the fact that the ultimate alethia implicit in all beings does not render 
the world to be closed within its absence but pushes it to seek continually for freedom from absence. 
What makes this possible is the agency. The alethic truth or alethia, according to Bhaskar, is 
inscribed in agency from the outset, so he calls the agency a ‘radically transformed transformative 
praxis’.62 Therefore, Dialectics is all the more an agential-centred explanation of reality; but this time 
it is conceived not only as the agency of being, but also as the agency of alethic truth.63 As Bhaskar 
states:  
We are left with non-identity, structure, negativity, finitude, essentially 
transformative change, holistic causality and phronesis at the end – in agency. But 
agency is, of course, in a sense already there at the outset in the phenomenologicality 
of science, so we can say, if we like, that the end is implicit in the beginning, but if we go 
along with this rather Hegelian way of speaking, we must see the agency as a radically 
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 Below in a critical analysis, the phrase, ‘radically transformed transformative praxis’, however, is taken as a 
hint that indicates the non-agential moment.  
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transformed transformative praxis, oriented to rationably groundable projects – 
ultimately flourishing in freedom. (Bhaskar, 2008, p.9) 
Second, however, serious challenges might be made to this account of agential centredness. 
To counter those challenges we should start from the very pivotal concepts of Bhaskar’s dialectics: 
absence and alethia.  We have noted the dual usage of absence, as noun and the verb form. Now 
each usage needs to be further specified: as the noun form, for example, between my hunger and 
the other’s hunger; from this specification it is possible to specify the verb form as absenting my 
hunger or absenting the other’s hunger. Now we can say that absenting my hunger is natural and 
necessary to the agent; hence it is an agential movement from the outset. But it is a different story if 
I take the bread out of my mouth to give to the other in order to absent her hunger. That is ethical 
but not necessarily natural to the agent. The fact of my hunger necessitates my agential movement 
of absenting it, but the fact of the other’s hunger does not naturally necessitate my ethical action of 
absenting her hunger, particularly when both are desperately hungry. We should distinguish 
between the two types of absenting: one is natural and necessary, hence agential to the agent, but 
the other is not necessarily natural movement to the agent. In the former case of absenting, 
freedom is necessarily presupposed for the agent, so the absenting absence for freedom of itself is 
natural and spontaneous; but in the case of the latter, absenting absence for the other’s freedom at 
the expense of my freedom is not natural to the agent. It is a special case that should be called ethics. 
So the distinction between two types of absenting signifies the distinction between freedom and 
ethics. What makes the distinction is not what the absence is, but whose the absence is. It is the 
other who is irreducible to my freedom from the outset; so we say, it is otherness of the other. From 
this point therefore it can be said that ethics cannot be accounted as natural necessity as freedom, 
nor is it considered as naturally necessitated freedom. Ethics is different from natural kind.  
Third, if ethics is not necessarily generated from freedom, then Bhaskar’s dialectical logic 
also faces a challenge. It has been shown that Bhaskar’s ethics has its dialectical logic or rationality, 
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which starts from the primal existential situation of absence in oneself: desire to freedom for 
survival of oneself. Then, through the ability of perspectival switch, gained from constellational unity 
with the other, one can be in solidarity with the other, pursuing more than my freedom, toward 
freedom for the other (Norrie, 2010, p.123). Bhaskar takes freedom and solidarity as two sides of 
ethics, then considers that the latter can be concretely developed by dialectical reflective agency 
through perspectival switch. So we can see a kind of extensionality of ethics that could be regarded 
as a sort of ‘tendential directionality’ (Hartwig, 2007, p.29). Moreover, Bhaskar seems to consider 
the directionality as implicit in all beings so that somehow it should be natural and true to the 
agency. Again, this is a thoroughly agential-centred explanation of ethics: seeing ethics from the 
position of the agency, explaining it from the reflectively extensive agency and, more importantly, 
claiming the agency as the source of ethics for the implicit ethical alethia in all being. According to 
the last point, then, all agencies should be somehow naturally ethical. But as argued above, ethics is 
a special kind, not a natural kind like freedom; it may be dialectically constructed as Bhaskar said, 
but it is not initiated by the agent’s spontaneous action. Furthermore, grounding the possibility of 
ethics on the human agent’s ability of perspectival switch means that ethics is dependent on each 
human agent (the concrete singularity in Bhaskar’s term): in his words, ‘the free flourishing of each is 
the condition of the free flourishing of all’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p.98). However, this could make ethics an 
option or ‘opinion’ (Levinas, 2007, p.47), which in turn makes the exercise of freedom prior to ethics, 
because of its selecting role between options. Again, the point is that to pursue freedom is natural 
and necessary to the human agency (for oneself) as Bhaskar claims; but to pursue ethics (for the 
other) is not natural to the human agency because, if it were so, the agent should necessarily take 
such an ethical switch from the outset, or in other words, the agent should give the bread out of his 
mouth to the other from the first. Therefore, it can be said that Bhaskar’s dialectical rationality, with 
its developmental or extensional understanding of ethics, shows the primacy of freedom over ethics; 
that is, ethics may be optional.  
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This renders the fourth, and crucial, point that ethics as a special case should be considered 
as distinct from freedom, particularly in regard to the origin of ethics. According to Bhaskar, ethics 
seems intrinsically related with freedom, as seen from his dialectical logic or rationality of ethics: my 
existential experience of freedom will eventually entail my agential ethical praxis for universal 
freedom. In this case however, as argued above, ethics always remains as an option or opinion, 
dependent upon my spontaneity. Contrary to this, it is argued here that ethics is a kind distinct from 
freedom, so that it does not pertain to freedom, hence it is not opinion or optional. When it is said 
that ethics is not opinion, nor optional, it does not mean that ethics always exists somewhere, 
waiting to be discovered. It means that ethics is a command from the other, not my agential opinion 
or understanding of the other’s situation. It is prior to my understanding from the perspectival switch. 
It comes first. This indicates that something happens to the agent prior to its agential movement for 
its desire. It is because something has already happened to the agent that the agent can give the 
bread to the other against its freedom. This agent would be the ‘radically transformed’ praxis 
(Bhaskar, 2008, p.9), meaning that something has happened prior to the agential movement so that 
the agent has been transformed radically.64 According to Bhaskar’s own theory, happening is distinct 
from action. While action is attributed to the agent’s intentional movement, happening is 
considered as something outside the agential parameter (Bhaskar, 1998, p.82). Happening as outside 
of intentional actions is thus conceived as the non-agential moment and, as argued in the previous 
chapter, the condition of the possibility of the non-agential moment is the other who comes to the 
agent in direct encounter65 or, in Levinas term, as will be seen, the face-to-face encounter. Thus, if 
something had happened to the agent that has made him radically transformed, and if this 
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 When it is said that ethics is prior to the agential movement this does not necessarily mean it is the prime 
existential experience that is, as we have seen, natural. But when we say that an agent is ethical (radically 
transformed) it means there something has happened to the agent so that he has been transformed ethically. 
65
 In the previous chapter, it was argued that some minor points of Bhaskar’s early book (Bhaskar, 1975) can be 
actively interpreted as providing a sense of what ‘non-agential’ would be like: it would be in the mode of 
moment (event) caused by extrinsic circumstance; the ‘non-agential’ is a moment (event), not an intentional 
action but a moment of happening caused only by the other beings (other than my agential being). Here, a 
crucial point is that the existence of the others is the necessary condition of the ‘non-agential moment’, so 




transformation is truly ethical rather than spontaneous choice, there must have been happening in 
the non-agential moment of encountering the other. This indicates that the birth place of ethics is 
not in the agential being itself (if it were, it would become a kind of natural necessity), nor in the 
agent’s dialectical movement (although it will be constructed as ethical rationality in the movement 
after the birth66), but in the moment of encounter with the other. Therefore, while Bhaskar finds the 
origin and the possibility of ethics from ethical alethia implicit in all beings,67 and agents’ freedom68 
in the concrete world of reality, it is argued here that ethics cannot be conceived as originated in 
such agential movement of oneself, but is only possible in the face of the other, who is irreducible to 
my agential centredness and whose otherness is ultimate alterity to which my freedom should be 
subject, otherwise it has to be subject to my freedom. Ethics is, therefore, somehow contrary to 
freedom. What makes difference is the other. 
Finally, therefore, this distinctiveness of ethics from freedom renders the argument that the 
concept of ‘the other’ should be considered as categorically distinct from the general usage of being 
(or human agency). As has been argued, the non-agential happening is only possible by ‘coming’ of 
the other prior to my agential reflection upon it. To conceive the other as the necessary condition of 
the ‘non-agential moment’ demands that we distinguish the concept of ‘the other’ from the concept 
of agential being. In Bhaskar’s account there is no such distinction between the I agent and the other; 
rather they are all categorised into one concept of human agency. It is true that I am an agent of my 
own and the other is also an agent of her own. But the category at work here is not genuine 
distinction between the I and the other, but homologous concept of the agency (hence it is an 
agential-centred form of explanation). But if we take seriously the significance of the non-agential 
moment, that is, to uncover the distinctiveness of ethics from freedom, or in other words, its causal 
effect of the birth of ethics, then the other as the very condition of the moment should be 
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 This point of argument will be presented in the following chapter. 
67
 In this case, each agent is conceived as an agency of the ethical alethia in its time-space, geo-historical 
specific context. Thus it is fundamentally a form of agential-centred explanation.  
68
 Here the agent’s freedom is an inclusive usage that includes transformative negation, which in turn includes 
explanatory critique entailed in the fact-to-value formula that renders ethical naturalism. 
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considered as a distinct category in social life. Therefore, the other is not simply another agent like 
me; she is also the other person who, by coming to me, may give to me a birth of ethics, which is 
impossible by my agency alone.69     
How can ethics be described in its outset, and what would be its significance? These 
questions will be explored in the following chapter, through a reading of the philosophy of Levinas. 
First, however, it should be said that there are some points in Bhaskar’s theory that adumbrate the 
possibility of the non-agential moment. For example, his phrase about agency, ‘radically transformed 
transformative praxis’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p.9), could be understood as meaning that the agency had 
already had the non-agential moment of facing the other, and has then been radically (ethically) 
transformed so that he may give the bread out of his mouth to another at the sacrifice of his 
freedom. But the accentuation of agential centredness has meant that Bhaskar’s CR has seemed not 
to give attention to, or to have been unable to give attention to, the non-agential moment and its 
significance; accentuation of the agential dimension has had the effect of attenuating the seemingly 
ontological distinctive dimension of otherness of the other. This dimension is called here a lacuna in 
critical realism, and it needs to be articulated in a proper way; a philosophy is needed for 
underlabouring this dimension. In the next chapter we will explore the possibility in Levinas’s 
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 This form of argument would be consistent with what Bhaskar calls philosophical ontology that is to 
delineate content of shape of the ontology of subject, Bhaskar, 2000, p.22; 26), with the role of philosophy as 
producing knowledge of necessary condition of the production of knowledge of a science (Bhaskar, 1998, p.8) 
or with the categorial and dispositional realism, establishing ‘contingently necessary constitutive truths of the 
world, i.e., the general contours of ontology’ (Hartwig, 2007, p.28). 
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Chapter 3 Otherness 
 
Introduction  
In previous chapters it has been argued that Bhaskarian ontology has a characteristic feature: 
agential-centredness. In his transcendental realist ontology being is understood as agential for its 
own intrinsic tendencies or powers. Hence his ontology is characterised as an agential-centred 
explanation of being. In Bhaskarian ontology, particularly when applied to social reality, the 
categorial distinction of the other person or otherness (alterity) of the other seems to be dissolved 
into the category of agential being. This led us to remark that his ontological realism, including his 
dialectical turn, although it was initiated by concern about the alienation of the other (of the 
underdeveloped countries), has resulted in attenuation of the significance of otherness by the 
accentuation of agential (actively relational) agency of being. The category of agential being has 
become the explanatory framework of social ontology at the cost of the distinctive category of 
otherness;70 the very concept of otherness (absolute alterity) has lost its significance by being 
dissolved into the parameter of agential being. This raises a sequence of questions: Is it possible to 
conceive otherwise than being-agential, or the non-agential moment? Is it possible to say about the 
real the other or alterity of the other? What significance would otherness have to Bhaskarian 
ontology? Could it fill the lacuna in the ontology?   
                                                          
70
 There are elements in Bhaskar’s philosophy that could be seen as indicating distinctiveness of otherness, for 
example his concepts of alterity as a form of real negation and of concrete singularity; the former as indicating 
pure otherness and the latter as indicating distinctiveness of each being. However, in both cases he did not 
attend sufficiently to the significance as otherness. Instead, he seemed to move on to explain how they are 
‘related’ in the dialectical process, in that, again, the agential active role of agent is taken as central.  
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In seeking to answer these questions, we bring to the fore the philosophy of Levinas. Levinas 
is known as a philosopher of four cultures;71 as a stranger to a country and one who suffered as a 
war hostage he himself could be called the other. Levinas’s philosophy is often called a philosophy of 
the other, in which he seeks to describe the significance of the other in the midst of the world of 
totality, where the same or the ontology of the same rules its mastery power in its freedom. By 
confronting Heideggerian ontology in particular, he puts the same aside and opens the path to 
infinity, which is concretely experienced in the encounter with the face of the other, the exteriority, 
in the non-agential moment; the path where ethics is born in the face of the other who brings my 
freedom into question, whose significance my agential movement cannot capture. The non-agential 
moment is a breach of agential being; the very moment where alterity of the other comes to pass; 
the genuine moment of transcendence that leaves a trace in the agential being, viz. ethics. In this 
chapter, therefore, we will read Levinas with particular reference to the non-agential moment and 
otherness. This reading will provide us with three points of argument: (1) a critique of agential-
centred explanation, (2) the placing of otherness within the structure of Bhaskarian ontology, and (3) 
a presentation of the significance of otherness for critical realist ontology, particularly in terms of 
otherness and ethical subjectivity.  
 
1. An Overview: The lived immediacy 
Putnam describes Levinas’s philosophy as a big idea, using an image of a hedgehog who 
knows one big thing rather than a fox who knows many small things (Critchley et al., 2002, p.8).  
Derrida72 calls it an ethics of ethics, since ‘Levinas does not seek to propose … moral rules, does not 
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 Born in Lithuania into a Jewish family, deeply inspired by German philosophy but living most of his adult life 
in France, he is called a philosopher of four cultures.  
72
 The work of Levinas was first introduced to the English speaking world by Derrida, particularly in his essay on 
Levinas, ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ (first published in 1964, later included in his book, Writing and Difference), 
which remains ‘unsurpassed in its analytic acuity’ (Bergo, 2011).  The work was received first by some 
philosophers from a Christian background, then by others from different disciplines, such as those seeking for 
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seek to determine a morality, but rather the essence of the ethical relation in general [that] … is an 
Ethics of ethics … an Ethics without law and without concept, which maintains its non-violent purity 
only before being determined as concepts and laws’ (Derrida, 2004, p.138).73 Exploring an ethics of 
ethics is, for Levinas, to seek ‘conditions of possibility of any interest in good actions or lives’, or the 
origin of ethics, in that he attempts to describe the rise and repetition of the face-to-face encounter 
with the other human person (Bergo, 2011). This encounter is an event or relation at the 
precognitive level, that is, before the work of comprehension of being or before ontology begins.74  
For Levinas, ethics proceeding ontology as the first philosophy where ‘ethics is understood as a 
relation of infinite responsibility to the other person’ (Critchley et al., 2002, p.8). In his view, the 
event is itself ethical so that it renders the birth of subjectivity, not in the sense of being master of its 
own but in the sense of being responsive to the other, being subjective to the other in a ‘continuum 
of sensibility and affectivity’ (Bergo, 2011). Such a responsibility defines human being first as ethical 
subjectivity before she becomes an active agent of its own being. In that sense Levinas’s philosophy 
is a ‘defence of subjectivity’ (Levinas, 2007, p.26), far from the modernist sense of ego-subjectivity 
that Descartes inscribed into modern philosophy, but rather an ethical subjectivity, which is born in 
the face-to-face with the other. Thus Kang calls his philosophy a philosophy of face of the other or an 
apology of subjectivity in the sense of ethical subjectivity (Kang, 2005).  
The face-to-face encounter as an existential event at the precognitive or the pre-intentional 
level means a moment of lived immediacy; it is a lived immediate before being mediated by 
consciousness through conceptualisation; before the distance from the other is filled by the 
mediation (Levinas, 2007, p.44). This lived immediacy is claimed as the locus where alterity of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
an ethics of deconstruction and those with an interest in the place of ethics in literature. Levinas’s influence is 
also found in feminist discourses, analytic philosophy, American pragmatism and in anthropology and social 
science as an imposing profile for ethics in those fields. For a more detailed discussion of Levinas’s influence, 
see, Critchley et al., 2002, pp. 1-5.  
73
 As such, Levinas’s ethics is not in the sense of traditional discourses of ethics.  As Bergo points out: ‘If ethics 
means rationalist self-legislation and freedom (deontology), the calculation of happiness (utilitarianism), or the 
cultivation of virtues (virtue ethics), then Levinas's philosophy is not an ethics’ (Bergo, 2011). 
74
 As will be seen below, the ontology concerned here is Heideggerian ontology, of which Levinas makes a 
fundamental critique from the position of priority of ethics.  
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other human is experienced, and the moment that transcendence comes to pass before such alterity, 
the distance, is absorbed into the same. It is not a moment of knowing the other; rather it is a 
moment in which the other signifies himself to me. Therefore, Levinas’s exploration is an effort to 
describe both the meaning and the signification of the lived immediacy and how the I and the other 
come to the moment. It is in this moment that transcendence, existence and the human other are 
found, together with their significance for an agential being.75 And it is the moment that adumbrates 
an answer to our central question of what the non-agential moment would be like.  
How then, does Levinas describe this immediacy? He began his philosophical journey by 
adapting the phenomenological method from his principal teachers, Husserl and Heidegger,76 but 
extended their approach in a unique way. Following Husserl, he took phenomenological reduction 
because it enabled him to go beyond the unreflective naivety, beyond the empirical givens of sense 
data toward the scientific search for ‘the a priori structures that give meanings to those seeming 
givens’. However, while he maintained the phenomenological method, he was not substantively 
committed to it because the intentional analysis of Husserlian phenomenology, based on the 
mastery work of transcendental ego, cannot grasp the significance of the other (footnote for 
transcendental ego from Bergo note).  This is because ‘the other is not a phenomenon but an 
enigma, something ultimately refractory to intentionality and opaque to the understanding’ 
(Critchley et al., 2002, pp.7-8).77 With the suspicion of excessive intellectualism of Husserlian 
phenomenology, Levinas turned to Heideggerian ontology, which takes a worldly approach to the 
concrete; to a priori structures of ‘Dasein’ (human being), which is called ‘existential’. This is a 
fundamental ontology that seeks to grasp the existential engagement of human being with things or 
other people in her rich variety of intentional life, including emotional, practical and theoretical life; 
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 Bergo points to transcendence, existence and the other human as three themes that shine light on Levinas’s 
exploration of lived immediacy (Bergo, 2011).  
76
 Heidegger succeeded Husserl as holder of the chair of philosophy in Freiburg in1928 (Levinas, 2001, p.viii). 
For a brief account of the dynamic of attraction and repulsion of Husserl for Heidegger see, Wheeler, Michael, 
‘Martin Heidegger’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/heidegger/>. 
77
  For Levinas’s exploration of enigma, see, ‘Enigma and Phenomenology’ in Basic Philosophical Writings. 
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it is itself ‘an act in which we consider life in all its concreteness’ or an analysis of the factual 
situation of human being.78 In this ontology, things or others are understood through the existential 
relationality of Dasein with them. Thus, in order for such ontological truth to be possible it is 
presupposed to understand a priori structures of being, that is, the existential horizon of that being, 
upon which things and others appear and by which they are comprehended (p.9).  This was the 
advantage point of Heidegger over Husserl which allowed Levinas to grasp human being in its variety 
of intentional life through concrete existentials.  
However, Levinas left Heidegger’s climate of thinking when the teacher turned to National 
Socialism, a move that was traumatic for Levinas and, to some extent, deterministic for his future 
work, with its shift from fundamental ontology to the first philosophy of ethics (p.8).79 Facing the 
deeply disturbing question of how a brilliant philosopher like Heidegger could have become a Nazi in 
such a short time, Levinas noticed the danger in the philosopher’s ontology: ‘the danger in all this is 
that the philosopher risks losing sight of the other person in his or her quest for ontological truth’ 
(p.13). Heidegger’s ontology of Being was, for Levinas, an ontology of faceless Being (Kang, 2005, 
p.77).80 Thus at the kernel of Levinas’s philosophy was the critique of this faceless ontology, which 
he terms totality, and his description of the way out of it, the face-to-face encounter with the other 
as a lived immediacy that brings forth ethical subjectivity in its response to the other before its 
ontological grasp of the other in its horizon of comprehension.81 His unique path from ontology to 
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 After Wilhelm Dilthey, Heidegger calls this factual situation of human being ‘facticity’ (Critchley et al., 2002, 
p.9).  
79
 Levinas himself suffered the Nazi horror as he was captured by the Nazis and imprisoned in Fallingsbotel, a 
labour camp for officers. During the war, his Lithuanian family was murdered (Bergo, 2011).   
80
 Levinas critiques western philosophy for its tendency to de-personalise or reject personhood of human 
being by reducing individuals to a medium of history (Hegel, Marx), a modality of God or nature (Spinoza), or a 
part of structure or system (structuralism), which is deemed as bringing a consequence of discourse of death 
of human or death of subjectivity. Heidegger seems for Levinas the most representative of his time. Against 
this Levinas’s works, together with those of Michael Polanyi, are regarded as exposing the tendency of the 
faceless thought (Kang, 2005, pp.76-77). 
81
 Although Levinas had a paper to write on Heidegger, ‘Martin Heidegger and Ontology’ (Levinas, 1996), which 
appeared in fragmentary form a year before Heidegger joined the Nazis in 1933, he abandoned the project. 
However, in 1951 he wrote an important essay on his ethical critique of Heidegger, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?’ 
(Peperzak et al., 1996), where the term ‘ethics’ appears with its significance for the first time in his philosophy 
(Critchley et al., 2002, p.10).  
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ethics was therefore his way to reveal the ethical significance of ontology from the moment of 
encounter with the other. This is well brought out in his mature works, Totality and Infinity and 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Particularly in the second book, he sought to describe the 
way in which to live out the ethical significance of the immediate relationship with the other in the 
course of one’s life, or, in his words, how the saying can be said in spite of the necessary betrayal. 
Here we find his description of ethical subjectivity living out its ethical rationality. Compared with 
Bhaskar’s ethical agency living out its dialectical rationality, one can see how the ethical significance 
of the other makes a difference to the ethical life of the responsible subject; it is the difference that 
is made, in our terms, when our stance of seeing the world is changed from the agential-centred 
mode, where freedom is the first principle, to the non-agential mode where ethics is the first 
principle. Let us start from Levinas’s critique of ontology and his description of the ethical 
significance of the lived immediacy. 
 
2. Critique of Ontology and the Non-Agential Moment 
Why was ontology so troubling for Levinas?82 With the reflection of his time, Levinas 
declared that ontology dominated by the search for surpassing of being deserves to be called 
barbarous.83 In particular, he was suspicious of Heidegger’s ontology featured in Being and Time for 
its possible links with the barbarianism that he himself had suffered (Levinas, 2001, pp.ix-x).84 For 
Levinas the faceless ontology, by losing sight of the other, seemed to provide a philosophical ground 
for identifying human being with the place of surpassing in terms of the spontaneous movement of 
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 Before proceeding further, it should be mentioned that ‘ontology’ here is Heideggerian ontology, not the 
critical realist ontology of Bhaskar. However, the fundamental critique of the losing sight of the other can be 
applied to both. Hence Levinas’s critique of it and his recovering of the face in philosophy may work to fill the 
gap, or lacuna, of the dimension of otherness that we have found in Bhaskar’s ontology.     
83
 Levinas grasped the value of European civilisation as the search for a way to surpass being, which he 
considered as linked with the tragic despair and the crimes of the Nazi war (Levinas, 2001, p.x). 
84
 Though Levinas considered Heidegger’s Being and Time as one of the four or five greatest books in 
philosophy, he continued to hold the suspicion (Levinas, 2001, p.ix).  
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Dasein, a movement that is characterised by its power to grasp other beings or entities within its 
comprehensive horizon.   
Let us turn to Levinas’s critique of this ontology. Fundamentally for Levinas the projective 
movement of Dasein is the movement of the same, which Levinas terms totality (Levinas, 2007). 
Though Dasein meets up with others (entities) so that it may move from one stage to another, what 
Heidegger terms ‘stepping over to’ (Bergo, 2011),85 this is the operation of a Dasein that has already 
a vague understanding of Being of those others. In Heidegger’s words:  
We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be 
grasped and fixed. But this vague average understanding of Being is still a Fact. … What 
we seek when we inquire into Being is not something entirely unfamiliar, even if 
proximally we cannot grasp it at all. (Heidegger, 2005, p.25) 
The vague average understanding of Being, that is, something that is not entirely unfamiliar 
with Being, indicates that others have been grasped within the horizon of Dasein, although vaguely, 
and Dasein’s movement is based on this comprehension.  This is because horizon for Heidegger is 
conceived as that ‘which provides the limits for certain intellectual activities performed “within” it’ 
(Heidegger, 2005, p.1, see note 4). Working in the vague familiarity within the horizon of the Dasein 
is the mode of the same. Thus, to say that others are not significant with their alterity to Dasein but 
they are mediated by Being of them, which is already familiar, though vaguely, within the 
comprehensive horizon of Dasein, is to affirm that such operation is characterised with the primacy 
of the same over the other.  As Levinas points out: 
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 Heidegger described the projective element of transcendence in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
(1982) with the terms ‘stepping over to … as such’. In the work one can see Heidegger’s early departure from 
Husserl’s phenomenology, while he retains the priority of Dasein’s being-in-the-world for transcendence 
(Bergo, see, note 13). 
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This primacy of the same was Socrates’ teaching: to receive nothing of the 
Other86 but what is in me, as though from all eternity I was in possession of what comes 
to me from the outside – to receive nothing, or to be free, (Levinas, 2007, p.43) 
This operation of the same, projecting meaning of others within the horizon of the same, is 
what Levinas calls mediation through conceptualisation, which is characteristic of western 
philosophy (pp.42-44).87  For Levinas, the primacy of ontology is to affirm ‘the priority of Being over 
existents; subordinating the relation with entities (the Other) to the relation with Being’.88 It is the 
role of the same to draw out Being from its vagueness by offering it a third term, like a concept, then 
to link it with entities; this is called mediation. Thus Being, when comprehended by a third term, 
mediates the relation with existents to the I who offered that third term. Levinas calls this operation 
accomplishment, in that ‘[t]he relation with the other is here accomplished only through a third 
term which I find in myself’; or surrender, in that ‘an exterior and foreign being is to surrender itself 
to intermediaries’ (p.44). For Levinas this philosophy is ontology, since that is his ‘general term for 
any relation to otherness that is reducible to comprehension or understanding’ of the same 
(Critchley et al., 2002, p.11); hence he says, ‘Philosophy is an egology’ (Levinas, 2007, p.44).  
The chief concerns here for Levinas are terror and betrayal. It is terror, as far as other human 
beings are concerned, that ‘brings a free man under the domination of another’ who is the 
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 For Levinas, ‘The absolutely other is the Other’ (Levinas, 2007, p.39). Here the capitalised Other is the 
personal other, the you, translating the original French ‘autrui’, a key term in Levinas’s philosophy. For Levinas 
the other as the breach of totality is human other, the other person; hence the other for Levinas is signified as 
a widow, an orphan or a stranger, but not God. In his two major works he insists that the other is not god 
because the concept of god itself is already an idealistic status in human perception of consciousness; it can be 
an example of idealism as egoism in that the I can endorse meaning upon it according to its interest (Critchley 
et al., 2002, p.11).  
87
 Levinas’s critique of the conception, horizon, can be clearly seen in the following:  
To see is hence always to see on the horizon. The vision that apprehends on the horizon does 
not encounter a being out of what is beyond all being. Vision is a forgetting of the there is 
because of the essential satisfaction, the agreeableness [agreement] of sensibility, enjoyment, 
contentment with the finite without concern for the infinite. In fleeing itself in vision 
consciousness returns to itself. (Levinas, 2007, p.191)  
88
 Levinas uses the terms ‘Existence and existents’ to address what Heidegger calls ‘Being and beings’.  
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knowing;89 hence there is a great betrayal because it is a process of depriving existents (the known) 
of their alterity in order to be mediated within the given mediatory frame (Levinas, 2007, p.44). This 
terror to and betrayal of the other in the work of ontology is the key point of Levinas’s critique, 
because it is the ground for taking freedom over ethics, the ground that makes a justification of the 
terror and betrayal.  
To affirm the priority of Being over existents is to already decide the essence of 
philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who is an existent (the 
ethical relation), to a relation with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits 
the apprehension, the domination of existents (a relationship of knowing), subordinates 
justice to freedom. … In subordinating every relation with existents to the relation with 
Being the Heideggerian ontology affirms the primacy of freedom over ethics. (Levinas, 
2007, p.45, emphasis original)   
As already noted, the mercilessness of the war that Levinas had suffered drove his 
intellectual life into a struggle with the problems of violence and injustice. What he found was that 
inevitable interconnected features at the heart of western philosophy generate this violence and 
injustice: freedom, possession and power constituting ontology as the first philosophy (Levinas, 2007, 
pp.45-46). ‘Ontology, which reduces the other to the same, promotes freedom … of the same, not 
allowing itself to be alienated by the other’ (p.42); the same maintains itself against the other while 
suppressing or possessing the other through thematisation and conceptualisation. The other can 
only be retained in the form of possession when it is appropriated within the horizon of the same 
while being denied its independence, its alterity. In this philosophy therefore ‘“I think” comes down 
to “I can”’, that is, I can possess the other within my comprehension. So he argued, ‘ontology as first 
philosophy is a philosophy of power’. In this spontaneous movement, human being for Heidegger is 
defined as builder and cultivator, for whom freedom is prior to justice, prior to obligation to the 
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 As for things, they are the generality by which the individual (which alone exists) is apprehended through 
the work of ontology (Levinas, 2007, p.44). 
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other (pp.46-47). But for Levinas it is totality that manifests itself in war (p.21) as it always seeks to 
absorb others into its horizon, which is itself a totalising and synoptic thought system (p.40). Levinas 
warns that such movement of the same leads to imperialist domination, to tyranny like Hitler’s 
Nazism that he himself suffered. In his words, ‘Heideggerian ontology, which subordinates the 
relationship with the Other to the relation with Being in general … leads inevitably to another power, 
to imperialist domination, to tyranny’ (pp.46-47). Through its exercise of freedom totality erases the 
distance between the same and the exteriority by absorbing the latter into the comprehensive 
horizon of the former. And by erasing the distance the radical alterity of the other is destroyed 
(pp.33-34).  
3. The Non-Agential Moment  
Now let us turn to our question of the non-agential moment. Fundamental ontology for 
Heidegger is characterised with the movement of Dasein in its mode of Being-in-the-world, which is 
the movement in seeking for ontological truth. Heidegger’s explanation of Dasein is therefore an 
explanation of human being from the point of the spontaneous and free movement of human mind, 
which can choose ways for projecting its interests. In this sense it has a degree of consistency with 
Bhaskar’s agential-centred form of explanation, particularly when the human agent is concerned.  It 
is worth remembering here that Bhaskar explains reasons as consisting of desires and beliefs, which 
are first gained from the situation to which agent is disposed and arranged in the pre-existing society. 
The human agent with reflective capability can act on reasons in freedom in ways that meet her 
interests. Heidegger’s horizon as a limit upon the movement of Dasein can be seen as consistent 
with Bhaskar’s explanation of reasons as limiting agents’ action in certain ways according to its 
reasons and interests. It is crucial that in both cases of ontology the explanatory stance of human 
being seems to be the agential movement of human being; human being as agent of its innate or 
inner structures, whether comprehensive horizon or reasons. However, it should also be noted that 
there is significant difference between them, particularly in regard to the other. While Heideggerian 
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ontology, as Levinas critiques, reduces the other (an entity) to the comprehensive horizon of the 
knower,90 Bhaskar’s critical ontology claims the independence of the other for its irreducible intrinsic 
tendencies that make possible knowledge of it for the knower. However, the point of argument here 
is that in both cases, the first principle for explanation is given to the agential movement of being: 
for Heidegger it is the agential movement of Dasein in grasping the other into its comprehension, 
and for Bhaskar it is the agential hence causal features of the intrinsic tendencies that make it 
intelligible. Human being for Bhaskar’s case is understood by its agential action on reasons in 
freedom. Thus, if Heidegger explains relations with the other ‘only by’ agential movement of human 
being, Bhaskar’s explanation of it ‘begins from’ the agential movement of human agent. However 
despite this difference, which is of itself crucial, the agential movement of human being is central to 
both cases.  
Yet the question of the non-agential has not been answered. Just as the question remains 
open in Bhaskar’s ontology, so it does in Heidegger’s. It is Levinas who provides an answer to the 
question. His serious confrontation with Heidegger’s ontology allows him to grasp what is not the 
agential moment, or what precedes the agential moment, that is, ethics, which is brought forth from 
the non-agential moment in its character. Let us consider the following passage:   
A calling into question of the same – which cannot occur within the egoist 
spontaneity of the same – is brought about by the other. We name this calling into 
question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. The strangeness of the 
Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions is accomplished as a 
calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics. (Levinas, 2007, p.43) 
In the world of totality, where the ontological movement of the same as an exercise of 
freedom remains as fundamental, escape from the same cannot be generated from the same itself; 
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 So Bhaskar charges Heidegger with anthropocentrism or anthropic fallacy, which is a form of epistemic 
fallacy, and is fundamental to irrealism (Hartwig, 2007, pp.40-41). 
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‘it is not an operation of thought’ (p.40). Thus, to ask about the possibility of escape from the same 
is to ask whether non-comprehensive relation is possible or, in our term, to ask whether non-
agential moment is possible. Levinas claims for the possibility. However it is not a movement that 
the I can make, but a moment or an instant that is possible only by coming of the other, that is, the 
moment of encounter with the other person. In this sense, ‘the other person is an event I can 
neither predict nor control’ (Bergo, 2011). The experience of the other in that moment is an 
experience of breach of totality because the other, who is refractory to my categories and over 
whom I have no power, disturbs the I with her strangeness and alterity (Levinas, 2007, pp.39-40). 
This is an experience of transcendence, which Levinas calls infinity. 
To claim infinity as the breach of totality is not like turning a coin to the other side. Rather, 
Levinas points out the structure between two: the precedence of infinity over totality. Inspired by 
the Cartesian picture of the relation of the I and God, Levinas explains the idea of infinity as that 
infinity always exceeds the idea of infinity in me. There is always distance between the infinity and 
the idea of the infinity in me because the former surpasses the latter. And ‘infinity is characteristic to 
a transcendental being; the infinite is the absolutely other’ (p.49) who cannot be reduced to my 
spontaneous consciousness; who is ‘preeminently non-adequation and the surplus of being over 
thought’ (p.27); infinity as transcendence in its expression always comes to pass. Inspired by 
Descartes but not wholly following his way, Levinas concretises the idea of infinity by replacing 
Descartes’s god with the concrete relation with the other person (p.50). He explains this by 
uncovering different layers of Dasein, different from Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein; he claims 
that ‘Dasein's understanding of Being presupposes an ethical relation with the other human being, 
that being to whom I speak and to whom I am obliged before being comprehended’ (Critchley et al., 
2002, p.10). This primordial relation with the other is more fundamental than my ontological 
comprehension of it. Here ‘the comprehension of Being in general cannot dominate the relationship 
with the Other. The latter relationship commands the first’ (Levinas, 2007, p.47). A relation 
exceeding ontological relation of the same is named ethical relation. And an ethical relation 
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concretely happens in the moment of encounter with the other person who exceeds the idea of the 
other in me. Levinas calls the way that the other presents himself ‘face’ (p.50). Ethics in this sense is 
‘a location of a point of otherness, or exteriority’ (Critchley et al., 2002, p.15), and face is what 
makes it possible to describe the lived immediate.  
The notion of the face … opens other perspective: it brings us to a notion of 
meaning prior to my Sinngebung and thus independent of my initiative and my power. 
It signifies the philosophical priority of the existent over Being, an exteriority that does 
not call for power or possession, an exteriority that is not reducible, as with Plato, to 
the interiority of memory and yet maintains the I who welcomes it. It finally makes 
possible the description of the notion of the immediate … The immediate is the face-to-
face. (Levinas, 2007, pp.51-52) 
The immediate is the moment that the violent grasp of the agential movement of the I is 
called into question by facing the other. Ethics therefore is the fundamental critique of the agential 
movement of the I; by questioning its naïve spontaneity while at the same time arousing a desire for 
infinity, that is, a desire to transcend the finite involvement (embodiment) of the I in the world 
towards what is desirable evermore.91 Ethics is in this sense the fundamental critique that makes 
possible any meaningful (ethical) change of the I.  
Now we have an answer from Levinas to the question of the possibility of non-agential 
moment.  By disclosing the nature of the non-agential moment, he tells us more than whether such 
moment is possible or exists. The answer discloses the significance of the non-agential moment for 
the agential movement, viz. ethical significance. This moment is in fact a constituent part of ethical 
agency. Whereas in Bhaskar’s critical realism ethics is argued in forms of natural realism, which is 
disclosed by an agential movement, that is, explanatory critique, for Levinas ethics cannot be an 
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 Levinas often uses the capitalised Desire to refer to a desire for infinity. In the same spirit, he uses the term 
metaphysics which precedes physical embodiedness or involvedness of the I, stating that, ‘Ontology 




operation of agential movement at the outset; rather it precedes the movement. Face signifies itself 
before being explained and affects upon us before being conceptualised, not asking to absorb its 
alterity into the agential comprehension but commanding the agent to act in a certain way to be 
ethical, otherwise we forget the face; as Bergo points out, ‘[w]e are always already in social relations; 
more importantly, we have always already been impacted by the expression of a living other. 
Because this impact is affective, because transcendence is not conceptualizable, we forget the force 
the other's expression has on us’ (Bergo, 2011). We may forget the face of the other, but 
fundamentally the moment of face-to-face encounter with the other is itself ethical and the 
fundamental critique, calling all agential movement, including explanatory critique, into question. 
From this it can be said that the moment of facing the other is the very ground of any explanatory 
‘critique’ or even the origin of the ‘critical’ of critical realism, so that it pushes all pursuit of 
ontological truth to be truthful.92 Then what would be produced from the face-to-face? Levinas 
claims that it is responsibility carried out by ethical subjectivity.  
 
4. Responsibility and the Birth of Ethical Subjectivity from the 
Non-Agential Moment  
Levinas’s ethics is itself an event, not an instantiation of an ethical idea (Levinas, 2007, 
p.199); it is an event of face-to-face encounter with the other from which ethics begins or happens. 
At the moment of the revelation or expression of the face what is required for the I is not to fix it 
into my totalising thought, but first to respond to the face. To respond to the other, despite one’s 
totalitarian tendency, is itself the first ethical significance that the I gains in the presence of the 
other. Levinas calls this the first teaching (pp.50, 171), which could lead the I to take responsibility 
for the other up to the point of being ethical subjectivity. In the Cartesian sense, subjectivity is 
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 ‘Truth and truthfulness’ are the cornerstone for Wright in developing his critical realist approach to religious 
education (Wright, 2007). In Chapter 6, the perspective we gain here will be integrated with his approach.  
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affirmed by the subject’s active and cognitive activities upon the object. Contrary to this, Levinas 
claims that the true meaning of subjectivity is gained when the subject welcomes the other. It is 
subjectivity of hospitality that accepts, welcomes and takes responsibility for the other who is 
hungry, and suffers injustices (Kang, 2005, pp.32-33). In facing the ethical exigency of the other the 
ethical subject submits to the will of the other and offers its being for the other despite putting itself 
in pain in doing so. This is moral creation of the I who displaces its centre to the other. But in order 
for all this to be possible Levinas claims first of all the necessity of the separation of the I from the 
world. It is here that his description of ethical subjectivity begins.  
In fact, Levinas introduces two types of subjectivity: subjectivity of the separated I gained 
from enjoyment, dwelling and work in the world, and the subjectivity gained from hospitality (pp.40-
41). The former is a necessary condition of the latter, and indicates the necessity of the separation of 
the I from the world (and the other) because without the separation there would be no ‘encounter’ 
or ‘otherness’, hence no ‘ethics’ at all. This subjectivity is not like Cartesian abstract subjectivity, but 
is ‘a corporeal being of man’ (Levinas, 2007, p.175), who is in need and feels hunger and pain.93 The 
corporeal being has to live by elements that satisfy his need and hunger. But need, unlike 
Heideggerian anxiety, signifies ‘a happy dependence’ and capability of satisfaction which gets filled 
(p.115). Thus, with satisfaction of need, the dependency turns into enjoyment94 in that I experience 
myself as being sovereign for pursuing my happiness, which is essentially egoist without reference to 
the other: ‘In enjoyment I am absolutely for myself. Egoist without reference to the Other, I am 
alone without solitude, innocently egoist and alone … entirely deaf to the Other … like a hungry 
stomach’ (p.134). Enjoyment is to live from elements but not to possess them, because the world of 
elements is always non-possessable and remains as anonymous and indeterminable; I have no 
control over the elements but I am in them (p.130). Surrounded and threatened by the 
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 In contrast to Husserl, Levinas emphasises the corporeality as prior to intentional consciousness (Kang, 2005, 
p.145). 
94
 Contrary to Heidegger, who sees life as constituted fundamentally from anxiety, Levinas sees life as 
enjoyment. So for Heidegger we eat to live (or exist) but for Levinas eating itself is life (Kang, 2005, p.145). 
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indeterminable elements the corporeal being needs to separate itself from the world of elements; it 
needs somewhere to sojourn to protect itself. Dwelling of the separated I in a home is the primordial 
mode of being, which is an ontological event.  In Levinas’s words: ‘To separate oneself, to not remain 
bound up with a totality, is positively to be somewhere, in the home, to be economically. The 
“somewhere” and the home render egoism, the primordial mode of being … the corporeal being of 
man’ (p.175, emphasis original). Levinas takes dwelling of the separated I as that which holds up 
subjectivity because on this ground new forms of relation with the world can be developed: work 
and possession. By dwelling in home the subject, separated from the threat of the world, has its own 
place where he is able to represent and control the world; in dwelling the subject of enjoyment 
turns to the subject of work. And by dwelling and work the subject can now possess elements of the 
world as things; he can grasp elements then make them ‘things’ by removing the anonymousness of 
them and then giving them meaning and functions; by naming them and presenting them to himself 
knowledge is produced;95 they become property. Thus enjoyment, dwelling and work have a dual 
dimension: they are the process of liberation of the corporeal being from the indeterminable world 
of elements so that they form interiority and the separated I, but at the same time they are the 
process of appearance of the totalitarian same to which the indeterminable elements are reduced as 
things and by which they lose their otherness or alterity by being fixed into concepts or knowledge 
(Kang, 2005, pp.140-143).  
The process of the establishment of the same as totality is not, however, entirely negative 
for Levinas. He also finds in it positive features. First, the separatedness and dwelling safely in a 
home is itself an experience of welcome by the other, whom Levinas calls the feminine for her 
tenderness and warmth. Because of this intimacy with the feminine one can go back home, back to 
its interiority, then be established as subjectivity. Thus the hospitality from the other is necessary for 
the establishment of interiority and subjectivity (pp.138-140). Second, Levinasian understanding of 
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 Levinas does not refute or reject the production of knowledge. Rather he considers the exercise of power 
through knowledge as an inevitable feature of work of the dwelling subject. He also considers it as an object of 
enjoyment (Kang, 2005, p.143). 
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life as ‘Being as love of life’ is taken positively because the corporeal being can welcome the other 
concrete manners from his experience of enjoyment and dwelling and goods that he makes, which 
he can offer for the other: ‘Thanks to his joy in living and his creation of a home, the human being is 
able to give and to receive the other into his space’ (Bergo, 2011).  
In spite of the positivity, however, Levinas does not find the ground of ethics from the 
separated I. This is because ethics comes about from the appearance of the other, who comes to 
pass the interiority. How does the other come? How can the coming to pass of the other be 
described? How can the face-to-face as the non-agential moment be described? These questions can 
be answered on the basis of understanding of Levinas’s distinction between phenomenon and 
expression. Phenomenon refers to the truth of the other being who is disclosed by work of the 
separated I, but it is not that of being itself, while expression refers to the mode of encounter with 
the other who is a being, and presents herself in the immediate moment: 
Being, the thing in itself is not, with the respect to the phenomenon, the 
hidden. ... The truth of disclosure is at most the truth of the phenomenon hidden under 
the appearances; the truth of the thing in itself is not disclosed. The thing in itself 
expresses itself. Expression manifests the presence of being, but not by simply drawing 
aside the veil of the phenomenon. It is of itself presence of a face and hence appeal and 
teaching, entry into relation with me-the ethical relation. (Levinas, 2007, p. 181, 
emphasis original) 
The I separated from the other, reaming in its interiority, is bound up with its phenomenality 
because all his work, that is the mode of existence of the separated I, manifests him in the absence 
of his being. Work does not express me but signals and symbolises me; in doing so it reveals me only 
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in concealing me. ‘To be expressed by one’s life, by one’s works, is precisely to decline expression’ 
(p.176),96 and 
The who involved in activity is not expressed in the activity … is simply signified 
in it by a sign in a system of signs, that is, as being who is manifested precisely as absent 
from his manifestation: a manifestation in the absence of being – a phenomenon. 
(p.178) 
The separated I living out of his works is surrounded by phenomena. This is the I who 
experiences things that are manifested by my agential movement and who is manifested by his 
works, all that is the production of the separated I; who meets himself as a phenomenon: ‘The 
phenomenon is the being that appears but absents itself from its apparition, corresponds exactly to 
the meaning of the phenomenon.’ Bound up with its phenomenality, it is not accidental but 
necessary for the separated I to forget transcendence (p.181). Trapped in the system of signs, the 
significance of all that is already said, infinity, a Desire beyond phenomenality, is attenuated then 
lost without breaking until the moment of ‘expression’ of being, viz. the face-to-face, comes to pass. 
Hence ‘the other's face is not an object. …. It is pure expression; expression affects me 
before I can begin to reflect on it’ (Bergo, 2011). Unlike phenomenon, expression comes to pass but 
leaves a trace in me, viz. affection. Expression as what comes to pass is an immediacy but it is a lived 
immediacy in that the corporeally separated I encounters the face of the other. The moment that 
the other expresses herself is always prior to my reflection upon it. It is the non-agential moment 
prior to my agential comprehension of it; it is a pre-cognitive moment.97 The other in this sense is 
exteriority that breaks interiority with its incommensurability (alterity), and reveals the insufficiency 
(phenomenality) of the interiority (Levinas, 2007, p. 179).  As Levinas puts it: 
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 But at the same time ‘the signs constitute and protect my privacy’ (Levinas, 2007, p.176). 
97
 Levinas often uses the term proximity to describe this moment: ‘The proximity of the Other, the proximity of 
the neighbor, is in being an ineluctable moment of the revelation of an absolute presence … which expresses 
itself’ (Levinas, 2007, 79). 
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By virtue of this relationship ... man does not permit himself to be deceived by 
his glorious triumph as a living being, and unlike the animal can know the difference 
between being and phenomenon, can recognize his phenomenality, the penury of his 
plenitude, a penury inconvertible to needs which, being beyond plenitude and void, 
cannot be gratified. (pp.179-80) 
But at the same time as the fundamental critique of interiority, the face, coming to pass as 
expression (giving her being, not a phenomenon) in the immediate moment, is always vulnerable to 
be forgotten or to be absorbed into my power of comprehension. Levinas calls the vulnerability and 
forgettableness nudity and defencelessness. In its defenceless nudity the face commands and 
summons, saying ‘Do not kill me’, an ethical vocation affecting me before my recognition; ‘a passive 
resistance to the desire that is my freedom’ (Bergo, 2011). Ethics as my response to the approach of 
the other, that is otherwise than or prior to my agential movement, is to ‘welcome her expression’ 
(Levinas, 2007, p.50). To welcome her expression is to hear her ‘destitution which cries out for 
justice’ and ‘is not to represent an image to oneself, but is to posit oneself as responsible’ for her, 
who is ‘thus the stranger, the widow, and the orphan’ (p.215), who dominate me with the ethical 
exigency (p.207) since they are deficient in something essential for their existence: home, spouse 
and parents (Bergo, 2011). With the ethical exigency, the other commands and summons me. Hence 
the other comes not from outside of me but from ‘above’ me, so that the relation with the other is 
not equal or correlative, but is essentially ‘asymmetrical’ (Levinas, 2007, p.216).98  
The ethical exigency arising out of invocation of the face of the other, which sets the relation 
with her to be essentially asymmetrical, ‘engenders me as responsibility; as responsible I am brought 
to my final reality’. Having set the separated I as responsibility, Levinas discloses how to respond to 
the other not in the mode of agential moment but at the very moment of the ethical relation. It is to 
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 As a description of my response, Levinas said that one cannot welcome the other with empty hands; rather 
one gives the bread to the other out of his mouth; a bread that is essential for his life. To take the essential 
need of the other as the first priority before me indicates the ethical relation is essentially asymmetrical.  
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attend to the presence of the other; it is to be oneself not in its phenomenality; to express oneself. 
‘Being attentive signifies a surplus of consciousness’ by the call of the other and it is ‘to recognize the 
mastery of the other, to receive his command, … to receive from him the command to command’ 
(p.179). To attend at the very moment of encounter with the other is to speak; to enter dialogue 
that is the straightforwardness of the face-to-face. Out of its phenomenality and out of mirror play, 
the I enters into the presence of the other in responsibility so that it takes its centre outside of its 
being but in the other: 
This is not a play of mirror but my responsibility, that is, an existence already 
obligated. It places the center of gravitation of a being outside of that being. The 
surpassing of phenomenal or inward existence does not consist in receiving the 
recognition of the Other, but in offering him one's being. To be in oneself is to express 
oneself, that is, already to serve the Other. The ground of expression is goodness. (p. 
183) 
Responsibility indicates ‘a soul capable of containing more than it can draw from itself’ 
(p.180). The command that the I receives from the other and the affection that the other leaves 
upon me is the very production of the first teaching. The term teaching designates the calling from 
the height, from the face of the other, not from my exploration or self-constructive knowing. It is not 
like the Socratic maieutics that prevails in education. Thus ‘the first teaching teaches this very height, 
tantamount to its exteriority, the ethical’. In doing so, it becomes critique that calls the naïveté of 
the direct impulse, the naïveté of the being exercising itself as a force on the move into question 
from the height; from the vulnerable face that makes the I feel ashamed of its naïve use of power. 
But this does not mean that the other is another force that violates me (p.171); rather 
His alterity is manifested in a mastery that does not conquer, but teaches. 
Teaching is not a species of a genus called domination, a hegemony at work within a 
totality, but is the presence of infinity breaking the closed circle of totality. (p.171) 
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The first teaching is not a scandal to reason. In the ontological sense of both Heidegger and 
Bhaskar, reason is constituted within its horizon or by the disposition and arrangement of an agent 
into the existing society. In this sense, reason is what is already in and familiar to me and on which I 
act. But the alterity of the other producing the first teaching should not be considered as a scandal 
to reason because there resides rational character of ethical relation. To see alterity of the other as 
scandal is to presuppose ‘the tranquil identity of the same’ as being freed from all participation and 
being independent of everything. But the other in ethical relation puts the freedom and ‘the brutal 
spontaneity of one’s immanent destiny’ into question, so that the other ‘put[s] an end to violence 
and contingency, and in this sense also, funds Reason’; the first teaching becomes the condition for 
all teaching. Different from Socratic maieutics, teaching as the idea of infinity in me is ‘a content 
overflowing the container [that] breaks with the prejudice of maieutics without breaking with 
rationalism’. It establishes rationality to be ethical (pp.202-204). In this sense, to be ‘being’, not a 
phenomenon, is to learn from the teaching; or in other words, to learn is the very mode of to be 
‘being’. That being, who is exposed to the other, is capable of ‘incessant reception of teaching’, 
hence ‘of incessant overflowing of self’ (p.204). The teaching therefore is the very ground of genuine 
sense of transformation beyond oneself and despite oneself.99 
That being in incessant learning is ethical subjectivity. At this juncture, Levinas explores the 
nature of the will of the I. The will is essentially the ‘for itself’; it is a desire for itself. All 
characteristics of the egoism, like spontaneity, freedom and agential movement, are essentially 
related with the will. How then can the will break out of the ‘for itself’? How can the will be 
integrated into responsibility? It is by patience through suffering. When the for itself as the essential 
nature of the will undergoes suffering it experiences the ultimate passivity where the will cannot 
work. Pain is the consciousness of the suffering. To be conscious of suffering means, despite the 
ultimate passivity, to be master of the object (suffering) in consciousness. In other words, ‘[i]n 
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 This is an important point for meeting Bhaskar. As will be argued later, Levinas’s ethical rationality can be 
consistent with Bhaskar’s ethical realism in so far as it is integrated with the very ground of explanatory 
critique from which Bhaskar argues for ethical realism.   
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suffering the free being ceases to be free, but, while non-free, is yet free’. And to have the 
consciousness of pain means that it has undergone a certain time of suffering; the duration is 
patience. Thus, ‘this ultimate passivity which nonetheless desperately turns into action and into 
hope, is patience – the passivity of undergoing, and yet mastery itself’ (p. 238). It is often said that 
death is the end of the will, but it is not the supreme ordeal of the will; that is suffering, because 
hatred is the case mainly when it desires not simply death of the other but the inflicting of death in 
suffering on the other. However, with the Desire for the other in responsibility, ‘violence remain[s] 
endurable in patience. It is produced only in a world where I can die as a result of someone and for 
someone.’ Such patience seems absurd, but it is possibly so only on the ground of ethical 
signification. Here the meaning of death, that is my death, is empted, since the gravity of my centre 
is displaced outside of myself ‘to will as Desire and Goodness limited by nothing’; hence it is the 
break through the crust of my egoism (p.239, emphasis original). ‘In this extreme consciousness, 
where the will reaches mastery in a new sense, where the death no longer touches it, … The egoism 






5. Ethical Subjectivity in Duration: the other-in-the-same 
In his book Totality and Infinity, Levinas discloses ethical subjectivity by stressing the 
distance and absolute separatedness between the I and the other. He designates the moment of 
encounter between two as the face-to-face moment, which is the moment of infinity that comes to 
pass, arousing responsibility in the I for the other, which is called ethics. In spite of the repetition of 
the face-to-face encounter in everyday life, it might be reasonable to suspect that ethics is 
contingent and dependent on the response of the I. In his second mature book, Otherwise than 
Being or Beyond Essence (Levinas, 1991), Levinas provides a new concept, ‘the Other-in-the-same’, 
to capture ‘the extraordinary everydayness of … responsibility’ (p.147), which indicates 
responsibility’s enduring. By unpacking the concept he shows the way in which responsibility 
endures through the birth of ethical subjectivity, which might grow with ethical rationality, and how 
… ‘responsibility and transcendence enter into the continuum of time and being ... and how … an 
investiture of this intensity passes into reason’ (Bergo, 2011). He begins the book with the meaning 
of transcendence:  
If transcendence has meaning, it can only signify the fact that the event of being, 
the esse, the essence, passes over to what is other than being … [it] is passing over to 
being’s other, otherwise than being. Not to be otherwise, but otherwise than being. And 
not to not-be. (Levinas, 1991, p.3, emphasis original) 
By this meaning of transcendence Levinas continues to undermine Heidegger, particularly by 
tackling the concept of being. It is because being is in war, like totality, that being needs to pass over 
to being’s other or beyond being.100 Levinas discloses the nature of being through etymological 
analysis of being; the meaning of being is rooted in essence, which in turn designates the esse as 
meaning ‘the process or event of being’.101 And ‘Esse is interesse’ and essence is interested. Thus 
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 ‘Beyond’ seems an appropriate term to denote the difference made by transcendence (Levinas, 1991, p.3). 
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 See, note 1 in Levinas, 1991, p.187.  
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‘being’ understood from its ‘essence’ is being-interested that is bound up in its interest; furthermore, 
being is understood as a verbal form (a verb that vibrates from and for its essence). Positively it 
confirms the conatus of being102 but negatively its dramatic form is egoism, whose deeds are at war 
against all others who are also defined as being-interested. Interested in itself, being remains in its 
presence; characteristic to its way of life is re-presentation out of its memory and history, including 
that of the other; being as present is without fissures or surprises (pp.4-5).103 
Otherwise than being denotes beyond being, whose gravitation of the centre is displaced to 
outside of it, in the sense not of contingency but of duration. Here the new concept of the Other-in-
the-same is introduced to designate the duration of responsibility. ‘It does not abrogate the de facto 
approach’ of the other person but, as the event increases to repeat in everyday life, ‘the question of 
immanence arises in regard to responsibility’s enduring out of the expansion of ethical events. The 
affection from the other left upon me as trace also repeats and expands so that ‘the status of a 
memory of sensuous events’ is framed as ‘sensibility as intrinsically meaningful, intrinsically beyond-
itself’. Sensibility and affectivity are now conceived as the very foundation on which the ethical 
subjectivity is built and resides. The new concept of ethical subjectivity, that is, the-other-in-the-
same, is described as an affective-sensible embodiment, who endures responsibility (Bergo, 2011).104 
Thus the Levinasian ethical subject is a sensible subject who subjects himself to the other. ‘[T]he 
form that this subjection assumes is that of sensibility or sentience. Sensibility is what Levinas calls 
“the way” of my subjection’.  By subjection to the other, ethics is lived in the sensibility which, in 
doing so, is exposed to the other, taking a call from the other upon ‘me’ so that ego turns to ‘me’, 
which is subject for Levinas, aroused in response to the other’s call (Critchley et al., 2002, pp.21-22):  
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 From a critical realist position Collier (1994) defines the conatus as the real (the intrinsic tendencies) of 
human being. 
103 As will be seen, ‘otherwise than being’, as contra to being, would be seen as ‘the overflowing of sense by 
nonsense, the bottomless passivity or subversion of essence’ (Levinas, 1991, p.164). 
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 By defining ethical subject as embodied being who is capable of hunger and enjoyment so that he can know 
what it means to give bread out of its mouth for the other. It is ‘the world’s shortest refutation of Heidegger’ 
that, Levinas claims, ‘Dasein is never hungry’ (Critchley et al., 2002, p.21). 
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Levinas phenomenologically reduces the abstract ego to me, to myself as the 
one who undergoes the demand or call of the other. As Levinas puts it, ... (‘Subjectivity 
is not the Ego, but me'). That is, my first word is not Descartes's ‘ego cogito' ('I am, I 
think’), it is rather ‘me voici!' ('here I am!' or 'see me here'), the word with which the 
prophet testifies to the presence of God. For Levinas, the subject arises in the response 
to the other's call. (Critchley et al., 2002, p.22) 
But to respond as a sensibility again indicates vulnerability or passivity, because enduring 
responsibility takes place 'on the surface of the skin, at the edge of the nerves' (Levinas, 1991, p. 15). 
The sensibility on the skin is termed proximity by Levinas,105 that is, a proximity to the other, not 
standing equally together with the other but substituting oneself for the other; substitution is the 
basis of the relation of proximity, and is ‘the centrepiece’ of the book (Critchley et al., 2002, p.22).     
Having said that the subject of sensibility is formed from the memory of affective-sensuous 
events, this memory cannot be regarded as like the memory that is a work of the I who does so in 
the form of representation. The appropriate term for this memory is, rather, the immemorial. 
Memory in the sense of the agential movement is representation of what is already ‘said’. But the 
affective signification aroused by the coming to pass of the other is left as trace upon me before my 
memory or recognition; it is beyond the said. That affective-sensuous trace Levinas calls the 
immemorial.  
The immemorial is not an effect of a weakness of memory, an incapacity to 
across large intervals of time, to resuscitate pasts too deep. It is the impossibility of the 
dispersion of time to assemble itself in the present, the insurmountable diachrony of 
time, a beyond of the said. It is diachrony that determines the immemorial. (Levinas, 
1991, p.38) 
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 The relation in proximity is also characterised with non-intentionality or non-teleology; it is disparate to 
being’s interestedness in itself (Levinas, 1991, p.90). 
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The immemorial however occurs in consciousness. Levinas calls this state anarchic. He 
describes it as a passion or source that occurs in consciousness but always slips away from the very 
play of consciousness; that is, re-presentation of an object, a form of domination of the interiority. 
He asks: 
How in consciousness can there be an undergoing or passion whose active 
source does not, in any way, occur in consciousness? This exteriority has to be 
emphasized. It is not objective or spatial, recuperable in immanence and thus falling 
under the orders of –and in the order of – consciousness; it is obsessional, non-
thematizable and, in the sense we have … defied, anarchic. (p.102) 
The infinitely exterior becomes an ‘inward’ voice (p.147), an anarchically resonant voice 
calling me to respond. Levinas distinguishes between the I and the me: the I is the mastery subject of 
consciousness while the me takes its form in ethical situation. It is the me who is called by the other; 
the one, saying ‘me voice!’; it is the ethical subjectivity born out of the anarchy.106 The me is ‘the 
ontological and metalogical structure of the anarchy’ (p.102) because it is born in anarchy: 
The subject is born in the beginninglessness of an anarchy and in the 
endlessness of obligation, gloriously augmenting as though infinity came to pass in it. In 
the absolute assignation of the subject the Infinity is enigmatically heard: before and 
beyond. The extent and accent of the voice in which the Infinite is thus heard will have 
to be made clear. (Levinas, 1991, p.140) 
So far all description of sensibility, proximity, the immemorial, anarchy and the anarchical 
birth of ethical subjectivity has been given as an explanation of the duration of responsibility; 
                                                          
106
 Undergoing affection, consciousness finds itself in a state of being against the will for itself; against its very 
nature. Thus to be an ethical subjectivity is already to be persecuted.  As Levinas says, ‘In these traits, we 
recognize a persecution; being called into a question prior to questioning … It is as though persecution by 
another were at the bottom of solidarity with another (Levinas, 1991, p.102). His description of persecution 
reminds patience that he described in Totality in Infinity as an essential feature of ethical subjectivity.  
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explaining it as more than an event but being otherwise; a duration.107 It is an answer to how infinity 
can reside within the finite without losing its significance; answering to how the infinitely exterior 
becomes an inward voice. With the notion of duration we may assume a structural form of ethics, 
called here ethical structure. It consists of the separation, the emergence of the same, the coming of 
the other at the non-agential moment, the rise of responsibility and the mysterious residue of 
responsibility in the same (duration). But it is not the end of Levinas’s ethics. There are two further 
constitutive parts to be included in the ethical structure: the movement of the same to the other, 
and the third party.108  
The anarchical inward voice has to be lived out through the ethical subjectivity. The term 
duration is designated to imply not only the residue of the other-in-the-same but also the movement 
of the same to the other in its responsibility. Here Levinas uses the terms ‘the saying and the said’ in 
order to describe the subject’s living out of the inward voice: the-same-for-the-other. As a simple 
explanation, the said can be the content of my words, identifiable with certain meaning or objects, 
which have already undergone the sign systems I have used. The said is ‘for the service of life as like 
an exchange of information through a linguistic system’; in this comprehension and representation 
of information are presupposed. Thus information, comprehension, representation and even the 
linguistic system itself are already the said. They are thematised, thematisable within the operation 
of the agential comprehension. But the saying is witness of the anarchical inward voice; ‘the saying is 
a non thematizable ethical residue of language that escapes comprehension, [but] interrupts’ the 
agential movement. It is ‘the very enactment of the movement from the same to the other’ 
(Critchley et al., 2002, p.18).  As the witness of the ethical voice resonating anarchically in me, the 
saying as for the same is to give oneself as signification to the other and for the other.  
The saying is to approach to the other as ‘communication which is not reducible to the 
phenomenon of truth’ because the saying is to express and expose itself, not a phenomenon, to the 
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 This structure form is heuristic and analytical for the explanatory purpose for ethics.  
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other. By exposing, the one undertakes for the other ‘the risky uncovering of oneself, in sincerity, 
the breaking up of inwardness and the abandon of all shelter, exposure to traumas, vulnerability’. 
The saying as the approach to the other expresses itself out of its home; being expelled, no longer 
dwelling; exposing itself to outrage, to insults and wounding. The subject of the saying is not in itself 
but is being turned to another, being turned inside out, not giving signs but becoming signs. The 
subject in the saying is open to separating itself from its own inwardness, making him 
disinterestedness, torn up from itself, the ‘one-penetrated-by-the-other’. Thus the saying is the most 
passive passivity, obedience, the sense of patience and pain, suffering without reason.109 It is folly 
and it is obsessional. But without this folly it would not be possible to go beyond essence (Levinas, 
1991, pp.48-50). And in spite of all that suffering, the subject of the saying is the way that the infinity 
passes the finite and as the subject bears witness to the infinity, so that the infinity has glory only 
through the subject (pp. 147-148).  
Ethics in the sense of the saying is the movement of the same to the other and for the other. 
At first it is in the form of a direct saying to the other as an exposure, as giving oneself as 
signification; it is the first teaching lived out by the same in proximity. But as time goes on, the 
repeated significance should be integrated in the constitution of life beyond proximity relation. The 
same at this juncture is not identified as being at war as marked in Totality and Infinity; war can be 
rationally mitigated on the ground of the ethical signification. A  Text can be written on this ground, 
and be unsaid under the light of the first teaching. The sensuous vulnerable and broken subject can 
be an author of such text. The possibility of ethical sensation is therefore always presupposed in the 
following agential constitution of life, rationality and tradition. So Levinas speaks of ‘pre-natural 
signification’ in the midst of the unavoidable return of the intentional consciousness in making those 
constitutions (Bergo, 2011).   
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 Levinas calls the subject of the saying ‘ipseity’, by which he denotes ‘the most concrete and particular core 
of the subject’ (Bergo, 2011): ‘The [I]pseity has become at odds with itself with its return to itself. The self-
accusation of remorse gnaws away at the closed and firm core of consciousness, opening it, fissioning it’ 
(Levinas, 1991, p.125). 
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In renouncing [Husserl's] intentionality as a guiding thread toward the eidos 
[formal structure] of the psyche … our analysis will follow sensibility in its prenatural 
signification to the maternal, where, in proximity [to what is not itself], signification 
signifies [as sincerity] before it gets bent into perseverance in being in the midst of a 
Nature. (Bergo, 2011, opt. Levinas, 1991, p. 68) 
Here a crucial question is raised: ‘how is the saying to be said?’, ‘how is the ethical saying to 
be conceptualized – and necessarily betrayed – within the ontological said?’ (Critchley et al., 2002, 
p.18). ‘How do responsibility and transcendence enter into the continuum of time and Being?’ 
(Bergo, 2011). The question is crucial because of the problem of inevitable thematisation of the 
saying in the course of life constitution. As seen in Totality and Infinity, Levinas’s ethical project was 
about overcoming or abandonment of ontology in the presence of ethical exigency and primacy, but 
in his second major book, he admits the unavoidability of the said that is alone the birth place of 
ontology, stating that, ‘contesting the abdication of the saying … everywhere occurs in this said’ 
(Levinas, 1991, p.44). Thus one might worry about the total abdication of the saying in the course of 
life constitution, while facing the unavoidability of the saying to be the said as our life is not always 
in proximity. Can the saying be the said? Even if so, there must be a certain degree of betrayal. Little-
by-little, Levinas becomes sensitive to this problem. The answer he explores is what we term ethical 
rationality.  
Here is the return of the intentional consciousness as the place of the ethical rationality. It 
would be called ethically assigned intentional consciousness. The term ‘illeity’ is most important 
here to address the very core of the ethical subjectivity, whose consciousness is the case only of 
ethically assigned consciousness. Illeity is ‘the coming of the order to which I am subjected before 
hearing it, or which I hear in my own saying … the pure trace of a “wandering cause”, inscribed in me 
… the anarchornism of inspiration or of prophecy’ (p.150). It indicates something the infinity left on 
the cognition which is ‘quite different from being and knowing’ (p.162) but by which reason is 
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assigned with responsibility in its conscious life. Inscribed in consciousness illeity can be regarded as 
the core and the ground on which ethical rationality is constructed. Indifferent to the dimension of 
illeity, Bhaskar’s ethical realism is based on the premises of the fact-to-value formula, which claims 
that value can be drawn from fact through explanatory critique. However, Elder-vass questions 
Bhaskar’s ethical naturalism for its unacknowledged a priori value; a value, he argues, that is always 
presupposed implicitly, explicitly or unbeknownst to oneself, when one derives a value from a fact 
through explanatory critique. He argues that explanatory critique can have its validity ‘on premises 
that there are already values and thus they do not derive values from facts’; rather it is likely value 
from value (Elder-vass, 2010, p.37). Elder-vass’s argument does not invalidate explanatory critique. 
Rather it unveils the fact that there is something in the deepest part of consciousness which grounds 
and pulses any sort of judgement to ethical. Illeity might be that something inscribed and resonant 
in consciousness on which ethical rationality is constructed so that one can live out the first teaching 
not only in personal relation (in proximity) but also in a wider social life. If illeity is something 
inscribed in the innermost part of mind, like the psyche, equally true is that it is inscribed so through 
the very skin of human sensibility! As sensuous we are such that all we can be is ethical, and would 
have ethical rationality each from its own ethical ground. Thus ethics is plural as face is plural, and is 
communicable between people and in society.110 This leads to the last point of the ethical structure: 
third party. 
With the entry of the third party and the consequent emergence of exigency for justice, 
Levinas becomes more sensitive to the role of consciousness. The third party is the one who is 
concerned about me, treating me as an other for him alongside of the other I face. He is alone 
ethical subject, and treats me as someone to be concerned about, someone to answer for out of his 
ethical obligation. Now the scope of ethics extends from interpersonal relation to a wider social 
relation in that one finds ‘the problems of co-presence (pluralism) and synchronization, of 
distributive justice’. An order is required among responsibilities in order to prevent waste of 
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someone’s ethical commitment or any violation upon those in service for the other. It requires 
‘reckonings, rationality, systematization’, which in turn require the bringing forth of a sort of 
rationality of which place is consciousness. Furthermore, exigency of justice calls impersonal agency 
like the State to respond to the problem, particularly in the structural level of social relation. All 
these require ethical rationality working as a principle; or, in Levinas’s term, philosophy as the 
wisdom of love: 
A problem is posited by proximity itself, which, as the immediate itself, is 
without problems. The extraordinary commitment of the other to the third party calls 
for control, a search for justice, society and the State, comparison and possession, 
thought and science, commerce and philosophy, and outside of anarchy, the search for 
a principle. Philosophy is this measure brought to the infinity of the being-for-the-other 
of proximity, and is like the wisdom of love. (Levinas, 1991, p.161) 
As a final point however, grounded on illeity and constructed in the form of the said, ethical 
rationality needs to be exposed again for attenuation of reification of the said and for the possible 
transformation of the said if necessary. The kind of exposure in this case is not like the exposure of 
oneself to the other. The exposure of ethical rationality is called ‘reduction’. Levinas claims that the 
second exposure is possible because behind all the said ‘there is … already heard the resonance of 
other significances forgotten in ontology, which now solicit our inquiry’ (p.38). The way of the 
inquiry is reduction, which is going back to the very first ethical significance from what thematised or 
what regarded as essence (p.44). In other words, reduction is the way in which the said can be 
unsaid. So, all text, including the religious, needs to be unsaid under the light of the very first 
teaching, the very first ethical signification, the first revelation, which may be resonant somehow in 
the text. So the reduction is a deconstructive and hermeneutical participation in the text in search of 
the first signification (Bergo, 2011). Ethics in this sense is ‘the persistent deconstruction of the limits 
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of ontology and its claims to conceptual mastery, while recognizing the unavoidability of the said’ 
(Critchley et al., 2002, p.18).  
We have seen the whole feature of the ethical structure of responsibility: constituents of the 
structure are the separation, the coming of the other at the non-agential moment, the rise of 
responsibility, the mysterious residue of responsibility in the same (duration), the movement of the 
same to the other (the saying and the said), ethical rationality, the entry of third party, and 
reduction. From this ethical structure, we can now speak of the other in two senses: the other-in-me 
(the anarchic voice in me) and the other everywhere and everyday around me as ‘face’ who comes 
to pass; the former from immemorial past and the latter as the other in the very non-agential 
moment of presence. Ethical subjectivity as a person stands always in between those others; born 
from the non-agential moment, growing up with the resonant inner voice, facing the face every day, 
developing ethical rationality in a wider social life then seeking back its original meaning of life.  
 
6. Otherness and Ontology – Filling of the lacuna  
Starting from the initial questions of the non-agential moment and otherness of the other, 
which were raised by the reading of Bhaskarian ontology in the previous chapters, this chapter has 
attempted to present Levinas’s philosophy as providing an answer to them. In this final section, we 
present a critical dialogue between the two philosophies in terms of their compatibility and 
difference, then identify a point of integration between them.  
Putting both Levinasian otherness in a dialogue with Bhaskarian ontology, we will start by 
pointing out the compatibility between them. First, the Levinasian account can be understood in 
terms of the Bhaskarian holy trinity of critical realism. We have seen that both accounts show the 
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same initial concern: the independence of exteriority.111 Against the epistemic fallacy generated 
from empirical realism, Bhaskar argues for the independence of reality from our knowledge of it: 
reality exists out there independently, and is not reducible to, or exhausted by, our knowledge of it. 
The independence of reality is designated in terms of the intransitive dimension of knowledge. 
Levinas too is concerned first of all with the problem of reduction of exteriority (the other) in the 
comprehension. The independence of exteriority is exemplified by Infinity, alterity and the face. 
From their statements that exteriority exists out there and it is not reducible to comprehension, we 
can say that both share a kind of ontological realist account of exteriority. Moreover, both account 
exteriority as what cannot be fully grasped in our understanding, although for different reasons. For 
Bhaskar it is because of the limited access to the real due to its non-transparency, while for Levinas it 
is because of the ambivalence of infinity that always moves away from thematisation then reappears 
as a question mark (Levinas, 1991, p.161).112 This non-transparency and ambivalence produce 
limited hence contingent and sometimes competing accounts of the exteriority. So we can say that 
epistemic relativism is at work in both accounts. Furthermore, the contingent or competing 
knowledge of exteriority can be judged as much as possible under the light of the exteriority itself. 
For Levinas it is called reduction, which seems compatible with Bhaskar’s judgemental rationality. 
What this indicates is the possibility of integration between two accounts in terms of the holy trinity 
of critical realism.  
The second compatible point between them can be found in their structural understanding 
of ethical rationality.113 Ethics is neither a moral idea, nor legislation, for either of them. Rather 
ethics in both accounts has its rationality, which has been constructed through the life course of the 
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agent’s multi-level relation in which diverse social structures and levels are reflected.114 Ethical 
rationality is understood in terms of processuality; it is not static but is in continual dialectical 
construction. At the outset of the process, the structural understanding of ethical rationality in both 
accounts recognises the importance of the (concrete) singularity of the agency as the starting site of 
the ethics, considering ethics as dependent upon him. Once ethical rationality is set on the ground of 
the singularity,115 the ethical agent will seek and conduct absenting absence in its multi-level relation. 
In doing so, his ethical rationality will take the course of development as described in Dialectics: 
developing as process-in-product and product-in-process (Hartwig, 2007, p.9).116 This indicates the 
possibility of integration of Levinasian ethical rationality with Bhaskarian dialectical rationality.117  
In spite of the possibility of integration between Levinasian otherness and Bhaskarian 
otology within the parameter of critical realism, however, there seems to be a radical (or ultimate) 
difference between them which generates some other significant differences, including the 
difference in stance between agential centredness and the non-agential moment. The radical 
difference is related to the understating of the initial setting of the agent on the ethical ground. 
What makes a singular person to be set on the ethical ground? For Bhaskar it is alethia, while for 
Levinas it is otherness of the other. In a simpler definition we can say that alethia is ‘implicit’ in all 
beings, guiding and setting beings on tendential directionality with axiological necessities that 
generate transformative negation (absenting absence) toward universal emancipation. Thus it is 
alethia that sets an agent to be ethical and to pursue the ethical dimension in life, since it is implicit 
                                                          
114
 The multi-level relation of the human agent can be seen in the four-planar social relation of the human 
agent in Bhaskar’s account. In the case of Levinas, it is seen in his consideration of the role of third party, 
including the State, for ethical life in the society in which the ethical subject is actively involved.  
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 The account of the initial setting of the agent on the ethical ground is the point of greatest divergence 
between Bhaskar and Levinas. This point will be dealt with later, but for the time being what is concerned is 
the process after the initial setting.  
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 Bhaskar conceives absence with a product/process bipolarity, which is retained in all stages of the 
dialectical movement (his MELD), issuing different types of association between the two poles at each stage: 
‘(1) product (simple absence) [at IM]; (2) process (simple absenting) [at 2E]; (3) process-in-product [at 3L]; and 
(4) product-in-process [at 4D]’ (Hartwig, 2007, p.9). Absenting absence in each stage will render the ethical 
rationality to be developed in the same pattern of dialectical construction.  
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in the agent with the tendential directionality toward emancipation (pp.26-29). In the actual course 
of life, it starts from the existential context of the agent where his first choice is to absent absence, 
let us say hunger, in order for freedom from hunger. Based on this existential experience of freedom, 
the agent can now develop the sense of freedom for the other (solidarity) through perspectival 
switch.118 Here we can see the dialectical logic of ethical rationality from freedom to solidarity; the 
latter would be the proper case of ethics while the former is focused on freedom. Thus it takes an 
extensional structure from the desire for my freedom to the desire for the other’s freedom; the 
latter is entrained by the former. Therefore by putting together the idea of alethia with the 
dialectical logic, it can be said that the human agent is implicitly ethical from eternity, so that it is 
somehow guided by the alethia in its actual course of life to pursue freedom for oneself and 
gradually for the other.  
However, in the previous chapter, this account was challenged through the reconsideration 
of Bhaskar’s pivotal concept, absence. There it was argued that if we specify absenting absence 
(hunger for example) in two cases – absenting my hunger and absenting the other’s hunger – then it 
must be that the first case is natural and necessary to the I while the second case cannot be natural 
to the I unless the first case is satisfied. This is particularly so if both the I and the other are in a 
situation of desperate huger. Thus to take the second case instead of the first from the outset is not 
natural to or necessitated from the I because the first case is not satisfied;119 to give the bread out of 
my mouth to the other despite my hunger is not natural, but ethical, and it is not the work of 
freedom; it is ethical in the face of the other. According to Levinas, ethics is not generated from 
freedom; rather freedom makes ethics an option or opinion. Moreover freedom entails a greater 
likelihood of the exercise of power in the form of possession and mastery (that is interested in its 
own conatus alive) than does ethics. One may use his freedom for the other but it is not natural or 
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 Perspectival switch is a special quality and ability affirmed from the constellational unity. See section 2.2. of 
Chapter 2.  
119
 This argument would be supported by Bhaskar’s logic of dialectical rationality, which stresses the existential 
experience of my freedom as the starting point. 
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necessary. It is only agential choice through perspectival switch. Therefore, for Bhaskar the human 
agent is still the possible site of ethics but ethics does not necessarily or naturally come out from the 
agent alone, even if he has the ability of perspectival switch. Even the perspectival switch itself is the 
very agential rational grasp of the other, grasping the other only according to my understanding of 
the situation of the other while ignoring or indifferent to the otherness of the other.  
For Levinas, absenting hunger of the other is ethical and is only possible because the face of 
the other commands me. It is not a rational understanding, but is pre-cognitive affection upon me. 
The initial setting of the I on the ethical ground is not the work of the agential movement or choice; 
rather it is by calling of the other, by being exposed to the other. Thus it is not the agential moment 
but the non-agential moment. Even the implicit alethia, if there is such a thing, in me cannot replace 
the significance that the other brings to me. It is not a kind of Platonic reminiscence of what is 
already in me. It is not drawing out from inside, but is rather sensuous affection on me from 
exteriority, viz. the other whose invocation puts my freedom into question. Therefore ethics is a 
breach of freedom. By being commanded my will for myself is persecuted. I become a hostage for 
the other. Therefore, the relationship with the other in ethics is asymmetrical. 
This all signifies one more crucial difference between Bhaskar’s ethics and Levinas’s ethics in 
regard to the logic of ethical rationality. As seen above, in Bhaskar’s case, ethics is extended from my 
freedom to universal freedom through transformative negation and perspectival switch. So we can 
see the movement from being to becoming. However, in Levinas, ethics is only signified by the 
coming of the other to the I; then all ethical changes including transformative negations (becoming) 
take place. Furthermore, in serving for the other, according to Levinas, there is inevitable suffering 
upon the ethical subject. It is very much characteristic to ethics because ethics is giving oneself for 
the other in spite of one’s freedom, will and desires; absenting hunger of the other in spite of my 
starvation. This dimension of suffering, or in Levinas’s term, substitution, is almost indifferent to 
Bhaskar’s ethics. While for Levinas ethics is traumatic, for Bhaskar ethics is described almost with 
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freedom. In the dialectical rationality or logic, the dimension of suffering seems hard, or even 
logically impossible, to place. The table below sets out the differences between the two accounts. 
Table 3.1. A comparison between Bhaskarian ontology and Levinasian otherness 
 
Transcendental Realism Critical Naturalism Dialectics Otherness 
(1) ‘Implicit’ as the 
primary mode 
of being 






becoming’:  a 
process of 
realisation   








(2) Reasons as 
‘properties’ of a 
person 
(3) Realisation of a 
persons’ reasons 
through actions or 
internal 
conversations  
(4) Circumstances of 
a person as 
enablements or 
constraints to the 
realisation 
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primarily 
‘implicit’ in all 
beings 
(2) 1M non-identity 
and 3L totality as 
‘properties’ of being  
(3) ‘Being to 
becoming’ through 
exercise of real 

























Therefore, it can be said that Bhaskarian ontology and Levinasian otherness have points 
both of compatibility and of radical divergence. In this regard the chapter provides, in addition to the 
compatible points, a point of integration between the two accounts in terms of ethical subjectivity, 
which may fill the lacuna in Bhaskarian ontology while putting Levinasian otherness on a critical 
realist ground. The ethical subjectivity is an openness prior to openness; ‘Before it is a devotion to 
Being, it is a subjection to the Good’ (Levinas, 1991, p.xxi). The first openness is the subjection 
(exposedness) to the other, which is followed by the second openness that is devotion to Being, 
which is agential involvement of Dasein. The second openness presupposes ethics, the first teaching 
from the other, though it is also true that the first teaching may have become a meaningful pulse of 
the ethically assigned intentional consciousness of the subject: 
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Here I exist as the author of what was put to me despite myself and 
unbeknownst to myself. … The force of God, the proximity of infinity, has all its 
inscription in my own voice. … It is even always dissimulated in the movement by which 
the saying itself converts into, is fixed in a said. All saying, which says Being, 
dissimulates this Beyond. It is only aimed at – or, more exactly, addressed – 
retrospectively or reductively by a critical back from the already-said. (pp.xxxiv-xxxv) 
The double openness provides a point of comparison between Bhaskarian ethical agent and 
Levinasian ethical subjectivity. In both cases openness seems to be that which makes human being 
such. Bhaskarian agent is explained with only one kind of openness: dialectical openness, which is 
natural. Bhaskar defines the human agent as an open totality on the ground of human being’s 
dialectical nature, of which a short definition could be process-in-product and product-in-process. So 
it is the dialectical nature that makes possible the dialectical openness in that ethics, understood as 
a characteristic agential movement, is incorporated through transformative negation. However, 
Levinasian subjectivity consists of two kinds of openness: a priori openness to the other (ethical), 
that sustains and pulses the following dialectical openness to be a special case (ethical). As we have 
seen, the first and prior openness indicates the exposure to the other, while the second refers to the 
dialectical openness of the agent radically transformed by the first openness. Therefore the agent 
can be, in Bhaskar’s term, ‘a radically transformed transformative praxis’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p.9), who is, 








Chapter 4 Ontology and Otherness: Transcendence  
 
Introduction  
In this chapter we turn our attention to the understanding of transcendence in terms of 
ontology and otherness. We present two contrasting ontological accounts of transcendence: 
Bhaskar’s meta-Reality and a classical Trinitarian account of God.  According to Wright (2012, 
pp.90ff), both accounts are ontologically exclusivist, epistemically exclusivist and soteriologically 
inclusivist. This chapter aims to show that at the heart of the difference between them is the 
different understanding of otherness. Therefore, we first present Bhaskar’s spiritual turn, which led 
him to construct meta-Reality, whereby non-duality conceived as ground-state qualities inhere in all 
beings, but by doing so make impossible a genuine sense of ontology of otherness (Bhaskar 2000, 
2002, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). This will be followed by a classical Trinitarian account of God grounded 
on the conception of personhood, whereby the ontology of otherness is embraced not as an added 
quality but as constitutive of ontology of the being of God, hence of all beings from their creation. A 
particular trajectory will be given to this account by referring to McGrath’s ‘iterative procedures’ 
(McGrath 1999, 2002, 2008, 2009), Gunton’s ‘the Triune God as Becoming’ (Gunton 2001),120 and 
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1. Bhaskar’s Meta-Reality 
1.1. The spiritual turn through transcendental dialectical 
critical realism  
We have traced the intellectual trajectory of Bhaskar’s ontological journey through the initial 
establishment of transcendental realism, critical naturalism and his dialectical critical realism. In 
particular, in his dialectical critical realism he envisages human agency as ‘radically transformed 
transformative praxis’, with its emancipatory intentionality that is ‘oriented to rationably groundable 
projects – ultimately flourishing in freedom’ (Bhaskar 2008, p.9). This orientation is ultimately 
attributed to the ontological stratum of ethical alethia implicit in all beings from the beginning, since 
‘the end is implicit in the beginning’ (p.9). Thus one can see that a sense of the ultimate reality or 
transcendence is already permeating his theory of dialectics, paving a way for further philosophical 
development. Indeed, Bhaskar make a step further from his dialectical critical realism (DCR) into 
spirituality in order to explore the envisaged project of ultimate flourishing in freedom, which he 
calls universal Self-realisation or God-realisation: ‘the dialectic of critical realism at once prepares 
the ground for and necessitates its development into transcendental dialectical critical realism or 
philosophy of (universal) Self-realisation (and ultimately of God-realisation)’ (Bhaskar 2000, p.21, 
emphasis original).   
Peculiar to this new philosophy is its mood adherent to spirituality; hence the term ‘spiritual 
turn’.  Critical responses to Bhaskar’s spiritual turn have come particularly from those within the 
critical realist community who recognise Bhaskar as an adherent of the Marxist tradition, and who 
focus on the inconsistence with Marxist materialist grounds. For example, Creaven critiques 
Bhaskar’s spiritual turn by alleging that the new philosophy is underpinned by ontological idealism. 
For Creaven, the ontological idealism is unsustainable and incompatible with the previous stages of 
critical realism, in which Bhaskar himself takes Marxist dialectical and emergentist materialism as 
139 
 
the true antithesis of idealism (Hartwig 2011). However, it is clear that for Bhaskar his spiritual turn 
is a response to the implicit demand for Marxist-inspired politics of universal emancipation, if one 
considers seriously the Marxist formula, ‘the free development of each as a condition of the free 
development of all’ (Bhaskar 2010, p.4). Otherwise one will not eventually be free, since 
in a real sense, a sense which is very difficult for most people to comprehend, 
you are not really different from me, but you actually are me. Sure, you are different as 
an embodied personality from me, but you are also enfolded within me, you are part of 
me and I am part of you and therefore your pain is as much as my pain. (Bhaskar 2002, 
p.316)  
Bhaskar’s spiritual turn is his response to the question once raised by Marx himself, but 
apparently not given a proper answer: ‘Who is going to educate the educators, who is going to 
empower them, who is going to transform them?’ Concerned with the educators, the would-be 
transformers for universal emancipation, Bhaskar notes that the western approach to emancipation 
emphasises change outside of self, on outward going so that it becomes at best altruistic for others 
while leaving the self as unexamined and so unchanged. Turning from the western approach he 
stresses the need for spiritual upgrading of the self, which can be the source of education of the 
educators. As such he finds his answer to the question in the aspect of self-transformation or self-
realisation, which is typical of a spiritual approach (p.300).121 Hence, he acknowledges two motives 
for his spiritual turn: (1) to speak of spirituality or, at least, religion in his critical realist terrain, 
because (2) without this source the left or the emancipatory project will remain weak.122 This 
indicates that Bhaskar’s spiritual turn is deeply related with his concern for the emancipatory project, 
particularly that of the left in the western approach; but with the recognition of its weakness he 
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 In fact it was Karl Marx himself who ‘gave rise to a school of social analysis that excluded the transcendent 
as a distraction from worldly praxis, or simply as an irrelevance’. But Bhaskar reads Marx’s question as 
implying the need for transcendence so that Bhaskar, one of Marx’s more recent successors, ‘appears to be 
reintroducing’ the notion of transcendence, ‘convinced that, if it did not exist, we would be obliged to invent it’ 
(McGrath 2008, p.52). 
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 He referred to these two motives in his lecture on ‘Critical Realism and God’ at the Forum on Religious and 
Spiritual Education held at King’s College London on 19th Jan. 2011.  
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turns to the east (and the north and the south) to seek a powerful retroductive explanation of the 
totality, which is somehow implicit already in his early works of critical realism and dialectical critical 
realism, but is now developed in a new philosophy that synthesises self-realisation with spirituality.  
As he states:   
mutual implication of (a) radical transformative agency; and (b) deep spirituality, 
brought together relatively early on in the development of critical realism in the 
conception of transformed transformative praxis … In practice this means that to be 
truly spiritual one has to be committed to, and an active agent in, radical transformative 
processes … on the realisation of the common ideal of spiritual and secular 
emancipatory projects …which … will necessitate the abolition of the totality of mater-
slave relationships … it is important to appreciate that the only form of revolution 
possible [against capitalism] is a spiritual one; and that anti-capitalism itself 
presupposes a commitment to spiritual change (i.e. self-development) … [which in turn] 
immediately implies commitment to radical transformative action. (Bhaskar 2002a, pp. 
225-6) 
Before his mature development into meta-Reality, Bhaskar had shown something of his 
transition to spirituality in his book From East to West: Odyssey of a Soul (2000), in which he 
describes the journey of a soul through successive reincarnation into fifteen lives.  While the book 
takes the form of a semi-autobiographical novella, in it Bhaskar brings forth the core claim of the 
perennial truth of universal self-realisation of a soul or God. He grounds this claim philosophically by 
linking God or ultimate reality with the hitherto developed terrain of critical realism, applying the 
holy trinity of critical realism along with dialectical critical realism in terms of MELD stadia.123 By 
applying the holy trinity of critical realism, he argues for the ontological realism of God as the object 
of studies such as theology, for the epistemic relativism of God from the fact of the existence of 
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 Hence it is called transcendental dialectical critical realism.  
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religions as either different manifestations of or different interpretations of God, and for the 
possibility of judgemental rationalism between religions on the basis of the claim for stratification of 
truth between the higher truth and ordinary truth.124 With regard to dialectical critical realism, God 
is, at 1M degree, conceived as the ultimate stratum of reality through the affirmation of categorial 
and dispositional realism. Bhaskar insists on ‘the transcendental reality of the categories prior to and 
independently of any knowledge or account of them’ because ‘realism about being … includes, and 
indeed ultimately depends upon, realism about categories – categorial realism’. Our epistemic grasp 
of categories ‘is also real but it is not what it is about, even when it is correct. The epistemic is 
constellationally contained within being’ (p.34). We can see here that Bhaskar assigns categorial 
realism the status of alethic truth, since alethic truth is not necessarily justified by a realist way 
because it goes beyond the ‘real’; it is not necessarily confined truth at 1M degree, but also goes 
beyond this in the sense of its very original and ultimate teleological meaning, which sets beings on 
their tendential directionality toward the realisation of the implicit alethic truth (Hartwig 2007, 
pp.26-29). Thus, with categorial realism he asserts that categories are ‘not merely human constructs, 
but rather substantial ontological realities inherent in the fabric of the universe’, of which God is ‘the 
ultimate ‘categorial structure of the world’, the ‘causally and taxonomically irreducible’ ground and 
alethic truth of being, ‘on which the rest of being is unilaterally existentially dependent’’ (Wright 
2012, p.21; Bhaskar 2000, p.40).125 The ultimate structures of the universe, however, ‘exist as 
potential awaiting future actualisation and realisation’ because, it is asserted, this is the dispositional 
realism, that ontic, epistemic and logical possibility is prior over actuality (‘actual objects and events 
were once potential’) as being is prior over action (‘forces must exist in order to cause’) and self over 
agency (‘persons must exist in order to act’). Again one can see that the priority of potentiality of the 
dispositional realism reflects the idea of alethic truth which allows the realism of the ultimate 
                                                          
124
 Drawing on an ancient Indian philosopher, Adi Shankara (788-820), he claims for the stratification of truth 
and applies it in understanding the phenomenon of multi religions. Based on this claim he rejects any exclusive 
religion as uniquism while encouraging inter-faith, intra-faith and even extra-faith dialogue for searching for a 
higher truth (Bhaskar’s lecture on ‘Critical Realism and God’). 
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 Wright, A. (2012) Christianity and Critical Realism: Ambiguity, Truth and Theological Literacy (forthcoming; 
book manuscript privately circulated with permission to be used as a reference for this thesis). 
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potentiality to be realised. Hence, for Bhaskar, God is defined as ‘both the ultimate categorial 
structure of being and the ultimate potentiality’ (Wright 2012, p.21).  
In spite of the implicit ingrained-ness of God in beings, there is always a certain type of 
‘absence’ in the level of the embodied world, such as lack, ideology, or illusion, which is called demi-
real.  This absence denotes the incompleteness of the world, and hence necessitates a 
developmental process or epistemological learning process toward completeness.126 Such absence is 
the motor of the learning process, which can be seen as a kind of the process of transformative 
negation at 2E, which will be integrated within the terrain of 3L of holistic causality of totality, where 
all beings are understood as constellationally interrelated through all the levels: material (biological), 
psychic, social and now the spiritual level. Through the process within the holistic relation, the 
dialectic of desire to freedom conducted by a concretely singularised (specific and uniquely 
individuated) person may entrain a further dialectic process toward universal emancipation if the 
person acts spontaneously according to his real nature (which Bhaskar calls dharma), in which 
Godlikeness is ingrained. This is because, in this account, the process is understood as a self-
determination that connotes ‘at once (individual) autonomy and universal flourishing or eudaimonia 
– i.e. the free development of each as a condition of the free development of all’. This indicates the 
transformative praxis of agent at 4D; however, this time it stresses the question of ‘who am I?’, a 
question about identity (the alethic identity) and agency, because the greater the learning about the 
true nature of oneself, the greater the possibility of right agentive action, and because ‘[u]ltimately 
the dialectic of self-realisation ushers in a dialectic of God-realisation’ (Bhaskar 2000, pp.3-4 
emphasis original).127 
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 Drawing on the eastern religious traditions, he describes this process in terms of ‘the interconnected triad 
of reincarnation, karma – or ‘quantum (or holistic) natural law’ – and moksha, or liberation’ (Bhaskar 2000, p.3 
emphasis original). 
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 Later, the spiritual turn and its philosophical articulation through transcendental dialectical critical realism 
as seen in the type of MELD explanation enable Bhaskar to extend MELD stadia to MELDA by adding 5A, which 
is the aspect of spirituality or ‘the spiritual aspect presupposed by emancipatory projects, whether secular or 
religious, and which deepened the other four stadia as well’ (Bhaskar 2002b, p.xix). 
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According to this account, ‘man is essentially God’ in his deep structure, ‘already essentially 
free, even now already enlightened’ (p.41), while the notion of God is still conceived as ontologically 
immanent as the inner urge of human being but not saturated by concrete singularity, and at the 
same time as ontologically transcendent as the ultimate reality but not exhausted by human being. 
Here we can see two senses of transcendence: ‘[first] the moment of transcendence, that is the 
move to a greater totality which resolves a contradiction … In this process of transcendence (in the 
relative sense) to a greater totality, [second] transcendence (in the absolute sense) plays the key 
role’ (Bhaskar 2002a, p.231). Thus Bhaskar’s spiritual turn can be seen as an explanation of the 
transcendental movement of a concretely singularised person toward the fuller realisation of God or 
his ingrained Godlike nature; hence it is a retroductive explanation of human being from its real 
nature, the very substratum of its reality in that God is ingrained implicitly; an explanation of human 
being in terms of its movement toward God-realisation, toward its ultimate goal. Therefore, as 
Wright points out, ‘[i]f dialectical critical realism opens up the possibility of self-transcendence 
through transformative action, then transcendental dialectical critical realism identifies the ultimate 
goal of human self-transcendence as the experience of identity with God’, in that ‘man is essentially 
God’s self-realisation is God-realisation’ (Wright 2012, pp.21-22; Bhaskar 2000, p.ix emphasis 
original).  
With reference to the key argument of this thesis, regarding the agential centredness 
explanation of critical realism and the consequent lacuna of otherness, it should be pointed out here 
that the philosophical grounding of transcendence or God in the transcendental dialectical critical 
realism shares the same characteristics we have seen in earlier stages of critical realism. Two points 
are particularly relevant here. First, it is noticeable that agentive agency is the very locus of the 
unilateral process of self-realisation. The merging point of two senses of transcendence is the agency 
of the self who acts out of its inner urge for the realisation of its true nature (dharma), which is 
gradually awakened during the process of transformative negation or absenting of absence (karma), 
even if this takes place over more than one life (reincarnation). This transfactual quality of the self or 
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its ultimate qualities over successive reincarnations is therefore like what Bhaskar calls tendency, 
delineated in his fundamental tenet of transcendental realism. Once conceived as such, it is not 
difficult to reach the second point, that the philosophy of self-realisation is based on transcendental 
realism, so that it shares the very characteristic features of agential centredness of TR as defined in 
Chapters 1 and 2: God, while categorically independent from man, is at the same time ‘implicit’ in, 
hence part ‘of’ man (in Bhaskar’s term ‘ingrained’); man’s directionality is one of ‘being-to-becoming’ 
(self-realisation); and relationships are identified with circumstance or the people around in terms of 
solidarity toward upgrading of their lives to the point of spirituality where they may reclaim and re-
enchant their lives to become what they truly are. Given the agential centredness of self-realisation 
up to the point of God-realisation we can see the same pattern of ontological priority of self over the 
other so that it produces the lacuna of ontology of genuine otherness. Though the causal efficacy of 
the other upon oneself as an external aspect is recognised, the explanation of the transcendental 
movement is fundamentally and essentially attributed to the agential powers out of one’s innermost 
urge, so that the other is eventually recognised either as a person with whom I should develop a 
relationship of solidarity, or as a person who has his own Godlike nature. In the first case, the other 
is only found with his significance in the extension of my dialectical self-realisation; that is, the other 
is found from my approach to the other or in extension of a dialectic of desire to freedom for the 
other through perspectival switch (at 2E), since the other is essentially related with the self in the 
sense of holistic totality (at 3L). Hence self is the initiative, the first movement and the priority, while 
the other remains as secondary or relative (compared with the absolute of self), absorbed into the 
relation of the self. In the latter case, the other is understood as an authentic self defined by the 
same categorial and dispositional realism so that the same pattern of the agential centredness is 
applied to him. Hence in both cases the priority is given to self, while there is a lacuna of genuine 
sense of otherness. This leads to another crucial point of Bhaskar’s spirituality. By focusing on the 
innermost nature of the self, while taking the other as secondary or relative, the spirituality of the 
self-realisation stresses on ‘awakening’ of what is already implicit through agentive transformative 
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action negation, rather than on what is filled from the other or on the Other who is ‘overflowing’ me 
with her face and otherness so that the overflowing pushes the self into a dialectic of ethical life, as 
we have seen in Levinas. In the next section, we will attend to such spirituality of awakening. 
 
1.2. Meta-Reality  
After the philosophical underlabouring of spirituality in the transcendental dialectical critical 
realism, however, Bhaskar identified two related unsatisfactory or limited points of the spiritual 
position with regard to responses he received from dialogue with both religious and non-religious 
people. He found that (1) most religious practitioners seemed to understand the transcendent 
reality featured in his spiritual turn as a way of referring to a particular God such as Allah or Brahman, 
which (2) for non-religious or atheist people is not appropriate, to the point that they become 
reluctant to talk about spirituality at all.128 This led him to develop a philosophy of meta-Reality, in 
which he attempts to articulate the ultimate non-dual state of spirituality or God in a secular way by 
replacing it with ground-state and cosmic envelope on the base of ‘the first principle’ of 
transcendental realism. Hence his meta-reality is characterised as ‘spiritual exposition of being’ at 
the level of 1M of ontology (Bhaskar 2002a, pp.191-192). Here non-duality (or non-dual state of 
being such as freedom, love, creativity and spontaneous right action) is formulated as a key concept, 
since it is that which sustains the world of duality (unhappiness, contradiction, split, alienation) 
(Bhaskar 2002a, p.52; Hartwig 2007, p.150), and is accessible or acquired to a certain degree by the 
transcendental self, because non-duality is implicit in a person as ground-state quality constituting 
the deep interior or interior fine structure of that person (Bhaskar 2002b, pp.x-xi). Hence, Bhaskar 
claims that spirituality or transcendence is no longer confined to a presupposition of religion and 
emancipatory projects, but is also considered as a presupposition of ordinary life whereby the self 
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 Bhaskar’s lecture on ‘Critical Realism and God’ at the Forum on Religious and Spiritual Education held at 
King’s College London on 19th Jan. 2011. 
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exercises its agency through transcendental identification with its true nature. The stress on the 
everydayness of transcendence and transcendental identification puts the role of transcendental 
agency at the centre of the everyday experience of non-duality since ‘transcendental identification 
[implying shedding of what is inconsistent with ground-state] and transcendental agency are seen to 
be necessary features of all social interactions’ through which non-duality is assessed and 
experienced (Bhaskar 2002b, pp.xii-xiii). This enables us to present Bhaskar’s meta-Reality in a way 
that is consistent with the key argument of agential centredness as seen in the previous chapters. 
Therefore in this section, Bhaskar’s meta-Reality is introduced in terms of a triad feature of the 
primary mode of being as ‘implicit’, agential centredness and transformative negation by drawing on 
three modalities (ground-state, transcendence, the fine structure or deep interior) and three 
mechanisms (transcendental identification, reciprocity, co-presence) of non-duality. Hence they will 
be non-duality (as being implicit), which causes agency to transcend its incompleteness (as agential 
centredness) through transcendental identification including shedding (as a form of transformative 
negation and praxis). Let us begin by considering the implicit nature of non-duality. 
In his explanation of the diachronic development of critical realism Bhaskar provides a 
critical description of the five phases of the philosophy of discourse of modernity (including post-
modernism) and their contradictions - lack, split and alienation - which indicate that the world is the 
world of duality (Bhaskar 2002a).129 Duality that can be seen for example in inconsistence or 
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 Bhaskar distinguishes five phases of the philosophy of discourse of modernity:  
(a) The Classical Philosophy of Discourse of Modernity (CDM): as ‘initiated with the classical English and 
French bourgeois revolutions of 1640-1660 and 1789’ respectively,  
(b) High-Modernism (HM): with ‘its heyday between the revolutions of 1848 and 1917’, 
(c) The Theory and Practise of Modernisation: as ‘associated with the revolutionary watersheds of 1945, 
the end of the second world war, and 1947, the symbolically and practically significant de-colonisation 
and partition of India’,  
(d) Post-modernism: from ‘the time of the revolutionary upsurge of 1968’,  
(e) Western (Bourgeois) Triumphalism: ‘in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc (1989-1991)’. 
The incompleteness of these phases is characterised by terms such as ‘egocentricity’ and ‘false abstract 
universality’ (of CDM), ‘the incomplete totality lack’ and ‘lack of reflexivity’ (of CDM as critiqued by HM), 
‘substitutionism’ (of HM), ‘unilinearity’, ‘judgementalism’ and ‘disenchantment’ (as appeared in the 
universalising tendencies of PDM in the phase of modernisation), ‘loss of interconnectedness and the unity of 
humanity’ and ‘anti-realism’ (of post-modernism), ‘formalist and functionalist’ (instrumental modes of 
reasoning), ‘particular form of materialism (denying and underestimating the role of ideas and consciousness 
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contradiction between theory/practice, object/subject, fact/value, material/spiritual, or East/West. 
However he also notes that there have been emancipatory thoughts throughout the world, whether 
religious or secular, that have enabled people to attempt to overcome such duality, although in a 
limited way. Hence he claims for the realism of the fundamental level of realty which generates 
those emancipatory thoughts over different time and space, because ‘[a]ll emancipatory thought has 
to presuppose in some way the actuality, the inherent existence (albeit in an unfulfilled state) now, 
of what could be’ (p. 89). He delineates a transcendental realism of the essential structure of 
emancipatory thought, which he calls the non-dual state of being or simply non-duality, which 
generates all forms of possibilities of emancipation so that the world of duality, despite the 
dominance of the actual forms of incompleteness, can be sustained and dependent upon it.130 Thus 
Bhaskar states the characteristic argument of the philosophy of meta-Reality that ‘the world [of 
duality] is only sustained by a world of non-duality which is its infrastructure, more than its support 
(and much more than a refuge or compensation), but its very basis and condition’ (p.59).131 Notable 
in this argument is that the fundamental possibility or potentiality is ultimately found ‘within a 
being’, ‘within in us’ in terms of non-duality, which inevitably renders the unilateral direction of 
emancipation in the form of the realisation or expansion of what is truly within us.  In Bhaskar’s 
words: ‘[t]he possibility of human emancipation depends upon expanding the zone of non-duality 
within our lives’ (p.11). This implicitness of non-duality in human being and all beings and its 
realisation (directionality) through transformative negation is delineated in his explanation of three 
modalities and three mechanisms of non-duality.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
hence in geo-history) and ‘ontological monovalence’ (of PDM in general) (Bhaskar 2002a, pp.167-173). For 
more details, see Chapters 1, 3, and 4.  
130
 So, Bhaskar states: ‘the tacit presupposition of all these negative social structures, whether they be 
capitalism, whether they be war, is the spontaneous good nature of our own inner selves, operating from the 
ground-state, our spontaneous creativity, our natural love, our willingness to trust other beings’ (Bhaskar 
2002a, p.152). 
131
 This indicates the characteristic form of argument of the philosophy of meta-Reality, that is, it ‘depends 
upon the necessary presupposition of the true by the false, the good by the evil, love by hate, creativity by 
regimentation/mechanisation, etc., freedom by heteronomy (oppression or servitude, etc.), non-duality by 
duality, enchantment by disenchantment’. He calls this ‘unilateral dependency’ because ‘the false or emergent 
or heteronomous level could not exist without the true or more essential or autonomous level, but that level 
of truth, freedom, etc. could exist without the emergent heteronomous level’ (Bhaskar 2002a, p.203). 
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The first modality of non-duality is ground-state. Based on the transcendental realist 
argument of the stratified nature of reality, Bhaskar argues for a foundational level, called being’s 
ground-state: ‘a basic level of being, characterised by the properties necessary for any being to be at 
all, … upon which all other levels depend’ (p.11). Thus the necessary properties or ground-state 
qualities are considered as ‘the ultimate ingredient of all other states of being, activity and 
consciousness’. Human beings, when they are in the ground-state, are defined by virtue of their 
implicit potential for creativity, love and right action (Bhaskar 2002b, p. x).132 However, these 
qualities are not defined as an individual property but as the ultimate ingredient of all beings, which 
makes it possible for beings to connect with each other ‘[b]ecause we are living in one world, one 
cosmos, we must be connected in some way with each other and with all beings in that cosmos’ 
(p.229). This reminds us of the notion of constellational connectivity (or internal relationality), a key 
aspect in dialectical critical realism; now, in meta-Reality Bhaskar presents clearly what it is that 
makes possible the ultimate or fundamental connectivity in terms of ultimate ingredients at the 
ground-state of being for all beings. This leads to the notion of cosmic envelope. These ground-state 
qualities are differentiated according to the process of stratification, emergence and disposition of 
concrete singularised beings, but they are connected ‘up to the ground-states qualities of other 
human beings and indeed beings generally through … the cosmic-envelope’ (Bhaskar 2002a, p.12 
emphasis original).  
The second modality of non-duality comprises certain aspects of transcendence, which are 
understood as ‘essential to constitution and reproduction of everyday life’ and, hence, through 
which non-duality sustains or grounds the realm of duality (Bhaskar 2002b, p.x). Generally in meta-
Reality, transcendence means ‘the move to greater completeness in all learning process and indeed 
all aspects of our lives (self-transcendence)’. This can be achieved by an indispensable feature of 
everyday life, viz. transcendental identification in consciousness ‘with our real self, an object or 
                                                          
132
 From this Bhaskar points out the possibility of development of the ground-state qualities of humanity in a 
relatively a priori fashion (Bhaskar 2002a, p.11). 
149 
 
person, our agency (absorption in what we are doing), or others in collective work, thereby losing 
our false sense of ourselves as separate and isolated’ (Hartwig 2007, p.234). Hence, the movement is 
between ground-state as the field of intrinsic possibility and our embodied personality as the field of 
articulation of the former; or it is a dialectical process of realisation (transformation) of the former in 
the field of the latter (Bhaskar 2002a, p.91).   
This links to the second component of our triad of meta-Reality: agential centredness. 
Bhaskar provides a three-fold sense of self: ego, embodied personality and transcendental self, of 
which ‘the point of agency is always that of the embodied personality’ (p.220). Ego is a sense that 
‘apprehends itself as existing separately from other … and asserts itself against an object world’ 
(p.71), so it does not ‘refer or correspond or reflect or pick out anything in the world’ because it 
defines itself as separated from others, whether structures or people (p.77). This ego is a 
construction of a kind of ideology of ‘a subjective point and rationale’ (p.75). However, ‘no one is 
separate from other beings … [because] [t]he social structure is inherent within us’. Hence ‘to be is 
to be related, so to be is to be geo-historical’ (p.113, emphasis original). Ego, in this sense, is an 
illusion, but it is real in so far as it is causally efficacious, so that it is defined as demi-real. Human 
beings as embodied personalities are ‘complex, relationally defined and constituted entities, 
themselves stratified, differentiated and changing – constituents of … relative reality’ (p.71 emphasis 
original), ‘limited and bounded and perspectivally variable’ according to their disposition (p.78); and 
are ‘relative, transient and contextual reality’ (p. 194). Transcendental real self is what lies beneath 
such embodied personalities as ‘the source of their causal agency and powers’ (p.71) and it is, 
according to the principle of cosmic envelope, ‘continuous with and connected to all other selves 
and other things generally and indeed to all of creation’ (p.78). Thus it is alethic self and is equivalent 
with being’s ground-state (Bhaskar 2002b, p.x). Compared with changeable embodied personality, 
transcendental real self ‘endures … is manifest most of the time only in the context of a totality in 
which it is both dominated and occluded by elements other than itself’ (Bhaskar 2002a, p.194). 
Human being is a mixture of ego, embodied personality and transcendental self. Now, if 
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transcendence is the movement toward greater completeness, it is only possible by action of the 
agent of embodied personality, but in order to make a change (movement) it is necessary to change 
first the intentional action of the agent to be consistent with its ground-state. ‘So all change depends 
ultimately on self-change; and all action depends ultimately on self-action’ (p. 100). When 
considering human being as a four-planar social being, prioritising self-change will be a crucial step 
for ‘transformation at all planes of social being including the most deeply sedimented social 
structure’ (pp.112-113). In other words, action oriented to self-change is necessary for emancipation 
of all (p.223). Hence, the embodied self or agency is the locus or default position of change not only 
for himself but also for universal self-realisation (pp.220-221), and this agency is the radically 
transformed transformative praxis in DCR. Bhaskar calls this priority of agential action the primacy of 
self-referentiality (p.147). At this point it should be noted that the theme of primacy of self-
referentiality can only be justified on the basis of the prior establishment of ground-state which is 
implicit in all beings. Thus to change agent’s action rightly means to change it to be maximally 
coherent with and spontaneously following from the ground-state (p.104). According to this account, 
therefore, it can be said that we have both the possibility of transcendence, which is the ultimate 
causal power of ground-state, and the agency of the realisation of the possibility, which is the 
agential role of embodied self. Simply saying we have what (transcendence) and who (agency), 
however, still leaves the question of ‘how’ the agent can make self-change and universal-realisation, 
or how the agent can be related or connected with the ground-state and the other beings.  
With regard to the question of ‘how’, we refer now to the third modality of non-duality, 
which is the fine structure of deep interior of being (or consciousness), and three mechanisms of 
non-duality (transcendental identification, reciprocity and co-presence). The fine interior is a 
necessary condition or constituent of all human life, which can be revealed with its qualities of ‘bliss, 
emptiness, suchness, rich identity, or pure unbounded energised love’. But how can those qualities 
be revealed? Or how can we have such a moment of being in a non-dual state? Bhaskar’s answer is 
that we do so by ‘going deep enough’ into it (Bhaskar 2002b, p.xi): ‘As we dig down to our ground-
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state, become more attuned (or in tune) with it, the more self-aware we become, the more we 
expand our capacity to change the world’ (Bhaskar 2002a, p.228). Because the agent has already the 
possibility within itself, no-one else can get it for him; he must search for it himself until he reaches a 
moment of ‘eureka’, like the moment of Platonic anamnesis. It is possible because the ground-state 
qualities are ‘already there implicitly, enfolded, encoded, as a possibility of manifesting in … 
consciousness. … it is only implicit’ (Bhaskar 2002a, p.230). That is why Bhaskar stresses 
transcendental identification in consciousness not only with one’s true self but also with other 
beings; at first it might be a weak consistency with objects, but increasingly we may come together 
with them until the moment of collapse of the subject-object duality, like a moment of agreement in 
communication with the other (Bhaskar 2002b, p.229). At this point the second characteristic way of 
reaching the non-dual state should be recognised along with the ‘going deep enough’, viz. ‘shedding’.  
As we go deep into the real self we find elements of heteronomy which block freedom, which are 
unfulfilled and split intentionality rooted in desire. Here the desire form itself is considered as the 
inner root of incompleteness, like contradictions and constraints to freedom:133 
It is the desire form itself which prevents and limits our freedom, not the 
constraints on the satisfaction of our desires, and when we see that it is the desire itself 
that imposes the constraints, not our environment, then there is nothing more in the 
physical world which is constraining. There are no constraints without desires. (Bhaskar 
2002a, p.62) 
Desire is what is attached to the real self, hence Bhaskar calls it attachment, acquired 
because we were born into ‘[t]he world of attachment, the world driven by desire for material goods, 
the world of commodification’ (pp.13, 59). As it is attached, hence the resolution is to relinquish 
desire and to give up what is inconsistent with the true self, that is, to shed the attachment (pp.62-
                                                          
133
 Bhaskar distinguishes two forms of incompleteness: negative incompleteness as marked by illusion, error 
and cruelty, and positive incompleteness as the absence of total development, which involves ‘intrinsically the 
potentiality for further development’ (Bhaskar 2002a, p.61). 
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63). Previously, he understood desire in relation to absence, then argued for the dialectics of desire 
to freedom by transformative negation of absenting absence toward universal realisation. Likewise, 
at this juncture the philosophy of meta-Reality accounts for a dialectic of liberation in a two-fold 
sense: the dialectics of shedding and the dialectics of development and realisation, which are 
conceived as asymmetrically related to each other in the sense that the latter cannot come before 
the former. Moreover, as in the case of dialectical critical realism, self-realisation is conceived as 
naturally linked to universal self-realisation, since the self-realisation, through shedding, is argued as 
‘immediately and automatically’ taking us ‘in to a conatus, that is a drive, oriented to the self-
realisation of every other being in the universe’ (p.53). Hence ethics here, as in his Dialectics, is 
conceived as a natural kind in the sense that it is originated in agential action of the self for shedding 
and its self-realisation.134  
Transcendental identification is followed, at a deeper level, by the principles of reciprocity 
and co-presence, which are the second and the third mechanisms of non-duality. In fact, all three 
mechanisms work in a way that increases the degree of internal relationality of totality. Reciprocity 
means that ‘the connection is already becoming an internal one’ as the result of engagement with 
both oneself, in the way of attainment, and the others in the ways of attraction and repulsion. At 
this level of reciprocity, the relationship with oneself and with the others begins to be defined as a 
part of the being, particularly a part of the embodied personality, so it is said that ‘a being is at once 
concretely singular and at the same time dialectically universal’ (Bhaskar 2002b, pp.224-227 
emphasis original).135 When it goes deeply enough, to the limit of completely universal reciprocity, it 
                                                          
134
 In the previous chapter it was argued that Bhaskarian ethics presupposes a natural connection between 
individual freedom and universal freedom in that ethics is conceived as a natural kind generated by the self. 
However, by bringing Levinasian otherness into the account, it was argued that ethics cannot be conceived as 
such a natural kind of oneself. Rather it happens and is inscribed by the engagement with the other. Moreover 
ethics presupposes an asymmetric relation between I and the other in that one should give up its freedom for 
the other, i.e. giving one’s bread out of its mouth for the other in spite of starvation. Ethics, according to 
Levinas, is in nature in the form of ‘despite oneself’, not in the form of ‘I then you’ as in Bhaskar. 
135
 It stresses the starting point of change or the locus of change, termed the primacy of self-referentiality, 
which is linked to universal emancipation according to the principle of co-presence, as will be seen shortly. 
From this point of view Bhaskar refutes the misconstruction of individual voluntarism upon the agency 
(Bhaskar 2002c, p.70). 
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reaches generalised synchronicity, whereby there is co-presence, meaning ‘the enfolding of another 
entity within the being of some entity’ (p.230). It is worth noting that in the first book on meta-
Reality Bhaskar defines the notion of co-presence as a state of being, such that ‘each is already 
implicit or enfolded in the other’ (Bhaskar 2002a, p.12), but in the second book he focuses on 
agential action or movement reaching at the state (Bhaskar 2002b). Thus co-presence can be 
understood not simply as an idea state in somewhere, but as a real level of state that can be reached 
only by agent’s right-action. Here we can see the characteristic feature of the intrinsic connection 
between ontology of co-presence and agential centredness: if, therefore, the agent can go deeply 
enough into the state of ‘completely generalised co-presence then all beings will be enfolded in any 
one being’ (p.230).  
Before arriving at the 5A (fifth aspect) of spirituality, Bhaskar had defined being as a 
becoming of our being through agential action, or thinking being in the action of transcendental 
identification in consciousness.136 However, at the state of co-presence being or reality is re-
theorised with two additional stadia: 6R (sixth realm) of re-enchantment and 7Z/A (seventh 
zone/aspect) of non-duality or awakening;137 being as a moment of a being being or a being of being, 
that is, a moment of non-dual state or a moment of awakening which is ‘what is required to bring 
out or complete our understanding of the fifth aspect, which must lead to notions of enlightenment 
or self-realisation and emancipation, leading ultimately to universal self-realisation’ (p.xx). Putting all 
these together, Bhaskar’s ontology of being is delineated as MELDARZ, then MELDARA (p.xix), in that 
‘awakening’ of what is within us (spontaneity, creativity, love etc.) is proposed as the final 
destination of being not in the sense of endism but in the sense that it always remains as a 
                                                          
136
 Bhaskar argues for ‘omnipresence of consciousness’ or ‘implicit nature of cosmos’ from the possibility or 
capacity of human being of transcendental identification with everything in consciousness (Bhaskar 2002a, 
p.143, 214). 
137
 According to Bhaskar, 6R of re-enchantment ‘designates not only the realm of the … para-normal or 
supernatural … also … the typical domain of religion, whereas 7Z/A designates that of spirituality’. This 
indicates that spirituality is in a deeper level than that of religion, so that he claims that ‘one can be spiritual 
without religious practice’ (Bhaskar 2002b, p.xxi). This is consistent with the distinction he made previously, 
between the higher truth and the ordinary truth.  
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potentiality, rendering the ever-openness of embodied life to this direction through agential action 
of shedding and transcendental identification. Hence the world of embodiment is the locus of 
change in the sense that a moment of awakening can be experienced, though it is very difficult since 
‘we are barely aware of most that is unfolded within us’. Despite the difficulty of awakening, 
however, there are awakened potentials in the form of powers such as ‘knowledge, virtues or skills’, 
and when we exercise them sufficiently in daily life until they become primed for action, then these 
powers become what may be called tendencies (necessities) as described in transcendental realism 
in Bhaskar’s first book A Realist Theory of Science (p.230). 
  
1.3. A critical reflection: The logical structure of 
transcendence, Awakening (7A) and incommensurability 
Bhaskar’s philosophy of meta-Reality has been described as a triad form of explanatory 
frame, brought forward from the argument on previous stages of critical realism: the primary mode 
of being as implicit, agential centredness and transformative negation, which in turn explain ground-
state qualities, co-presence and non-duality, the agential role of embodied personality in 
transcendental identification, and awakening and shedding, respectively. After the long journey to 
meta-Reality, we have come back to the initial point of ‘tendency’. The thesis began by considering 
tendency as the crucial concept of transcendental realism, in that a central characteristic feature of 
its ontology is that the primary mode of being is ‘implicit’. This crucial feature was attributed to the 
thoroughgoing standpoint of the explanatory form of agential centredness in that the central role of 
the agency is defined with the transformative praxis in forms of negation (shedding) and realisation. 
Subsequently it has been shown that the intrinsically related triad penetrates all stages of critical 
realism up to Bhaskar’s latest philosophy, of meta-Reality. Therefore it can be said that the intrinsic 
relationship between the three components of the triad reveals the very logical structure of 
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transcendence in meta-Reality, but also the whole project of critical realism. The logical structure is 
that Bhaskarian critical realism, from the first to the last, is based on and dependent on the crucial 
aspect of his ontology that defines the primary mode of being as ‘implicit’ as tendencies (necessities), 
which entrain the necessity of the transformative agency whose action is characteristically 
transformative negation for awakening.  
However, as argued previously from the point of view of Levinasian philosophy, it does not 
capture or put weight on the crucial dimension of otherness (the non-agential dimension) in its 
ontology, so that in the dialectical development it remains in a form of dialectics with characteristic 
lacuna of otherness, which can only envisage a single dialectical openness of being in terms of ‘being 
to becoming’, while unable to grasp the double openness captured from Levinasian otherness in 
terms of ‘coming to being’ (openness opened by the other), then ‘being to becoming’ (dialectical 
openness of the opened agency). The single dialectical openness seems to be all the more so in the 
philosophy of meta-Reality because there is no genuine sense of otherness or alterity, due to the 
ultimate connectivity of all beings with each other and the ultimate sameness of all beings enfolded  
together at the level of the ground-state and co-presence. Moreover it does not allow, rather is 
critical of, any notion of imposed or heteronomously given salvation or redemption as in some other 
religious traditions (Bhaskar 2002a, p.226). This means there is no genuine significance of the other 
to emancipation; instead it claims emancipation as coming only from within. This again is attributed 
to the primary aspect of ontology and its consequent overwhelming connectivity of all.  
At this juncture, the final feature, of awakening (7A), attracts our attention. Awakening here 
is a connotative concept which implies both the presupposition of what is to be awakened within the 
self and the ways of awakening, such as shedding, filling and realising. What is stressed in both is 
that the self-transformation in that agency is not only the locus of change but is itself autonomous 
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and deterministic for its realisation.138 Awakening therefore is about self-transformative efforts 
within the stratified self, in that any notion of heteronomously given salvation is fundamentally 
unacceptable, hence incommensurable. Such notion of heteronomous salvation is refuted as 
uniquism for its blocking of the higher truth; in particular, the exclusive truth claim of certain 
religions such as Christianity is charged with uniquism. Drawing on an ancient Hindu philosopher, 
Shankara, Bhaskar makes a distinction between the higher truth and the ordinary truth, in that the 
former ‘sees all religions as so many different paths to the absolute’, while the latter ‘proclaims a 
monopoly truth’ that espouses uniquism (Bhaskar & Hartwig 2010, p.151). On this basis, he 
advocates the possibility of spirituality, as the higher truth, without exercise of religious practices (as 
the ordinary truth) and his philosophy of meta-Reality can be seen as an attempt at an inclusive 
conceptual articulation of the higher truth in that he theorises transcendence as the presupposition 
of both religion and everyday life. Hence he claims that ‘the time for the higher truth to become the 
ordinary truth has arrived’ (p.151). The connotative concept of awakening indicates both the higher 
truth quality with the ultimate potentiality within us, and the possibility of access in ordinary life 
through exercising self-transformative and self-deterministic efforts. 
However, as construed from Levinasian otherness, there might be another significant aspect, 
rather than the self or even prior to the contentiously deterministic self. If this is the case then it 
implies that the incommensurability between the connotative concept of awakening and the 
concept of heteronomous salvation entails the necessity that we identify the philosophy of meta-
Reality as a particular case rather than a higher truth case. This point is explored in Wright’s critical 
reading of Bhaskarian critical realism. Wright traces the roots of Bhaskar’s spiritual turn then shows 
that Bhaskar’s claim of ‘the higher truth’ is advocated in terms of the notion of perennial wisdom, 
which is itself ‘a particular product of emergence of modernity in the West, rather than a product of 
primal mystical encounters that pre-date all religious traditions’. By examining a close relationship 
                                                          
138
 Wright considers this point as a specific ontological assumption of human being as ultimately good and 
autonomous. But he points out that this assumption as a production of modernity is highly questionable and 
indeterminate. See, for details, Wright 2012, pp.98f.  
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between the New Age movement and Theosophy,139 both rooted in nineteenth century Romanticism, 
Wright reveals how the notion of perennial wisdom was constructed as the source of a personal 
spirituality against Christian exclusivism, and also shows its comfortable connection to a democratic 
liberal economy in the guise of the claim that ‘human beings are free and equal, then they must 
have free and equal access to spiritual truth’ (Wright 2012, pp.22f).140 Hence Bhaskar’s position is 
highly compatible with religious pluralism and theological inclusivism, while it rejects religious 
exclusivism as uniquism.141 However, Wright critiques this position on the basis of the holy trinity of 
critical realism. Ontologically, in its affirmation of ontology, meta-Reality necessarily excludes the 
ontological commitments of all the religious traditions or admits them only for their epistemic value 
to the higher truth (pp.92ff); epistemologically, with indifference to the inevitability of the cultural-
specificity of all religions, including meta-Reality itself,142 Bhaskar’s position ‘is vulnerable to the 
charge of committing epistemic fallacy by forcing realistic spiritual truth claims into a liberal 
democratic polity’ (p.92). Hence Bhaskar actually ‘affirms a single, particular and exclusive path to 
God’ (p.94), while colonising others in the single liberal frame, ‘ignoring fundamental difference in 
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 Bhaskar acknowledges the influence of these two positions upon the development of his thought (Bhaskar 
& Hartwig 2010, p.6f). 
140
 For a deeper explanation of the meaning of the perennial wisdom explored by Wright, see the quote below:  
This perennial wisdom was seen as the primal source of all spiritual and religious traditions, a 
fact that those religious traditions which claim exclusive possession of spiritual truth – pre-
eminently, at the time of the European Renaissance, the Christian tradition – were accused of 
seeking to suppress. However, the suggestion that the world’s religious traditions emerged from 
a common perennial spiritual wisdom rooted in mystical experience is not supported by the 
historical evidence. A more powerful hypothesis is that belief in a perennial wisdom is a product 
of counter-cultural attempts to secure a personal spiritual life apart from organised religion by 
actively resisting the hegemony of Christianity. It is possible to trace a historical lineage of such 
attempts from the Renaissance, through nineteenth century romanticism, to the contemporary 
New Age movement. In its modern guise, the notion of a perennial wisdom accessible to all sits 
comfortably with a democratic liberal economy: if all human beings are free and equal, then they 
must have free and equal access to spiritual truth. (Wright 2012, p.22f) 
141
 Bhaskar’s critique of religious exclusivism can be seen in a sequence of three stages: (1) the distinction 
between the open universal stance of religious pluralism and the closed parochial stance of religious 
exclusivism in that the former is construed with potentiality of serving for all while the latter with potentiality 
of serving the interest of a particular religious group, (2) hence the former as expanding human freedom while 
the latter as constraining freedom and (3) the former as engendering tolerance while the latter as breeding 
intolerance (Wright 2012, p.95f). 
142
 Through the process of bracketing of prior commitments with universality and neutrality, Bhaskar privileges 
his position with neutrality while ascribing others, particularly Christianity, as parochialism. But this position is 
representative of a specific tradition, ‘that of Enlightenment Project’. Therefore, it appears ‘to contradict the 
principle of epistemic relativism, which insists that all knowledge is necessarily contextual and grounded in 
parochial cultural contexts’ (Wright 2012, p.96). 
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favour of an economy of “sameness”’ (p.101). This economy of sameness debilitates judgemental 
rationality between different accounts. In fact, as Wright points out, Bhaskar’s position may ‘cut 
across the grain of judgemental rationality’, and ‘imply judgemental relativism’, stemmed from the 
fundamental assumption of ‘an analogue between God and nature’ (pp.88-89, emphasis added), 
which is identified in this thesis in terms of the key premise of his ontology that the primary mode of 
being is ‘implicit’. This all leads to the point that Bhaskar’s meta-Reality is a particular, cultural-
specific account of the absolute, but is still ontologically, epistemologically and soteriologically 
exclusivist so that it is to a certain degree incommensurable with other accounts, particularly with 
other religiously exclusive accounts. This renders the possibility to attempt to seek an account of the 
absolute or God otherwise than through meta-Reality, while retaining crucial aspects of critical 
realism, hence remaining within a broad sense of critical realism.143  
Therefore, in the next section we will attempt to provide the Christian Trinitarian account of 
God as a greater explanatory model, because it takes account of the ontological distinctiveness and 
significance of otherness, which has been seen as a characteristic lacuna in meta-Reality.  We will 
draw out a particular feature of Christian Trinitarian relation, viz. ‘overflowing’, which is remarkably 
different from the ‘negation and awakening’ of meta-Reality. 
 
2. Trinitarian God  
This section will explore the Trinitarian account of God.  This account is suggested as a better 
critical realist explanation of God than Bhaskarian meta-Reality with regard to the ontological 
dimension of otherness because, as will be seen, ontological otherness is crucial to the classical 
Trinitarian account of God, which is radically distinct from panentheist accounts of God or 
transcendence, including Bhaskar’s meta-Reality. The section does not aim to provide a full account 
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 It is worth bearing in mind Porpora’s point that Bhaskar’s spiritual turn is not the spiritual turn of critical 
realism but it is his spiritual turning of critical realism in a specific way.  
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of Trinitarian theology; rather it will be limited to highlighting the capacity of the classical Trinitarian 
account to embrace the dimension of otherness.  To do so it will draw from Alistair McGrath, T.F. 
Torrance and John Zizioulas, and particularly from the central notions found in their works: the 
iterative procedure, the homoousion and personhood as hypostasis, respectively.  
 
2.1. Christian theology and critical realism (iterative 
procedure and methodological reverse) – Paving a way to the 
Trinitarian account of God   
There have been two sources for talking about Christianity in a broad sense of critical 
realism: one is found in dialogue within critical realist groups and the other in a tradition of 
theological critical realism, which developed largely independently of critical realism until they came 
together recently (Shipway 2000).144 In both cases there is a dividing point in the dialogue with 
regard to the understanding of God. For example, in a joint book project about God, the well-known 
Christian critical realists, Margaret Archer, Andrew Collier and Douglas Porpora kept their 
commitment to a specific tradition of Christianity, while Bhaskar withdrew himself from the project 
on the grounds that ‘the critical issue dividing them was that of God’s immanence in the world, and 
in particular Bhaskar’s panentheistic conceptualisation of the immanence of God within the world’s 
categorical structure’ (Wright 2012, p.36; Archer, Collier, Porpora 2004). Meanwhile, in a brief 
review of theological critical realism, Wright introduces four representatives of the tradition: Ian 
Barbour, Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne and Alistair McGrath.145 He demonstrates that they 
too, in their interface studies between theology and the natural sciences, which share ‘a particular 
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 ‘The existence of a “religious” strain of critical realism predating “secular” critical realism was brought to 
the attention of the Bhaskar List by Tobin Nellhaus in June 2000 and raised by Doug Porpora at the IACR 
Conference in August.’ (Shipway 2000, p.29) 
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interest in the congruence between scientific and theological epistemology’, have shown that they 
are divided in their understanding of the Christian God between the panentheistic account (Barbour 
and Peacocke) and the classical Trinitarian account (Polkinghorne and McGrath) while all remain 
within a broadly critical realist spectrum (Wright 2012, pp.38ff).146 Wright provides the essential 
contrasting ideas between the two views.  First, in the panentheistic account one can find 
remarkable consistence with meta-Reality: 
[Barbour] invoke[es] a panentheistic ‘process theology’ in which God is 
simultaneously ingrained within the natural order yet transcendent of it, and the being-
in-becoming of the universe coincides with the being-in-becoming of God. … Peacocke 
[by picking up Barbour’s point] replaces the doctrine of incarnation with an account of 
Christ as the model human being, rejects the doctrine of original sin in favour of a 
notion of a failure of humanity to fulfil its potential, and supplements the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo with a notion of emanation that opens up an understanding of God 
and God-in-nature operating together as co-creators. (Wright 2012, p.41) 
As for the key aspect of the classical Trinitarian account of God, 
McGrath responds to Peacocke’s revisionism by exploring the implications of 
retaining a classical Trinitarian theological model and seeking to understand it, and its 
relationship to natural science, within a critically realistic framework. He seeks to 
achieve this by approaching the natural world from the a posteriori retroductive claims 
of the classical Trinitarian doctrine of creation. According to this doctrine, the universe 
was created by, and is continuously sustained by, a creator God who created ex nihilo 
and allows creation the freedom to exist apart from himself, yet without ceasing to 
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 Wright reveals three points pertaining to both sides of theological critical realism, which are consistent with 
key aspects of critical realism. They are (1) interface study between science and theology ‘as a response to two 
flawed approaches to the relationship between science and religion generated by the Enlightenment’, (2) 
towards a critical realist epistemology, and (3) recognition of the significance of ontology (Wright 2012, 
pp.39ff). It is in the third point that the dividing point becomes apparent, according to Wright’s review.  
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engage creatively with it. This immediately rules out panentheism: according to 
Trinitarian theology, God cannot be identified even partially with nature, so that nature 
is in no sense divine. (Wright 2012, p.42) 
In spite of the contrasting views between the two sides, common to both is the requirement 
for inference to the best explanation, and the way taken by each side constitutes the methodological 
route of each theology, which in turn results in their division and contrasting accounts. Peacocke 
(1993, pp.15ff), for example, argues for the need to develop theology beyond hierarchical 
authentication147 by applying criteria of reasonableness in that ‘no authority would be automatic … 
but would have to be authenticated inter-subjectively to the point of consensus by inference to the 
best explanation’ (pp.17-18). He recognises that both religion and science engage with realities by 
employing metaphorical language and describing realities in ‘models, which may eventually be 
combined into higher conceptual schemes’. This leads to the question of ‘how the respective 
claimed cognitive contents of science and theology might, or should be, related’ (p. 19). Hence he 
calls for a critical realist theology that deals with a hierarchy of truth drawn from the structured 
reality148 by using not only criteria generally used in assessing ideas and in appraising ‘scientific 
models and theories – namely, fit with the data, internal coherence, comprehensiveness, fruitfulness 
and general cogency’, but also religious truth contained in communal interpretation and individual 
experiences in a reasonably combined way (pp.15-16). Hence he believes that authenticating of a 
religious tradition, like Christianity, can be validated when it is reasonably assessed not only from 
inside but also from outside the written sacred word or the sacred tradition, i.e. by facing sharp 
questions about the relationship between its claims and reality (Peacocke 1988, p.47). Hence, he 
insists upon continual openness to revision according to what is regarded as reasonable in the given 
time, in a way that neutralises tradition-specific authority. However this approach to theology seems 
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 By hierarchical authentication he means to claim for the authority of a type of theology by referring to a 
form of self-sufficient inner authority, such as ‘the Church says’ or ‘the Bible says’ (Peacocke 1933, p.17).    
148
 Peacocke shows his understanding of reality in terms of entities, structures, processes and causality, which 
is consistent with critical realism (Peacocke 1988, p.51). 
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to share the characteristic feature of deistic or theistic Enlightenment natural theology, which, as 
McGrath points out, makes a strong appeal to nature for the demonstration of the existence and 
attitudes of God without necessary recourse to divine revelation (McGrath 2009, p.27).149  
McGrath takes a rather contrasting way in inferring to the best explanation for theology.  
Using what he calls an iterative procedure he claims Trinitarian theology as the best explanation of 
God (McGrath 2002, 2008, 2009) in that we can find a source for inference to the best explanation of 
otherness. It should be noted here that in McGrath’s approach there is a methodological reverse or 
transition from that of theistic or deistic accounts of God to Trinitarianism. In understanding the 
relationship between natural and revealed theology many traditional accounts envisage that the 
‘triune God’ is distinguished from the ‘one God’ as indicating the specifically Christian construal of 
God and a generalised notion of divinity, respectively, while conceiving their relation in terms of 
extension or amplification of the latter to the former; hence the triune God is a kind of additional 
insight to the notion of ‘one God’ (McGrath 2009, pp.62-63). This is similarly observed in the recent 
theological and philosophical debates about science and God in the form of essential deism 
inherited from Enlightenment thought. Those accounts have generated a perception that ‘the 
doctrine of the Trinity tends to be treated as kind of addendum to the doctrine of God’, which 
entails a typical model in classical natural theology in which  
nature reveals a certain amount of information of God, which is then 
supplemented by revelation, which appends additional insights. Nature tells us that 
there is one God; revelation clarifies and enhances this discernment by adding that God 
is also threefold. (McGrath 2009, p.63) 
                                                          
149
 According to McGrath, there has been a pattern of transition of classical natural theology from deism, to 
theism and Trinitarianism. In a simple explanation, ‘deism holds that God created the world; theism holds that 
God created the world and continues to direct it through divine providence; Trinitarianism holds that God 
created the world, continues to direct it through divine providence, and guides the interpreters of both the 
books of nature and Scripture through the illumination of the Holy Spirit’. McGrath provides points of 
difficulties with deism and theism from a Christian perspective. For details see McGrath 2009, pp.63ff. 
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However, in his historical survey of the notion of 'natural theology' McGrath finds that the 
concept of nature is indeterminate, an interpreted entity that is not autonomous. This leads him to 
reject the Enlightenment idea of nature as ‘an objective entity, capable of acting as a universal 
ground of judgment’, and to the conviction that the concept of nature is a geo-historical specificity. 
While rejecting Enlightenment natural theology, which appeals to nature to prove core elements of 
faith without recourse to divine revelation, McGrath explores ‘the capacity of the Christian faith to 
make sense of what is observed’ without failing to recognise theological significance of the empirical 
question of human perception, seeing or human engagement with the world of nature, such as 
‘thinking about, affective responding to and enactive interaction with the world’. He takes Trinitarian 
theology as a unification model, understood as an important meeting point between the Christian 
church and secular culture under the light of divine revelation through the Holy Spirit (pp.27-28).  
The way that McGrath argues for the best explanation of the Trinitarian God is called 
‘iterative procedure’, which can be characterised as a methodology in the quest for God in science 
and theology. Drawing on critical realist recognition of stratification of reality (personal, nature, 
history etc.),150 he asks how a scientific theology can respond to such a stratified reality. He grasps 
the nature of the ‘response’ as interactive between reality and theology in an iterative process in 
which each addresses and is addressed by the other in successive and incremental revisions of the 
way we ‘see’ things in the light of ‘insights disclosed through engagement itself’ (p.32). Hence he 
states that, 
Theology does not just address history, nor does it just address nature – it 
addresses and is addressed by these and other strata of reality, and has the 
responsibility of coordinating these different levels of being, and showing how they are 
coherent with its overall vision of reality. (McGrath 2002, p.239) 
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 Critical realism as referred to by McGrath (2002) is the early stage critical realism, see pp.209ff.  
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McGrath calls this ‘iterative procedure’ a scientific method, which has its starting point of 
‘seeing’ nature from ‘a definite social location, which shapes what we see and what we regard as 
significant’ since ‘there is no view from nowhere’ (McGrath 2009, p.31); our seeing or ‘reading’ of 
reality is always ‘tradition-mediated and tradition-constituted’ (McGrath 2002, p.238). But the way 
of seeing or perception may be changed over the course of inquiry through discovery of new aspects 
of things, or by the emerging of new levels of interpretation of things while the things in question 
remain unchanged. Those new discoveries lead to the recalibration of theological observation, which 
is an integral aspect of natural theology. It does not fall into epistemic fallacy, but asserts the priority 
of ontology over epistemology since ‘something may be "seen" in such a way that its true identity is 
concealed’ (2009, pp.31-32). Hence we can see a degree of consistency of this approach with certain 
key aspects of critical realism, such as the holy trinity of critical realism and the principle of the 
intransitive/transitive dimension of knowledge. However, there is a crucial difference here. While 
Bhaskarian critical realism focuses on ‘the stratification of the reality which generates theories’ 
(McGrath 2002, pp.237-238 emphasis original), hence relies on a strong appeal to nature in the form 
of causal explanation, even for the explanation of the transcendent as we have seen in his meta-
Reality, the iterative procedure ‘does not entertain the idea that the observation of nature can prove 
the existence of God through necessary inference’ (McGrath 2009, p.56 emphasis original); instead it 
takes a unification form of explanation for its natural theology in that ‘a bigger picture’ takes the 
integral role for knowing and understanding its individual elements, including the nature of human 
engagement with them. The big picture can be a kind of metanarrative, such as the Christian 
Trinitarian narrative, which McGrath takes as his standpoint (2009, pp.53ff):151 
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 With regard to the classic difficulty of ‘the great ontological trade-off’ between ‘a rich, abundant ontology 
with great explanatory power’, which is the causal form of explanation underlying much classic natural 
theology, McGrath argues for a unificationist approach in which ‘understanding’ of a phenomenon means ‘to 
see how it fits together with other phenomena in a unified whole’. This strongly resonates with ‘the traditional 
Christian idea that to understand the world is to see the fundamental reality which underlies its multiple and 
sometimes apparently disconnected phenomena’ (McGrath 2009, p.54).  
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By a ‘Trinitarian natural theology’, I mean the way of understanding both the 
natural world and the human engagement with that world which results from the 
Trinitarian vision of reality that is articulated by Christian orthodoxy. This way of looking 
at things is a consequence of the Christian revelation, and is not entailed by nature itself. 
(McGrath 2009, p.36) 
McGrath provides three reasons for taking the Trinitarian vision of reality (pp.37ff): (1) with 
regard to ‘the transformation of all things’, it is better to explain it in terms of ‘salvation’, rather than 
‘explanation’,152 (2) a Trinitarian worldview has the better ‘empirical fit’ with ‘what may be observed 
of the natural world, human reason and experience, and culture in general’ than any of its 
alternatives or rivals (p.57),153 and (3) it enables us to develop a unificationist approach, articulated 
in the iterative procedure, through an abduction rather than deduction (like causal explanation), 
which seems more appropriate for natural theology by reinforcing ‘the plausibility of the bigger 
picture’ as the fundamental source of explanatory power of natural theology that explains the 
totality of human experience of reality. 
The latter point, about abduction considered as a way of inference to the best explanation, 
provides a way of explanation of otherness within a bigger picture. Previously it was shown that the 
genuine sense of otherness is gradually attenuated in Bhaskar’s critical realism up to the point of his 
dialectical turn, and is then fundamentally replaced or absorbed within the process of self-realisation 
in meta-Reality. Due to its fundamental premise of ontology, his critical realism was shown to be 
unable to integrate the surprising, non-agential moment of revelation of otherness with its genuine 
significance. This is particularly so where ethics is concerned, in that Bhaskar conceives of ethics as 
naturally arising from the pursuit of freedom of self, and as then extended for the other. This 
                                                          
152
 This is congruent with the point raised earlier with regard to the lacuna of otherness in the Bhaskarian 
agential-centred explanation, where it is pointed out that concepts like heteronomous emancipation or 
salvation cannot be fitted into this form of explanation.  
153
 By ‘empirical fit’ McGrath means the ability of the Trinitarian world view ‘to match a wide range of 
phenomena, by its overall success in meeting a variety of needs’ (McGrath 2009, p.57).  
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account was shown to be unable to capture the overflowing nature of encounter with infinity, like 
the engagement with the face of the other; filling the self with what cannot be drawn from within 
the self and overflowing with more than the self can contain, so that it becomes desire, inspired 
from otherness and inspiring the self-dialectical process. Now this surprising phenomenon can be 
explained by the Trinitarian account of God through McGrath’s way of abduction. According to a 
model of abduction provided by Norwood Hanson, the logic of scientific discovery contains three 
common features:  
1. The observation of some ‘surprising’ or ‘astonishing phenomena’, which represent 
anomalies within existing ways of thinking. This ‘astonishment’ may arise because the 
observations are in conflict with existing theoretical accounts. 
2. The realisation that these phenomena would not seem to be astonishing if a certain 
hypothesis (or set of hypotheses) H pertained. These observations would be expected 
on the basis of H, which would act as an explanation for them. 
3. There is therefore good reason for proposing that H be considered to be correct. 
(McGrath 2009, p.46; Hanson 1961, p.104) 
 According to this model of abductive reasoning, the astonishing, non-agential event of 
otherness (B) is in conflict with the agential-centred explanation of Bhaskarian critical realism, but it 
would not be astonishing if it is expected in and explained by the Trinitarian account of God (A). 
Therefore we have a good reason to propose the Trinitarian account of God as correct and as a 
better explanation of otherness, and in the same way, otherness justifies the Trinitarian God. This 
fits with the simpler expression of the abductive reasoning that McGrath uses for Trinitarian natural 
theology: ‘A explains B while B justifies A’ (McGrath 2009, p.56).154  
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 McGrath provides the following simple explanation of the form of abduction used for his Trinitarian 
approach: 
If N designates the type of natural theology presented and defended in this work, O designates 
the observation of the world, and T designates Trinitarianism, then we could suggest the 
following relationship between them which emphasizes a distinct role for natural theology: 
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Therefore, we now have a way paved by McGrath to the Trinitarian account of God as a 
better explanation of the dimension of otherness than Bhaskarian meta-Reality. In the next sub-
section we will explore how otherness can be seen, fitted into and explained by the bigger, though 
limited, picture of the Trinitarian account of God gained through Gunton, Torrance and Zizioulas, 
particularly in terms of their key notions of the Being of God in Act (the triune Becoming), the 
homoousion and personhood as hypostasis of the triune God, respectively.  
 
2.2. The triune God and otherness  
It is not the aim of this section to provide a general overview of Trinitarian theology; indeed, 
such a task would be impossible in the limited space available. Rather, it is intended here to get an 
explanation of ontology of otherness, something Bhaskar’s ontology was unable to give, under the 
light of the Trinitarian account of God. Hence, we do not seek to answer the question of whether the 
Trinitarian account of God can register the dimension of otherness in its framework; rather, we aim 
to ‘see’, as McGrath insists, otherness from the tradition of the Christian Trinitarian account of God.  
Previous chapters have drawn out certain features of otherness, such as ‘non-agential 
moment’, ‘happening’, ‘event’, ‘revelation’, ‘transcendence’, ‘coming to being’, and ‘the first 
teaching’. In the following exploration we find that many of these feature as key aspects of the God 
of Trinity. Perhaps it was neither accidental nor coincidental that we figured out those features of 
otherness, if otherness is ontologically real and is grounded on the ontology of the triune God. 
Arguing in such a way is a typical form of explanation of the Trinitarian God, that is, to explain the 
stratified reality of the world including the dimension of otherness from the triune God of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
T explains N; N explains O,  
O justifies N; N justifies T.  
This could, however, be simplified to:  
T explains O;  
O justifies T. (McGrath 2009, p.58) 
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Christianity, expressed here as ‘the Being of God in Act, Who is Person’155. In searching for the 
ontology of otherness, particularly with regard to God or the transcendent, our exploration of the 
Trinitarian God in the section will follow the line of study of the Being of God in Act, Who is Person, 
conducted by Colin Gunton (1941-2003), T.F Torrance (1913-2007)and John Zizioulas. Gunton, in his 
book Becoming and Being (1978), explored how Karl Barth (1886-1996) conceived the Trinitarian 
God in terms of the Being of God in Act; Torrance, a most significant interpreter of Barth, took the 
doctrine of the homoousion (the Being of God) as the cornerstone of his theological realism (1969, 
1971, 1980, 1991, 1996); and Zizioulas gives due weight to personhood as the hypostasis (the mode 
of existence) of Trinity, from which he draws his exploration of ontology of otherness (1985, 2006).   
 
Gunton – The triune God as ‘Becoming’   
Gunton begins his exploration of Barth’s understanding of God from the point that God is 
one ‘Becoming’ in revelation (Gunton 1978, pp.117ff).156 For Barth theology is a posteriori because it 
starts its work from believing what is a priori given in revelation. This manner of theology, which he 
developed from his study of Anselm, enables Barth to constitute the rationality of theology, in that 
the object of theology is the revelation as a priori given before our explanation or discovery, which in 
turn provides the rationality ‘because God has given himself in his revelation in such a way that we 
can speak rationally of him on the basis of this very revelation’ (p.126).157 Hence to speak of God is 
dependent on who God is, and the being of God is known by his revelation that is his coming to us, 
which is expressed as ‘Becoming’. Without this coming of God to us in revelation, according to 
Barth’s account, it is impossible to pursue rationally the truth of God: ‘Christian faith is not irrational, 
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  The expression for the triune God, ‘The Being of God in Act, Who is Person’, is drawn from the works of 
Gunton, Torrance and Zizioulas.  
156
 In the book, Barth’s Trinitarian God is explored through critiquing the neoclassical theism represented by 
Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000). 
157
 This sense of rationality is different from a kind of rational theology in that we establish, ‘by the use of 
reason, the existence and sometimes also the character and attributes of the object of theology’ (Gunton 1978, 
p.126), which is often seen in both deist and theist approaches to theology. 
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not anti-rational, not supra-rational, but rational in the proper sense’ (p.127). This aspect of 
revelation as givenness shows its deep contrast to the Bhaskarian sense of ‘awakening’ of alethic 
truth conceived as ingredient within the self. There is a fundamental difference of ontological 
assumption between God as immanent and God as otherness, in that the former understands God 
(or meta-Reality) as both immanent and transcendent but ultimately co-present at the level of 
ground-state, so that it can speak of concretely differentiated singulars, while these remain 
ultimately the same in the ground-state (or of singularity as emerged over the course of geo-
historical process from the ultimate source, whatever it is),158 but it cannot speak of otherness in a 
genuinely ontological sense. In contrast to this, in the latter explanation God is the other to us so 
that he ‘can’ come to us, rather than be discovered within us, in his ‘Becoming’. 
Gunton points out three meanings of the triune Becoming in revelation from his study of 
Barth. The first is ‘God who happens’ (p.128 emphasis added). For Barth revelation refers to 
‘something that happens; not to subjective experience but to events that are God’, hence ‘it is 
impossible to distinguish between God’s word and himself between what God does and what he is’ 
(p.129). We have already conceived ‘happening’ as a non-agential moment, caused by ‘coming’ of 
the other and indicating the existence of the other beside the self; now we have a very good reason 
to see otherness as a feature seen in the act of God; an explanation of otherness as not attributed to 
our agential being but conceived as the very non-agential moment given by Becoming of God. The 
second meaning, as ‘God who happens’, is God’s Action in Jesus Christ as the historical event 
(pp.130ff); Jesus is the becoming, God incarnate as a particular historical event. This leads to the 
third meaning (pp.132ff) that God’s happening cannot be depicted as happening within the cosmic 
process in that God’s relation with universe is reduced to purely general terms. But Barth 
understands God’s action in revelation as a concrete particularity, distinct from general history, 
                                                          
158
 This explanation is in accordance with the principle of synchronic emergent powers materialism, which 
Bhaskar first introduced in his explanation of social being (Bhaskar 1998) then later in meta-reality (2002a, 
2002b). By applying the principle both to human being and to meta-Reality it is already assumed that there is 
‘internal connectivity’ between them, in which there is no place for genuine sense of otherness. This point will 
appear again in dealing with Zizioulas’s account of the triune God.   
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hence preventing ‘the conception of revelation from degenerating into triviality, metaphysical 
generality or myth’ (p.136). 
The last point of revelation leads us to an important argument on the predication of the 
triune God: personhood. Barth’s stress on the historical, concrete particularity, and refusal of 
reduction to generality indicates his rejection of the idea that God’s freedom cannot be preserved 
and that God’s action is necessitated by a general system. This idea leads to a further point, that the 
first principle will of ‘necessity’ pertain to the general system. But Barth fiercely rejects such an idea 
in his understanding of God because the doctrine of Being of God in Act does preserve God’s 
freedom in his action.  
In Barth the crucial proviso is made that God remains free to relate himself or 
not to do so … He remains Lord … God … who really does things with, to, and for 
mankind, but who does them not because of necessitated metaphysical ties but 
because he freely and graciously chooses to do them. (Gunton 1978, p.154) 
Since ‘it is not enough simply to conceive God’s being as being in general’ (p.163, ; Jüngel 
1967, p.9) Barth contrasts two doctrines of relation: the doctrine of necessary relatedness, where 
necessity overtakes free choice of person, and the Trinitarian doctrine of relation, where freedom of 
person to choose is preserved (Gunton pp.159ff).159 The crucial difference between them is whether 
God is understood as Platonic substance or as person.  The former renders the priority of necessity 
over freedom of person so that there is no possibility of being otherwise than by necessity, hence it 
rejects both being other and letting other to be; the latter, in contrast, conceives personality as 
acting free from necessity.  While the former emphasises the communality of God with nature, 
hence leading to a typical form of pantheism of which the essential weakness is to ‘restrict the 
freedom of God to be immanent where he will’ (p.198), the latter rejects the ‘communality of nature’ 
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 In his reading of this, Jüngel stresses the point by conceiving the triune God ‘as the origin of relationship in 
that it puts itself in relation’ (Gunton 1978, p.163; Jüngel 1967, p.9). 
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as an error of natural theology (p.153). Therefore personhood is a key point that makes the 
Trinitarian God such as it is; hence the predication of God the Trinity because personhood is what 
makes possible the relation with otherness, a point that will be more clearly shown later in the work 
of Zizioulas.  
Now, Gunton stresses that Barth’s theological assertions are all centred on ‘God is’, and the 
assertion of ‘God is person’ leads Barth to a dynamic understanding of the being of God, which is 
termed ‘the Being of God in Act’ (p.189).  
[W]ith regard to the being of God, the word ‘event’ or ‘act’ is final … To its 
deepest depths God’s Godhead consists in the fact that it is an event – not any event, 
not events in general, but the event of His action, in which we have a share in God’s 
revelation. (Gunton 1978, p.189 cited from Barth, Church Dogmatics II/ı, p.263)160  
Here, to say that God is a particular event is to concentrate on ‘the particular actuality of this 
particular triune subject’; God’s act is an eminently personal act because ‘God is not merely personal 
but the supreme instance of personality’ (pp.189-190). At this point Barth articulates his realism of 
language: because language is a posteriori  it must follow what actually happens. ‘Since what 
happens is personal event, personal categories are required if we are to describe it correctly’ (p.192). 
On this basis, Christian dogmatics can be seen as a posteriori description, ‘referring’ to the Being of 
God in Act as ‘happening’ in Jesus Christ who is the particular actual event in history.  Hence the 
dogmatics as a posteriori language has its ontological basis in the Being of God in Act. This view 
contrasts with the post-structuralist view of language and discourse. For example, according to 
Derrida’s account, meaning, the signified, is conceived as ‘a passing product of words or signifiers, 
always shifting and unstable, part-present and part-absent’; and reality is conceived as ‘constructed 
by our discourse rather than reflected by it’. What is implied is that we never know reality itself, 
‘rather than merely knowing our own discourse’, so that there is no determinant truth or meaning 
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 “II/I” indicates volume/part of the book. 
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possible at all. Hence, as Sarup points out, according to this dogma we are imprisoned in our endless 
language-chain of the signifier-the signified without possibility of referring to reality: ‘we are 
prisoners of our discourse’ (Sarup 1993, p.97). However, in Barth’s account, what is ‘given’ in 
Christian credos is referred to the Being of God in Act as actual and concrete particularity, and 
cannot be reduced to the impersonalised notion of the signifier or the signified, nor can it be erased 
in the endless chain of language; rather it is conceived as always providing a genuine referent point 
so that it provides possibility to ‘renew’ (or transform) the chain from that point. This idea is 
congruent with both Bhaskar’s conception of transformative action by agent in his social theory of 
transformative model of social activity (TMSA), and Levinas’s conception of ‘the first teaching’ that 
gives rise to the rationality of ethics, as seen in Chapters Two and Three respectively.  
 
T.F. Torrance – The homoousion  
This realist conception of language as a posteriori description in the form of dogmatics is 
highly congruent with Torrance’s realist theory of theological knowledge, or simply theological 
realism (Torrance 1969, 1971, 1980, 1991, 1996). Torrance develops much of his distinctive 
theological reflection on the ground of the doctrine of the homoousion: ‘the doctrine that Jesus 
Christ as the Word and Son of God belongs to the divine side of reality, and is himself very God come 
into our world to redeem and recreate us’ (McGrath 1999, pp.151-2). It was in the later stages of his 
career that he developed a longstanding interest in the theological interaction with natural science 
in the form of theological realism, ‘which he found especially expressed in the doctrine of the 
homoousion’ (McGrath 2002, pp.264ff). Influenced by Barth’s Christological focus in the 
understanding of God, Torrance keeps this idea central, but develops it in a different way by 
emphasising ‘the physical nature of the incarnation’ that establishes ‘a rigorous theological 
connection between incarnation and creation, allowing cross-connections to be posited between the 
sciences which recognize Christ as their proper object, and those which address the creation itself as 
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their object’ (p.265).161 But the doctrine of the homoousion keeps its centrality in the interactions 
with the sciences because Torrance asserts the need for Christian theology to ‘return to the ground 
and grammar’ ‘in the light of the questions and issues thrown up by the scientific revolution’; the 
return to ‘the foundations of knowledge carried … on the ground of the revealed inherence of Word 
of Act in the Being of God’, which ‘demands an engagement with the classical doctrine of the 
incarnation’. This is because we have ‘cognitive access into the being of God, into his inner divine 
intelligibility or Logos’ only ‘in and through Christ’. Hence the notion of the homoousion becomes 
important for his scientific theology because the doctrine that God is homoousios with Christ asserts 
that ‘[i]n our relations with Jesus Christ, we have to do directly with the ultimate reality of God. … 
the homoousion is the ontological and epistemological linchpin of Christian theology’ (McGrath pp. 
266-267; Torrance 1980, pp.160-161). This methodology of ‘seen as’ is a fundamental creedal insight 
of the Christian churches since ‘[t]he Christian tradition has been shaped by this incarnational insight, 
which affects the manner in which both nature and Jesus Christ are perceived and comprehended’ 
(McGrath p.268). This can be seen both as a form of the iterative procedure that McGrath 
expounded, and as being congruent with critical realism162 in that epistemological insights are 
determined by the ontological ground of the homoousion. 
Torrance, on this ontological ground, demonstrates three distinct levels of knowledge, 
according to the stratification of theological explanation that can be developed from an engagement 
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 Therefore it is said that, 
... all intellectual disciplines or sciences are under an intrinsic obligation to give an account of 
reality according to its distinct nature … theology and every scientific inquiry operate with the 
correlation of the intelligible and the intelligent … it follows that the 'scientific' nature of an 
undertaking does not depend primarily upon the method to be employed, but upon the 
identification of the object to be studied ... to be seen as a posteriori activities, which are a 
response to 'the given'. (McGrath 1999, p.209) 
162
 McGrath understands Torrance’s theological realism as congruent with critical realism by referring to the 
conception of critical realism of N.T. Wright. Wright’s CR, which seems to share essential aspects with that of  
Bhaskar, is 
a way of describing the process of 'knowing' that acknowledges the reality of the thing known, as 
something other than the knower (hence 'realism'), while also fully acknowledging that the only 
access we have to this reality lies along the spiralling path of appropriate dialogue or 
conversation between the knower and the thing known (hence 'critical'). ... Knowledge, in other 
words, although in principle concerning realities independent of the knower, is never itself 
independent of the knower. (McGrath 1999, pp.217-218; T.F Wright 1992, p.35) 
174 
 
with reality as a theological response toward a higher understanding of the Trinity (McGrath 1999, 
pp.168ff). The constitution of three levels indicates a developmental or deepening meaning of the 
world in that it has its starting point in the initial perception of orderedness and structure for more 
discerning investigation. Hence its methodology takes a form of 'advancement to deeper levels of 
understanding, in which each level rests upon what has already been uncovered, yet casts additional 
light upon it' (pp.168-169): Experience of God → Economy of Trinity → Essential Trinity (McGrath 
2002, p.237). The first level of incipient theology is the basic level of Christian experience and living, 
called ‘the evangelical and doxological level’, which is ‘the level of our day-to-day worship and 
meeting with God in response to the proclamation of the Gospel’ in that ‘God is apprehended 
intuitively, 'without engaging in analytical or logical process of thought' (McGrath 1999, p.170; 
Torrance 1996, pp.88-90).163 The second stage is the theological level that moves from ‘the 
experiential apprehension’ of God into ‘discerning the structures’ which underlie the experience 
(McGrath p.171). It was this kind of movement, according to Torrance, ‘that was involved in the 
deliberations of the Council of Nicaea’, in that ‘the Nicene fathers developed the all-important 
concept of the homoousion not through abstract theological speculation, but through an attempt to 
give expression to the reality which they had grasped intuitively at the level of evangelical and 
doxological experience’ (Myers 2008, p.8). Since the theological inquiry at this level is focused on ‘an 
analysis of the self-revelation of God in history’, that is, his economic Trinitarian relation in history, 
the concept of the homoousion is decisively important as it is recognised as ‘the central organizing 
truth’ of the theological engagement (McGrath 1999, p.172). It should be noted that this movement 
is not away from the concrete experience but a moving ‘deeper into that level by uncovering the 
patterns and structures which gave rise to our experience in the first place’. Hence it is ‘the 
penetration into the structures of the divine reality’ (Myers 2008, p.9). The movement continues at 
the third level, or higher theological level, where we reach the ‘purest and most refined form’ of 
theology and concepts are formulated as to ‘constitute the ‘basic grammar’ of all theological 
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 Torrance uses the term ‘intuitively’ ‘to refer to the means by which believers directly apprehend the reality 
of God, so that it should not be read as equation with revelation’ (McGrath 1999, p.170, see note 73).     
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thought’, since it is the place where ‘we have to do with ‘the ultimate relation intrinsic to God’s own 
Being’ which as such must ‘govern and control all true knowledge of [God] from beginning to end’ 
(p.9; Torrance 1980, pp.158-159). This movement, according to Torrance, corresponds to the 
patristic movement from the economic Trinity (oikonomia) to the essential Trinity (theologia), in 
which ‘the organizing truth, complementing homoousion, is perichoresis, the mutual or coinherent 
indwelling of the three divine persons in the eternal communion of their one Being’ (McGrath 1999, 
p.172), which is richly explored by Zizioulas in terms of ‘personhood’ and ‘communion’ in relation 
with ‘ontology of otherness’, to which we will turn next. But before doing so, one last point is worthy 
of attention, since it can be a good bridge to Zizioulas.  
With regard to the third level, there might be a danger of mistaking the upgrading 
movement for an esoteric experience of transcendence, in that the ultimate goal is the exoteric 
knowledge itself, and being confined in speculative enjoyment of that knowledge. At this point the 
highest truth is reduced to esoteric knowledge and becomes desire. What is left then is desire for a 
desire, in which God, the Other par excellence, is evaporated (Zizioulas 2006, p.50).164 Torrance 
himself gave a similar warning not to run ‘the risk of becoming detached from its mooring in God’s 
self-revelation in history, and becoming little more than speculation and possible invention’ 
(McGrath 1999, p.173).165 This is a fatal mistake, like the one that is observed in the very first sin 
committed by the first persons in their desire for knowledge instead of personal relation with God; 
by reducing God to desire what remains is the non-personal fruit of knowledge. What this indicates 
is the evaporation of personal relation, which is against the true goal of the Christian vision of life of 
faith, viz. being in personal relation as a person; communion with the triune God as the three 
persons of the Trinity are with each other; loving and being loved. 
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 This is a fundamental critique of Levinas from Zizioulas.   
165
 So he says: 
We must keep a constant check on these refined theological concepts and relations to make sure 
that they are in definite touch with the ground level of God's actual self-revelation ... and that 
they remain empirically correlated with the saving truths and events of the Gospel, otherwise 
they tend to pass over into mythological projections of our own rationalizations into Deity. 




John Zizioulas – Personhood and otherness  
From McGrath’s iterative procedure we have found the rationality of explaining otherness 
from a particular tradition, such as the traditional theology of the Trinity; in Gunton’s study of Barth 
we have noted that the features of otherness drawn out in previous chapters are features of the 
triune God as ‘Becoming’; and from Torrance we have found a realist epistemology, centred on the 
homoousion, in which three developmental levels of theological inquiry are distinguished, reflecting 
different types of knowledge of God of which the highest is about essential Trinity. Now in Zizioulas’s 
study of the triune God we find a rich theological account of the essential Trinity in terms of 
personhood, in that ‘otherness’ is explored as constitutive of the Being of God. While the term 
Trinitarian God was used quite generally in our introduction to McGrath’s iterative procedure, and in 
Gunton and Torrance it was more focused on God the Son incarnate, as seen in the expression of the 
triune God as Becoming and the emphasis on the doctrine of the homoousion, it is in Zizioulas’s 
works that a particular attention is given to God the Father in understanding the triune God. At the 
heart of this exploration is the concept of personhood as hypostasis of the triune God, which is in 
turn conceived as the very ontological ground of otherness.  
 The crucial question has to be … whether [otherness] is a sine qua non 
condition for one’s very being and for the being of all that exist. (Zizioulas 2006, p.14)  
From Bhaskarian ontology we have seen his particular account of God (or the ultimate 
reality), called meta-Reality, for which the fundamental way of argument is grounded on 
transcendental realism, which in turn argues for ontology of being in terms of its implicit, inner 
tendencies (which are ground-state qualities for meta-Reality). Hence it has been argued here that 
this form of ontology is characterised as being-centredness in the sense that being is fundamentally 
explained by what is within, that is, its normically qualified properties, working as causal agent of 
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that being so that this ontology is termed a form of agential-centred explanation. Now, this type of 
ontology is markedly congruent with the substantialist approach to the understanding of the being 
of God, which contrasts with Zizioulas’s personhood approach. Thus at the heart of his development 
of the personhood approach, one can see an argument between the substantialist and the 
personhood accounts on the being of God,  in that the central notions are ousia and hypostasis, 
respectively.  
According to Zizioulas, to understand the ‘being’ of God as ‘substance’ and to give it priority 
over the person is deeply related with the basic Greek idea (Zizioulas 2006, p.220). The main 
characteristic of the thought is its concern for ousia, that is, a concern about ‘being’, hence it 
developed a kind of ontology within which ‘Greek thought in all its variations (Platonic, Aristotelian, 
etc.) always operated’ (p.208). Drawing on Mascall, Zizioulas calls this ontology a closed ontology in 
that  
… every being had a nicely rounded-off nature which contained implicitly 
everything that the being could ever become … What Greek thought could not have 
tolerated … would have been the idea that a being could become more perfect in its 
kind by acquiring some characteristic which was not implicit in its nature before. 
(Zizioulas 2006, p. 208, see note 3; cited from Mascall 1971, p.256f)166 
Thus being understood in such ontology is ‘being qua being’, without allowing any external 
thing or being as causative for its being. With regard to the idea of causation, Greek philosophy 
radically posited causation only within the framework of being; everything in the world is caused by 
something else but ‘the world as a whole is not caused radically … The world is eternal; it is not 
ontologically caused.’ This kind of ontology is a ‘self-existent’ explanation of being in that ‘being is 
not a gift but a datum to be reckoned with by the particular beings’ within it. All particular things, in 
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 It has already been observed that to understand being as containing ‘implicitly everything that the being 
could ever become’ is central to Bhaskar’s ontology, implied in his transcendental realism and the principle of 




this ontology, are conceived as caused necessarily by what is implicit so that the idea of necessity is 
inscribed into the ontology (Zizioulas 2006, p.104).167 Everything in this ontology is understood in 
terms of the boundaries of being in terms of its qualities, properties, and particulars. Hence the 
logical necessity and ontological structure are constituted such that ousia, that is, ‘being is’ comes 
first, then ‘modes’ of being in particulars; the priority is given to being itself rather than to its 
particular modes. This being itself is conceived as the principle of being or the cosmological necessity, 
which is termed substance of being (Zizioulas 1985, pp.39ff). When applied to understanding of the 
doctrine of the Holy Trinity, that is, ‘one substance, three persons’, there has been a traditional 
interpretation of the doctrine, particularly in western theology, whereby  
God first is God (His substance or nature, His being), and then exists as Trinity, 
that is, as persons … ‘On the One God’ followed by ‘On the Trinity’ … [on] the 
assumption that the ontological ‘principle’ of God is not found in the person but in the 
substance, that is, in the ‘being’ itself of God. (Zizioulas 1985, p.40 emphasis original)  
However, according to Zizioulas, this represents a misinterpretation of the Greek Fathers’ 
theology of the Trinity because for them ‘the unity of God, the one God and the ontological 
“principle” … the being of God does not consist in the one substance of God but in the hypostasis, 
that is, the person of the Father’ (p.40). A serious form of misunderstanding of the Trinity had 
already been raised earlier in the teaching of Arius (AD. 250-336); Arianism had been condemned as 
a heresy in the first ecumenical council of Nicaea. The Arians took the position that it was implied 
that ‘the generation of the Son was not free but necessary’ (Zizioulas 2006, p.108, see note 18, 
emphasis added).168 This necessitarian understanding of the Trinity made the Son subordinate to 
God the Father; hence it implied both the reduction of God the Father into the system of necessity 
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 To understand being as to be reckoned is also congruent with Bhaskar’s idea of ‘awakening’ or ‘Platonic 
anamnesis’ by agent, who is conceived as ‘thinking (conscious) being’ fundamentally. See, Bhaskar 2002b, 
pp.357ff.  
168
 Arius was a Libyan presbyter in Alexandria when he declared that ‘there was when he was not’, which 
implied that the Son is divine but a created being, not co-essential with the Father. This raised soteriological 
challenges to the early stage of the doctrine of the Trinity since it made the Son Jesus less than the Father.  
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and a rejection of the true meaning of being person for both God the Father and the Son. It was the 
Cappadocian Fathers in the fourth century who dealt with this problem successfully by asking 
whether God’s being is constituted necessarily or freely. In particular, Gregory of Nazianzus, based 
on the works of predecessors who had distinguished between will and substance, distinguished 
between ‘will’ and ‘the willing one’ in that the ‘will’ of God presupposes his freedom while the 
willing one denotes a willing person. Zizioulas finds two crucial points implied in the distinction:  
On the one hand, it is implied that the question of freedom is a matter of 
personhood; God’s being ultimately depends on a willing person – the Father; on the 
other hand, it indicates … that ‘even the Father’s own being is a result of the ‘willing one’ 
– the Father himself. Thus by making a person –the Father – the ultimate point of 
ontological reference … the Cappadocian Fathers made it possible to introduce freedom 
into the notion of being, perhaps for the first time in the history of philosophy. 
(Zizioulas 2006, p.108, note 18 emphasis original) 
Here we find the shift of identification of the being of God from divine substance or ‘ousia’ 
to the personhood, that is, the hypostasis of the Father, through conceiving personhood as freedom 
from necessity.169 But at the same time this point reminds us of the contrast between this position 
and the Bhaskarian account of meta-Reality, working in the framework of what he calls modalities 
and mechanisms, which are non-personal by nature, and subject to its own inner ontological 
structure, within which a particular has no possibility to claim for genuine causative power, but is 
always posited in internal relationality of the whole, hence cannot claim for ontological primacy. 
However, Zizioulas argues that asserting the personhood as the hypostasis of the being of God is 
consistent with Biblical thought in that being is understood as ‘caused in a radical way by someone – 
a particular being’, leading to an ontology of personhood in which a particular person – the Father – 
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 It should be mentioned that the concept of hypostasis has been used by both the substantialist and the 
personhood approach. However, by tracing back to the Cappadocian Fathers, who made the original shift, 
Zizioulas makes the point that for those Fathers ‘the ontological identity of God and the unity of his being were 
not to be found in divine ‘substance’ but in the hypostasis of the Father’ (Zizioulas 2006, p.215, see note 16).   
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is given the ontological primacy (p.104).170 He is ontologically unique and irreplaceable by any others 
because the whole being is dependent on him (p.108). How then does Zizioulas expound this?  
Zizioulas expounds the personhood of God the Father in terms of a combination between 
ekstasis and hypostasis, arguing that personhood denotes the arche of the Being of God, that is, the 
mode of existence as a movement, rather than ‘being’ in the sense of ousia (pp.212ff). As has been 
argued, being a person means being free from necessity, which implies ‘openness of being’, but 
more than that, it implies the ekstasis of being, a movement towards communion with others in that 
the person transcends the boundaries of the ‘self’ to freedom to love in the communion. At the 
same time ‘the person in its ecstatic character reveals its being in a catholic … integral and undivided 
way and … in its being ecstatic it becomes hypostatic’, bearing its nature in its totality (p.213). 
Ekstasis and hypostasis represent two basic aspects of personhood … Thus the 
idea of person affirms at once both that personal being cannot be ‘contained’ or 
‘divided’, and that the mode of its existence, its hypostasis, is absolutely unique and 
unrepeatable. Without two conditions, being falls into an a-personal reality, defined 
and described like a mere ‘substance’, that is, it becomes an a-personal being. The 
combination of the notion of ekstasis with that of hypostasis in the idea of the person 
reveals that the personhood is directly related to ontology – it is not a quality added, as 
it were, to beings, something that beings ‘have’ or ‘have not’, but it is constitutive of 
what can be ultimately called a ‘being’. (Zizioulas 2006, p.213 emphasis original)  
Now, from this conception of personhood we can follow how Zizioulas grounds otherness 
ontologically as a constitutive part of being. It is not about what is being, but is about how is being, 
and this question of how is being can only be answered from the notion of personhood. According to 
the ontological primacy of particular, it has been shown that God the Father is the particular person 
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 It is worth noting that the ‘I am who I am’ of the Bible (Ex. 3:14) is a remarkable illustration of the assertion 
of God as a particular and a person rather than a being. In fact, it is not the way of the Bible to attempt to 
describe this someone in terms of being (Zizioulas 2006, p.104). 
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who caused in his freedom the others to be. His personhood, that is, his mode of being, creates the 
others in his freedom. By letting the others be God the Father freely becomes the other of the world.  
‘Being “other” is part of what it means to be oneself’ (p. 13), hence the freedom of being other of 
God makes possible not only creation but also other persons of the Trinity. Here we can speak of  
ontology of otherness and ontology of freedom in the personhood of God the Father; to make 
oneself be other genuinely implies to let the other be her/him self, not to be absorbed into my 
totality. It is where that otherness and freedom meet in the constitution of the being of God the 
Father and other persons of the Trinity. The relationship between the three persons is conceived in 
terms of perichoresis, by which the Cappadocians expressed the unity of the Trinity:  
[E]ach person carries the full, undivided nature and co-inheres in the other 
persons, thus showing substance to be commonly shared among the persons not by 
way of each person holding part of it … but by each coinciding fully into one and the 
same nature, carried in its totality by each person. (2006, pp.106-7, note 14 emphasis 
original) 
Zizioulas calls the relationship between the persons of the Holy Trinity the ‘hypostatical 
relation’ in that the Father is the ‘Willing One’ as a person and his whole ‘will’ is shared by all three 
persons. Thus the ontological arche in the Trinity is in the Father who is the ‘willing one’ as the 
initiator of the divine freedom, and the Son is not born out of substance but is born ‘willingly and 
freely’ by the Father. Therefore the notion of personhood is crucial in Trinitarian theology (pp.120-
121).  
The hypostatical relation, the mode of existence of the being of God is also central to the 
understanding of the doctrine of ex nihilo, in which the world as the other of God is not conceived as 
extension of God’s being, as in the case of ousia or emergence from the cosmic envelope as seen in 
Bhaskarian meta-Reality, where there is no genuine other; but only ‘out of nothing’ with His freely 
loving will is the world created as the other of God. The doctrine of ex nihilo asserts the uniqueness 
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of the Creator and the creation, while the act of freedom of the Father safeguards otherness 
between them so that they, including human beings, do not remain separate but come to 
communion in a hypostatic way: ‘God and man remain other, and thus ontologically free, by virtue 
of the fact that they are united in a hypostatic way’ (p. 37).  
Among other creatures, the human being is privileged in an awesome way because he/she is 
created as the imago Dei, gifted with freedom so that ‘the human being can properly be called, a 
person, as it is endowed with the freedom to reflect divine personhood in creation’. Hence the true 
meaning of human being or the alethic truth of human being should be found in his/her uniqueness 
as a person, not in certain qualities he/she ultimately shares with other beings. The person of human 
being can only be properly personal when it is hypostasised by the divine personhood who is the 
Christ Jesus incarnate, since ‘it is divine personhood alone that can be the model of true 
personhood’.171 This Zizioulas calls hypostasisation of human being through the hypostasis of 
Christ,172  which renders the human person with a double sense of destination: on the one hand, ‘to 
bring the rest of creation into communion with God so that the hypostasis of every creature might 
be saved from mortality and thus be shown to be a true hypostasis’ (p.95); on the other hand, as 
Farrow points out, to participate in Christ’s sonship, ‘in his filial schesis [the eternal relation to the 
Father], in his being for the Father’. This is because ‘to be personal is to be distinct … for the sake of 
unity’. Thus in the unity with Christ we find ourselves, not ceasing to be ourselves but ‘being for the 
Father’ as Christ is for the Father (Farrow 2007, p.117). Thus, by combining those two senses of 
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 It is worth noting the usage of the term ‘hypostasisation’ or ‘hypostasised’ as a verb type of hypostasis, 
which can be juxtaposed with the notion of being whose essence is understood as ‘the process or event of 
being’, implying its dynamic meaning as ‘a verb to be’ or ‘to vibrate’ (Levinas 1991, p.23; 187), in order to 
reveal an interesting point of contrast between them. Whereas the verb type of hypostasis indicates a 
movement towards the other, the latter notion indicates a movement of the self for the self, securing its 
essence, hence Levinas calls it totality. Thus what makes the two usages different is not what being is itself, 
but the presence or absence of otherness.   
172
 With regard to the question of how Christ fulfils the hypostasisation upon human being, there is a twofold 
answer. First, his personhood, which is constituted from his eternal relation (schesis) to Father, enables him to 
cause his human nature to be, and then second, he generates ‘the free or catholic person by sharing with him 
or her the same schesis that is constitutive of his own person’. This requires ‘the cross and the descent into hell 
[and] is effected in the Spirit, by sacramental means, through the baptismal and Eucharistic liturgies’ (Farrow 
2007, p.113).  
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destination, the ultimate goal that can be drawn from Zizioulas’s theology would be ‘fully becoming 
a person’ (Collingwood 2007, p.13).173 
 
3. Concluding Remarks – A model of stratification of human being  
Here we can see the difference in vision of universal emancipation between Zizioulas and 
Bhaskar. Though both accounts are expounded in terms of what is beyond the natural being, for 
Bhaskar the possibility of universal emancipation is attributed to the cosmic envelope that is shared 
by all beings, hence it is ultimately the self, in that the notions of freedom and love are 
fundamentally bound within the working framework of the self like awakening and co-presence; 
while for Zizioulas it is attributed first to the personhood and otherness of God, then to the 
hypostatical relations gifted to human beings by God in his freedom in love. Farrow  expounds the 
hypostasisation in terms of ‘freedom in, as well as freedom from necessity’ because when Zizioulas 
speaks of freedom from necessity it does not mean the elimination of necessity, but ‘freedom in 
necessity, through creaturely communion with God’ with the possibility of overcoming certain 
necessities, which might be called deification (Farrow 2007, p.117; 120). Therefore, seen from the 
Trinitarian perspective, the Bhaskarian vision of emancipation is limited by its necessitarian 
framework, hence is unable to let others be genuinely and uniquely, and if the otherness is absent 
then there would be no genuine sense of ethical relation; moreover, it would be a mistake to 
understand emancipation solely by reference to self-realisation and self-awakening because in the 
Christian vision the dominance of self over otherness is congenial to our fallen existence as the result 
of the rejection of God, that is, to reject ‘the Other as constitutive of his being’ and to declare 
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 The concept of personhood ‘should not be understood as an ‘individual’ in the sense of an identity 
conceivable in itself, an ‘axis of consciousness’ and a concurrence of natural and moral qualities, or a number 
that can be subject to addition or combination’, because this was not what was meant by the Greek Fathers 
(Zizioulas 2006, p171). Rather, to understand human being or its hypostasis as consciousness or mind was a 
substantialist approach, which is a western cultural inheritance from St. Augustine (Collingwood 2007, pp.140), 
and in recent history influenced modern existentialist philosophers;  Zizioulas calls it ‘anthropomorphic 
monstrosity’ (Zizioulas 2006, p.173). 
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‘himself to be the ultimate explanation of his existence’, in other words, to give rise to the self as 
having ontological priority over the other (Zizioulas 2006, pp.43-46). Therefore what is a lacuna in 
Bhaskar’s critical realism, the lacuna of ontological otherness, seems the very point that constitutes 
the two ontological, but contrasting, accounts of meta-Reality and the Trinitarian God.  
With regard to Levinas, we find that the concept of personhood challenges his concept of 
otherness and ethical subjectivity, not in the sense of negation of them but in the sense of fulfilling 
of them.174 First, the immense emphasis on the ethical directionality of ‘from me to the other’ as 
expressed for example in terms of responsibility, substitution, or expiation for the other, needs to be 
put in the right order of relation according to the prior hypostatic relation given ‘from above’.175 As 
we have seen, the Father is the ‘one personal arche in God’ who is causative of the other two 
persons and of creation (p.119), and Christ, like the Father, shares his personhood with us, hence 
generates the free person in his ‘becoming’ (incarnation, the Cross and the descent to hell) (Farrow 
2007, p.113), that is the hypostasisation. This is to recognise the prior ontological directionality ‘from 
above to me’, which was recognised as ‘coming of the other’ in the reading of Levinas but also as the 
first openness to the other.176 At this juncture what is crucially corrective for Levinas is that it is not 
simply ‘openness’ to the other but at the same time it is ‘freedom’ in and from necessity with the 
generation of personhood within us so that we may be able to make a hypostatic personal relation 
with others. Thus what we called ethical subjectivity in Levinasian philosophy can find its 
anthropological arche that is more than ethical, it is also personal since it has its divine arche in a 
never ceasing relationship with the true Other. This leads to the second point of correction of 
Levinas’s concept of otherness, particularly as concerns the eschatology of otherness (Zizioulas 2006, 
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 In spite of Zizioulas’s critique of Levinas with regard to certain points, he recognises Levinas and Buber as 
having made a departure from the consciousness-centred philosophy of western thought and culture (Zizioulas 
2006, p.46). 
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 Zizioulas makes clear that the ontology of personhood for human being can only be provided by Christology, 
not by created being, because Christology as fulfilling the human being drives to personhood. From this point 
of Christology he sets out four conditions for the possibility of personhood of human being: it comes from ‘the 
above’; it is from ‘the hypostatic unity’ with God; it needs a new birth which requires the Cross; and the 
impossibility of fulfilment of the identity in history (Zizioulas 2006, pp.108-109).  
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pp.49ff):  ‘for Levinas the ultimate destination of Desire is not the Other but the Desire of the Other’ 
which is sharply contrasted with the Greek Fathers ‘for whom the movement of Desire or eros finds 
its rest in the particular other’ (p.50). In Levinas’s thought, the Desire is always my Desire as a way of 
transcendence from totality, and is also ethical insofar as my Desire keeps a distance of the Other 
from totality in order for him not to be absorbed; but it is not communion as seen in hypostatic 
relation because the Other does not desire us or any other; hence, ‘what we are left with in the end 
is nothing but our own Desire’ (p.50). But God, the Other par excellence, ‘initiates or “causes” our 
Desire for him in and through his Desire for us’ so that there is ‘an event of communion of Desire at 
the very heart of otherness’ (p.51 emphasis original). God’s initiative movement towards us, his 
desire of us and provoking us to desire him, is expressed as love or eros in that we, particulars, are 
‘beloved’ and ‘unique’ only as gifts of God, ‘who grants [us] an identity by establishing a unique 
relation with [us]’ (p.89). In this Trinitarian vision, Zizioulas understands faith in a Eucharistic way, in 
that everything, including our very being, is attributed to the giver: 
Faith is thus an attitude of gratitude … and of doxology to the Other par 
excellence, the author of all otherness. This kind of faith offers no security of rational 
conviction. The only proof of God’s existence is his love – demonstrated by our very 
being, in otherness and communion. We are loved, therefore he exists. (Zizioulas 2006, 
p.98 emphasis added) 
This gives rise to recognition of an ontological dimension even prior to Levinasian ethical 
subjectivity. If Levinasian philosophy corrects Bhaskarian ethical agent by incorporating it within the 
dimension of otherness, so that it presents ethical subjectivity, it is the Trinitarian account of 
personhood that corrects the Levinasian ethical subject by originating it in the ontological primacy of 
‘being loved’ over ethical subjectivity.177 In other words, while in Levinasian thought the engagement 
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 Levinas does adumbrate a prior event of being welcomed by the other (which he calls a famine other) in his 
explanation of the dwelling of the separated I, because without such hospitality of the famine other there 
would be no difference in dwelling from the brutal outside; hence dwelling indicates a place where the 
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with the other is seen as a happening or event with which the I remains non-agential, so that it is 
described simply as ‘coming of the other’, in the hypostatic relation the Other par excellence comes 
for us, not accidentally or necessarily but freely in his love, hence can be described as ‘overflowing 
with love’ from his personhood upon us;178 while the Levinasian encounter with the face of the other 
gives rise to apology and obligation for ethical exigency, which may constitute a language of critique 
in the form of negation, including of its own totality, the hypostatic relation gives rise to an attitude 
of gratitude, which may constitute a language of hope from the gratitude for the fundamental 
givenness of being itself in the faith of truthful personhood of God, which in turn becomes the very 
source of transformative negation.179 If we have been informed by Bhaskar with a limited sense of 
love, simply speaking, as a binding force of the self,180 hence constituting ethical dialectical agency,  
and if Levinas has taught us the inevitability of otherness and my ethical response to the other, 
hence constituting ethical subjectivity, it is the Trinitarian theology, particularly that of Zizioulas, that 
lets us know who we are, not in the sense of qualities we ‘have’ but more fundamentally in the 
sense of who we ‘are’; that is, we are person, ‘being loved then loving’ after the model of the Trinity. 
Therefore we may suggest the following model of ontological stratification of human being: 
(Bhaskarian) Dialectical agency, as incorporated into 
(Levinasian) Ethical subjectivity, as originating from 
(Zizioulas)  Personhood generated by  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
separated I can develop its interiority in security (see, Levinas 2007, pp.109ff). But, this being welcomed 
cannot be conceived as a hypostatic personal relation because what is developed from the point is not person, 
but interiority on which all works of totality, even totality itself, are established, affirming its separatedness. 
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 One should not confuse the expression ‘overflowing with love’ with the Platonic image of God, expressed as 
an ‘overflowing crater with love’ because in the former it is from personhood, that is, freely in love, but the 
latter is a kind of necessary generation from ‘being’ of God in which the concept of personhood cannot be 
attributed (Zizioulas 2006, p.119 see note 25).  
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 In their communal study on educational curriculum and schooling, Arnowitz and Giroux claim ‘a 
fundamental commitment to the notions of hope and emancipation’ and a need to be ‘informed by the 
language of possibility and hope’ in the face of the one-sided position of the radical educators whose critique 
was so focused on power-interest introduction through schooling, which falls short of providing ‘possibilities 
for critical teaching and student empowerment’ (Arnowitz & Giroux 1986, pp.141ff).   
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 The Bhaskarian concept of love can be described as an aspect or result of awakening. Love for Bhaskar is a 
principle of unity, working at the 3L realm of totality, which is construed as ‘the cohering, healing, uniting, de-




(Trinitarian) The hypostatic relation with the persons of the Trinity 
At the level of the dialectical agency there is a lack of recognition of, or an indifference to, 
the dimension of otherness, resulting to a single openness in that human being is conceived in terms 
of the agency of its innermost self with capability of dialectical openness for a greater totality. 
Remaining at this level, life can be true to the degree that it awakens what is true for the self 
through transcendental identification, including transformative negation. At the level of ethical 
subjectivity, the significance of otherness is recognised and lies at the heart of the constitution of 
ethical subjectivity; it reveals another dimension of openness, which seems more fundamental than 
the openness of the ethical-dialectical agency because the latter can only be ethical when it has the 
openness to the other. Life at this level may be true to the degree that it desires beyond itself and 
becomes responsible for the other according to the ethical truth, provoked by encountering the 
other then inscribed in consciousness. At the level of personhood, human being is not identified with 
either subjectivity or agency, which is a quality that we have but who we are. Human being is 
identified as a person and those qualities can only be achieved by or added to a person. Likewise 
openness is conceived not as a quality we have, but as a constitutive part of a person, because being 
a person means being in the hypostatic relation, in that a person is being other of someone else in 
the mode of beloved and loving, in which ethical relation is already implied. Thus it can be said of 
person as openness that the Levinasian double openness finds its ontological unification in 
personhood; a person as openness works through all stages of ethical and dialectical stages. Such 
personhood is not self-generated, but is a gift from the divine person by his hypostatic relation to us. 
Life in the level of personhood is, therefore, ontologically truthful since by becoming a person we 
are hypostatically realised truth or a new birth in truth, but still in need of becoming more fully 
person, not only by transformative dialectical negation but fundamentally in faithful relation with 









Andrew Wright was perhaps the first to engage properly with critical realism and to identify 
it as one of the underlying principles in the formation of religious education (Wright 2000, 2000a, 
2004, 2007).181 Previously, his work had focused on developing a critical approach to spiritual 
education (Wright 1996a, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2000, 2000a), one that is 
‘designed to cast doubt upon the provenance of an experientially based religious pedagogy, open up 
other potential horizons of meaning, and empower students to take responsibility for their spiritual 
lives by cultivating appropriate level of religious literacy’ (Wright 2004, p.viiii). Hence it is possible to 
see his works in the frame of confrontation and response. By confrontation we mean that his in-
depth critique of liberal religious education finds serious flaws related with the problem of 
dissociation of truth from truthfulness that is rooted in the tendency in religious education to reject 
truth claims. By response we mean that he proposes a type of religious education that re-habituates 
religious literacy among pupils in a critical manner by inviting them into the course of the pursuit of 
truth and truthfulness. This is where he takes a critical realist perspective, alongside other 
philosophical sources, in framing his critical realist approach to religious education. In the following 
sections, therefore, we will attend first to his critique of liberal religious education, then to his 
theory of critical religious education, which comprises the central conceptual framework of Truth 
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 Even more recently, he has extended his interest to the incorporation of critical realism into the 
understanding of Christianity and vice versa (Wright 2012). 
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and Truthfulness, and finally to his stress on discrete religious traditions as the default position of 
religious education. Particularly in the second section, we will read Wright’s approach in regard to 
ontology and otherness as argued in the previous chapters. In the final section, it will be shown that 
Wright’s approach to religious education, although moderate in itself, paves a way for the ontology 
and otherness approach to religious education that provides the possibility of Christian religious 
education in Christian schools. 
 
1. Critique of Liberal Religious Education  
1.1. A vertical account 
In the second half of the 1990s Wright sought to develop a critical approach to spiritual 
education.182 The results of over five years’ work can be seen in his book, Spirituality and Education, 
where he provides an account of how the inclusive model of religious education has emerged in the 
United Kingdom (mainly in England and Wales) (Wright 2000, pp.63ff).183 The consolidation of the 
Church-State partnership in the 1944 Education Act made it possible to offer a ‘common-
denominator Protestant Christianity, without denominational bias’ (p.64), characterised as a 
confessional Christian education.  Later the eclipse of Christianity in society brought about a gradual 
change in the characteristic of RE from the confessional to the neo-confessional, rejuvenating 
Christian education by bridging teenagers’ own ‘grammar’ of their lives to Christian values (Loukes 
1961, p.7). By the 1970s this had been replaced by ‘a modern multi-faith religious education 
concerned with phenomenological description of religion’ rather than with induction into Christian 
beliefs (Wright 2000, p.64). This was accompanied by the rise of the vision of liberal humanism in 
society and in education, particularly in moral education that stressed the cultivation of the twin 
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 Since the term spiritual education has been used to denote the recent interest or direction of religious 
education, it is used here interchangeably with the general term religious education.  
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 His reading of the historical background of RE in this book provides a crucial reference for a reading of the 
Korean case, because of the resemblance between the two cases of RE development in certain aspects.     
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liberal virtues of freedom and tolerance ‘as means to establish common cross-cultural understanding 
in a pluralist society’ (pp.64-65). This led RE to replace the ultimate spiritual goal of the ultimate 
truth of Christianity with ‘the establishment of a just, equitable and harmonious society’, that is, a 
vision of an inclusive society in which religious education is considered as a tool for social harmony 
(p.65).  
By this time there had been developed two models of RE, which contained ‘the origins of the 
main agendas which have largely determined the evolution of the different pedagogies of RE over 
the last forty years’ (Grimmitt 2000, p.26ff): ‘explicit’ religious education, ‘concerned with the 
detailed phenomena of religion’, as originally advocated by the Schools Council Working Paper 
Number 36 in 1971, and ‘implicit’ religious education, ‘concerned with the pupils’ search for 
meaning’, in which John Hull took a significant role184 (Grimmitt p.28). In a context of increasing 
concern with the plurality of religious and secular worldviews, these models advocated a neutral 
presentation of religion, by focusing either on objective or common features of religions, or on the 
experiential dimension of pupils. But in doing so, they dislocated ‘the exploration of religious truth 
claims from the task of enabling pupils to live truthful lives’ (Wright 2007, p.88). Instead, they sought 
strategies to make a balance between them, which led to the identification of two distinct 
attainment targets, identified by Grimmitt as ‘dimensional’ and ‘experiential’ and by Edwin Cox as 
‘religious understanding’ and ‘understanding religion’185 (p.88).  Grimmitt provides a famous way of 
integration of the two attainments, using a number of pedagogical strategies, into a formula called 
‘learning from and learning about’ religion (Grimmitt, p35). It aims to be a mutual learning process 
that encourages pupils ‘to evaluate their understanding of religion in personal terms and evaluate 
their understanding of self in religious terms’ (Grimmitt 1987, p.213).  However, the fact that its 
ultimate concern is human development indicates that it is an instrumental approach to RE, hence it 
also dislocates truth from truthfulness.   
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The model that is developed is derived from the view, therefore, that the 
structure of the curriculum and the choice of content and teaching methods must all be 
specifically designed or chosen to enable pupils to develop the skills and abilities of 
being able to apply religious insights to an understanding of their own situations and 
experiences and to their own self-concept. (Grimmitt 2000, p.36 emphasis original) 
Moral and spiritual liberalism paved the way for a further shift in education from content-
based curriculum to child-centred curriculum, ‘accompanied by a call for education to be more 
directly relevant to the immediate needs of pupils’ (Wright 2000, p.65). However, by the late 1980s 
this was challenged by ‘a resurgent traditionalism … [desiring] to restore order, in the face of what 
was considered to be the self-imposed anarchy of progressivism’ (p.65). With the increase of tension 
between progressive and traditionalist visions of education, school education was faced with the 
question ‘What are our schools for?’ which opened up the importance of the spiritual dimension. 
This was reflected in the 1988 Education Act (p.65), which positioned RE as a core curriculum, aimed 
at promoting ‘the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils at the school 
and of society’ (HMSO 1988, p.1).  The Act also specified that RE should reflect Christianity as the 
main religious tradition of the society, while taking account of other principal religions.  
However, as Wright points out, the subsequent development of religious education has kept 
its normative stance in an inclusive approach (Wright 2000, pp.67ff). The development of an 
inclusive model of spiritual education grounded on ‘a basic, inclusive understanding of spirituality’ 
was consolidated by a discussion book issued by the National Curriculum Council, Spiritual and 
Moral Development (NCC 1993; reissued as SCAA 1995).  An anthropological understanding drawn 
from two contrasting accounts of spirituality appeared in an HM Inspectors’ educational discussion 
book, Supplement to Curriculum 11-16 (DES/HMI 1997b); it is worth quoting the definition of the 
inclusive, anthropological account (Wright 2000, p.68):  
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The spiritual area is concerned with the awareness a person has of those 
elements in existence and experience which may be defined in terms of inner feelings 
and beliefs; they affect the way people see themselves and throw light for them on the 
purpose and meaning of life itself. Often these feelings and beliefs lead people to claim 
to know God and glimpse the transcendent. (DES/HMI 1997, recited from Wright 2000, 
p.66) 
Although the inclusive model of religious education has become ‘a normative influence on 
spiritual education’, working as quasi-authoritative curriculum guidance, there have also been 
narrow, exclusive forms of religious education.186 Thus ‘[t]he tension between [them] … is a key issue 
in contemporary spiritual education’ (p.68).  
At this juncture it may be useful to provide an account of why religious education has come 
to be dominated by the inclusive forms. This is closely related with the change of the cultural context 
of society, particularly the change to the comprehensive liberal environment, which has been called 
‘the dominant ideology of our time’ (Wright 2007, p.33). In his critical analysis of liberal religious 
education and its dominant inclusive model, Wright has noted that the liberal religious education 
has been formulated, sustained and delivered within the framework of a comprehensive liberalist 
environment (Wright 2007, pp.79ff). In order to understand the situation he explores features of 
comprehensive liberalism in contrast to political liberalism (pp.29ff):  
Comprehensive liberalism … constitutes a total worldview that offers an all-
encompassing account of the place of humanity in the world; in doing so it reifies the 
principles of freedom and tolerance and establishes them as ends in themselves, rather 
than as the means to some greater end. Generally speaking, political liberals are 
committed to an economy of difference: they recognize that not all accounts of the 
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 Wright introduces four alternative exclusive approaches: Christian Orthodoxy (Adrian Thatcher 1996, 
1995a), Religious Universalism (David Hay 1982), Secular Humanism (Mike Newby 1994, 1996) and Post-
modern Relativism (Clive Erricker 1993). For a brief account of them, see Wright 2000, pp.77ff.  
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good life are valid, that the ability of citizens to pursue the good live can be restricted by 
inequalities deeply ingrained within society, and that the exercise of freedom and 
tolerance are not ends in themselves but rather the means to the greater end of 
pursuing the good life in a responsible and informed manner. Comprehensive liberals, 
on the other hand, tend to be committed to an economy of sameness: contrasting 
accounts of the good life are treated as equally valid, all citizens are deemed free to 
pursue their chosen life regardless of their particular circumstances, and the exercise of 
freedom and tolerance is viewed as an end in itself. (Wright 2007, pp.32-33) 
As mentioned earlier, the dominant inclusive model originated in the concern with social 
integration and harmony in an increasingly plural society, so that it has sought a form of religious 
education that is as open and accommodating as possible (Wright 2000, p.70). Hence, to Lealman’s 
question, ‘Can people who approach education from different philosophical/theological viewpoints 
find a common working definition?’ (pp.70-71, cited from Lealman 1986, p.67), it answers in the 
affirmative, citing anthropological spirituality.  For inclusivists, by assigning the human being as the 
centre of spirituality, regardless of particular cultural and traditional origin, the inclusive model 
assumes the ‘enhancement of social harmony and stability, rooted in a moral concern for equality of 
opportunity and drawing on the liberal principle of freedom and tolerance’ (Wright 2000, p.71). This 
approach is based on the assumption of the possibility of the dissociation of people’s lives from the 
particular context or tradition in which they have constituted their identity and worldview.187 In 
Wright’s term, it is a typical form of the dissociation of truth from truthfulness found in the 
dominant form of religious education. Moreover, such an assumption is seriously mistaken, because 
tolerance is offered to those who embrace the basic values of liberalism as ends 
in themselves, but denied to those who subscribe to alternative traditions and belief 
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 Such an assumption is possible on the ground of the universal claim of those liberal virtues as constitutive 
parts of human nature; for example, the ideas of Rousseau on freedom understood as the natural goodness of 
humanity. For a brief account of the transition to the universal claim, see, Wright 2007, p.32.  
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systems. Consequently, access to the public sphere is limited to those who espouse 
liberal values as normative for the good life, while adherents of non-liberal traditions 
are ostracized and forced to live as resident aliens in a closed comprehensive liberal 
society. (Wright 2007, p.34-35) 
From a political liberalist point of view, although such a common working definition is not 
possible, such differences, even contested views of ultimate meaning of life or truth claims, should 
be taken into account in religious education rather than renounced for the sake of harmony, in a 
manner that ‘must seek to enable pupils to engage critically with a diversity of spiritual traditions’ in 
an informed way (p.71). To this end, discrete religious traditions take on particular significance 
because they are prime bearers of truth.  This, according to Wright, should be the default position of 
critical religious education, as will be seen later.  
This leads to the question of how to relate objective study of religion (explicit model) and 
subjective experience of religion (implicit model) in a critical way. To answer this question, Wright 
constitutes his critical realist approach, but first he reflects upon the crisis in religious education as 
represented in its two forms. On the one hand, as mentioned earlier, the pursuit of balance between 
them has been replaced by the dominance of the inclusive, implicit model which has since become a 
normative stance, reflecting comprehensive liberal anthropology and liberal humanism. In recent 
cases, those tackling the issues of diversity have shown that they take a normative stance by rooting 
their religious education in certain values of wider society, such as human rights (Skeie 2006a; 
McGrady 2006; Gearon 2002). Characteristic of all this is that religious traditions and their truth 
claims are reduced to means for the cultivation of certain normative values as ends in themselves, 
mostly drawn from a comprehensive liberal ethos. On the other hand, there is another type of 
reductionism in the phenomenologically based teaching, in that learning is reduced to ‘the 
accumulation of factual knowledge at the expense of any existential engagement with the ultimate 
questions raised by religion’ (Wright 2007, p.87).  This problem of balance is reflected in Model 
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Syllabuses for Religious Education (SCAA 1994), which introduced explicitly the terminology ‘learning 
about’ and ‘learning from’.  However, although the problem was expressed in terms of balance 
between two models, Wright’s concern is not with balance but with the relationship between them, 
because ‘[t]he crisis lay in the absence of any clear understanding of the connection between the 
two’ (p.87).  
 
1.2. The dissociation of truth from truthfulness: on ‘learning 
about’ and ‘learning from’  
Wright argues that absence is rooted in the dislocation of truth from truthfulness, which is 
seen in liberal religious education particularly in the eclipse of truth (related with ‘learning about’ 
religion) and the ascendancy of truthfulness (related with ‘learning from’ religion).  
 
1.2.1. The eclipse of truth: on learning about religion in liberal 
religious education 
With regard to the eclipse of truth, Wright brings forth a central issue in his approach, viz. 
religious particularity. For Wright, the eclipse of truth is synonymous with the eclipse of religious 
particularity, and it has happened in liberal religious education because particularity is there 
considered as a scandal. 
Perhaps the great challenge was that of religious particularity: the fact that 
different religious and secular traditions offer mutually exclusive accounts of the 
ultimate order-of-things … For comprehensive liberals … the challenge of particularity 
was seen as a scandal urgently in need of resolution. (Wright 2007, p.90) 
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This ‘urgent need’ has been seen in the form of dissipation of the threat of particularity 
(Wright 2007, pp.90ff). Wright points out three strategies for this dissipation in liberal religions 
education. The first is to deny the existence of particularity by dissolving discrete religious traditions 
into a greater whole or by breaking them down into their constituent parts, as reflected in 
phenomenological and contextual religious education, respectively. The former treats particular 
religious traditions ‘as diverse manifestations of the common generic category of ‘religion’ … [as 
sharing] a common phenomenological structure and [originating] in the same universal experience 
of transcendence’ (p.91). Robert Jackson as a representative of the latter argues that there is no 
such thing as ‘a religion’ to be presented as a rigid and bounded system, because of ‘contested 
representations’ and ‘disputed borders’ of particular religious traditions among their adherents 
(Jackson 2004). Thus Jackson views discrete religions as ‘fluid and ever-changing amalgams of the 
spiritualities of individual adherents’ (Wright 2007, p.91). This strategy has circumvented the 
particularity while securing the comprehensive liberal commitment to the basic values of freedom 
and tolerance.  
The second strategy of dissipation of particularity has been to bracket out contested truth 
claims of religious particularities from the rational debate. Phenomenological religious education 
works on the basis of an implied distinction between objective knowledge and subjective opinion, in 
that it describes the beliefs of religious adherents objectively but treats truth claims, by abiding to a 
liberal polity, as ‘private beliefs rather than contested public knowledge’; hence it can accept 
description or discussion of those beliefs as a way of learning, but it cannot accept rational debate 
on ‘the truth and falsehood of the realities lying behind such beliefs’, and as such it avoids the 
scandal of particularity (p.92).  
The third strategy is to reject the key role of religious language in describing the ultimate 
order-of-things (pp.92ff). This rejection originates in Schleiermacher’s understanding of religion as 
‘modification of feeling’ rather than knowing or doing; hence it marginalises ‘the traditional 
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cognitive-propositional reality-describing understanding of religious language’ (p.92). The 
attenuation of the key role of religious language has given rise to two claims in regard to religious 
education: ‘the claim that religion is a “modification of feeling” identified with transcendent 
experiences as the basis of religious belief’ and ‘the claim that religion as essentially a “doing” invites 
the belief that religious identity is determined by the adherent’s action, with religious language 
functioning merely as a pragmatic guide to behaviour’ (pp.92-93). On the ground of the first claim, 
David Hay develops his approach to religious education, which is concerned with nurturing ‘pupils’ 
innate capacity for deep spiritual experience’ while considering the truth claims of particular 
religions as ‘culturally relative expressions of a common universal experience of transcendence’, 
hence as relatively inconsequential (p.93; Hay 1982, 1985). By stressing ‘doing’ John Hull argues for 
authentic religion as manifesting itself ‘not in true belief but in the adoption of non-religionist and 
non-tribal attitudes and actions’, but in doing so, the truth claims of particular religions are 
marginalised (p.93). 
  
1.2.2. The ascendancy of truthfulness: on learning from religion in 
liberal religious education 
As mentioned earlier, the dominant form of liberal religious education has been an inclusive, 
implicit model of learning ‘from’ religion in a particular way, that is, as dissociated from truth. 
Rooted in the struggle for social integration, it offers a model of spirituality, ‘an inclusive common-
denominator spirituality’ which seeks to be ‘as open and accommodating as possible’ (Wright 2000, 
p.63, 70). Wright identifies four central features of this model (pp.72ff):  
(a) The priority of spiritual experience, in that spiritual experience is conceived 
as a fundamental aspect of the human condition that makes us capable of dynamic self-
awareness in searching for personal identity, and of a sense of the ultimate meaning of life 
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in responding to common key experiences of death, suffering, evil and beauty (SCAA 1995). 
In regard to the relationship with religions ‘[t]he capacity for spiritual experience resembles, 
but is not ultimately reducible to, our religious, moral and aesthetic experience. Since such 
experience is universal it cannot be limited to any specific religious, ethical or artistic 
tradition, outlook or world-view’ (p.72).  
(b)  The rejection of materialism and rationalism, in that it argues for the need 
to protect the capacity for spiritual insight from the threat of materialism, which is rooted in 
positivist dogma that rejects unverifiable experiences, by asserting the priority of spiritual 
experience over such restricted rational reflection (pp.72-73) because ‘[s]piritual awareness 
manifests itself first of all in feelings and emotions from which it has to be translated into 
thought if it is to be talked about at all’ (Priestley 1985, p.114).  
(c) Transcendent mystery, in that there is a degree of suspicion of doctrine, 
belief and language for describing spiritual experience, even a claim for liberation from the 
fruitless search for objective truth. Instead it strives for ‘a new innocence of perception 
liberated from the cataract of accepted beliefs’ (Lealman 1982, p.62)’ and for celebrating the 
inherent mystery of life (Wright 2000, pp.73-74). 
(d) Educating spiritual sensibility, in that ‘spirituality is to be inculcated and 
nurtured through the sensitisation of the pupil’s curiosity, imagination and intuition’; hence 
an authentic spiritual education is defined as one that seeks ‘to sensitise pupils to a 
heightened awareness of their personal inner space, stimulate their imagination, nurture 
their creativity and spark their imagination’, and there is greater reliance on the validity of 
pupils’ own inward private experience than on that of religious traditions and their beliefs 
(p.74).188 
Wright identifies a number of flaws implicit in the inclusive model.  
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 Appealing to inner capacity as more valid than any religious tradition, and encouraging pupils’ self-
awareness of their inner world are highly congruent with some of key ideals of Bhaskar’s meta-Reality, such as 
the ontological priority of the self and the stress on awakening. 
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(i) It is flawed in its approach to anthropology because it ‘relies on an 
individualistic anthropology rooted in notions of personal autonomy’ (p.75). However, 
according to Charles Taylor (1992), the notion of the individual in western thought has been 
formed not only in an introspective way but also in terms of developing relationships with 
others in community (nature, people and God) (p.75).  
(ii) It is flawed in its approach to tradition because it lacks any sense of history, 
which renders the possibility of dislocation of individuals from their communities and 
cultural roots. 
(iii) It is flawed in its ostensive definition of the function of language because 
language is a pre-existing reality that conditions individuals’ lives and their expressions of 
experience. Hence, ‘seeking meaning no longer means spelling out consciousness but, rather, 
deciphering its expressions’ (Ricoeur 1974, p.149). This suggests that religious education 
should teach pupils ‘both to feel and communicate appropriately about their ultimate values 
and ultimate reality’ (Wright 2000, p.76).  
(iv) It is flawed for its stress on unreflective experience, which might open up 
‘the possibility of a spiritual emotivism detached from critical reflection’, and result in ‘the 
tendency to assume that the stronger the emotion, then the more authentic the experience, 
and … the more justified we are to act upon them’. By balancing the two strands there might 
be ‘a better chance of producing appropriate levels of spiritual sensitivity and literacy’ (p.76). 
(v) It is flawed in its ‘lack of material content … its failure to relate experience 
with the reality of how things actually are in the world’ (p.77). In order to be inclusive of a 
range of opinions in directing the attention of experience to whatever object, the model 
deliberately avoids specifying objects but ‘encourages pupils to develop their own personal 
and idiosyncratic visions of ultimate reality’. Hence it fails to address effectively questions 
about the relationship between the truth of ultimate reality and my perceptions of ultimate 
truth, about the possibility that my perceptions might be false, because the model’s default 
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position is to impose upon pupils a post-modern stance for problem solving, ‘in which the 
only truth is the truth expressed by the individual pupil … [and] the outward freedom 
disguises a subtle yet pervasive indoctrination of pupils into a post-modern world-view’ 
(p.77).  
(vi) Overall, the inclusive model ‘constitutes a distinctive – and hence exclusive – 
spiritual tradition grounded in a mish-mash of romantic and post-modern ideology’, and as 
such it ‘effectively silences the voices of alternative minority spiritual traditions’ (p.70). 
Seen from the point of otherness, two further flaws of the inclusive model can be added to 
Wright’s critique.  
(1) First and foremost, the inclusive model is grounded in the interpretation of 
spiritual experience by referring mainly to oneself, so that it is characterised as subjective 
feeling or experience, as solely inner process. As such, it loses sight of the otherness of 
whatever brought the experience. Exalting spiritual experience while keeping it in the level 
of individual inner significance is, according to Zizioulas, to invite danger of Desire for Desire, 
the infinite desiring for the transcendental experience itself; having lost realist contact with 
reality, or personal relation with the other, what remains is the desiring self (Zizioulas 2006, 
pp.49ff).  
(2) The problem of otherness is also seen in the model’s understanding of 
language and anthropology. A peculiar characteristic feature of otherness is its essential 
relation with language. In Levinas’ philosophy, the genuine ‘speaking’ is initiated only when 
engaged with the other; in Trinitarian theology, God reveals Himself to us in his Word, that is, 
the mode of God’s personhood. By speaking to us He lets us be his other as well as letting 
Himself be our other in personal relation. What is crucially missing here is ‘speaking’; the 
stress is solely upon speculative self-awareness, talking to oneself as if it were the true mode 
of human being, which it is not.  
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Wright is deeply concerned about the failure of contemporary spiritual education to allow 
pupils to engage critically with both the issues associated with their spiritual experience 
(truthfulness) and the ultimate truth claims provided by their religious or secular tradition (truth). 
Instead, it has offered two uncritically related ways of learning ‘from’ and ‘about’ religion. In the 
next section we will attend to Wright’s exploration of critical religious education by focusing on the 
grounding conception of truth and truthfulness and the stress on ‘particularity’ of discrete religion as 
the default position of religious education.  
 
2. Critical Religious Education: Ontology and Otherness 
2.1. Pursuit of truth and truthfulness  
Why does truth matter? A pivotal argument of Wright’s work is that ‘religious education 
should enable pupils to wrestle with ultimate truth’ in an informed manner (Wright 2007, p.7). 
However, he also recognises that there has been misrepresentation, the introduction of distorted 
and perverted images of truth into modern society, 189  which have impoverished society by 
employing strategies of evasion of truth rather than retrieval (Wright, 2007, p.7). The eclipse of truth 
in contemporary religious education has been one of the consequences. In order not to leave a 
space where truth claims once stood, religious education has recruited comprehensive liberalism to 
fill the gap.  This has resulted in the dissociation of truth from truthfulness in that the former has 
been eclipsed in the forms of the ‘learning about’ approach, while the latter has been overshadowed 
by the dominance of the inclusive, implicit, ‘learning from’ approach to religious education.  
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 The term truth claims’ conjures up with secular images of totalitarianism, religiously fundamentalism and 
educational indoctrination (Wright, 2007, p.7).  
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In response, Wright has sought over the years to develop a critical religious education,  
employing critical realism throughout the process of development of the approach.190 Earlier in his 
response to the problem Wright noted the possibility of critical realism as a proper philosophical 
perspective for spiritual education, which was already dominated by the inclusive model (Wright 
2000). There he presented central aspects of critical realism in terms of stratified reality, unity of fact 
and value, wisdom and contingent knowledge (pp.23ff). Later he provided a fuller account of critical 
realism,  developing further its potential for critical religious education by articulating it in terms of 
‘the primes of critical realism’ (Wright 2004, pp.52ff). There he used the terms truth and truthfulness 
more explicitly in regard to critical religious education in general and to the critical realist 
perspective for religious education in particular. Central aspects of critical realism were more deeply 
engaged with and related to the issues of the association of truth and truthfulness in terms of 
holistic wisdom. With regard to prominent aspects of critical realism, he introduced the transfactual 
quality of knowledge as authentic knowledge in terms of ‘trans-phenomenal and counter-
phenomenal’, which reflects both the stratification of reality and the holy trinity of critical realism 
(ontological realism, epistemic relativism and judgemental rationalism) as the way to reach the 
deeper level of reality (p.60). Hence he stressed that critical realism maintains a kind of minimalism 
in regard to truth claims, because knowledge and rationality, as parts of central mediums to truth 
claims, are contingent, subject to correction under the light of the real of reality. What is needed in 
the process is to be ‘guided by the contingent judgements of probability and warrant rather than 
proof and demonstration’ (p.60), which reflects Bhaskar’s critique of empirical realism, particularly 
empirical positivism. Then Wright worked out the need for association of truth and truthfulness by 
explaining the need to move from knowledge to wisdom, because ‘[a]ny truthful and authentic 
engagement with the world requires the cultivation of a holistic wisdom’ (p.60). By ‘holistic’ Wright 
                                                          
190 Wright has not focused exclusively on critical realism in developing his approach. Rather he has embraced a 
broader range of philosophical positions and thinkers, seeking to combine a modernist concern to engage with 
the actual order-of-things with a post-modern recognition of the limits of our knowledge and understanding 
(p.52). However, it is also true that critical realism cannot be replaced by any other perspective, since it has 
taken a pivotal role in grounding the central concept of truth and truthfulness in his approach.  
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means to overcome the modern polarity between objectivism and the romantic/postmodern 
celebration of subjective opinion, and hence ‘wisdom’ means, quoting Hodgson, the constitution of 
‘a complex cognitive stance that includes apprehension and appreciation as well as critical reflection 
and an orientation to practice based on life experience’ (p. 60; Hodgson 1999, p.7). In the case of 
religious education, where objective learning about and subjective learning from are divided without 
a proper critical relationship, the cultivation of wisdom would be ‘dependent on the collapsing of 
this distinction between sense and sensibility and the recovery of forms of knowledge that are 
simultaneously rational and personal’ (p.60 emphasis added); a pursuit of simultaneity between 
‘rational’ knowledge as drawn from the learning about, and ‘personal’ from the learning from. At 
this point we can understand the reason for the direction of development of Wright’s critical 
religious education, which he has recently worked out under the title Critical Religious Education, 
Multiculturalism and the Pursuit of Truth (Wright 2007), in which he states:  
The intimate relationship between truth and truthfulness suggests the organic 
unity of religious education: the search for truth and pursuit of truthful living ought to 
form twin aspects of a single process. (Wright 2007, p.55)   
 
2.1.1. Truth and otherness 
As Wright reveals in his opening sentence: ‘The central argument of this book is that 
religious education should enable pupils to wrestle with ultimate truth’ (Wright 2007, p.7).  From 
this we can easily imagine the crucial role of critical realism, of which the most obvious influence can 
be found in Wright’s conceptualisation of truth and ultimate truth. From a critical realist 
understanding of reality, Wright commences the book by reintroducing the holy trinity of critical 
realism (pp.8ff). He does this on the working assumption that reality is out there and independent of 
our knowledge of it. Furthermore, reality is conceived as stratified according to the ontological levels 
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of the real, the actual and the empirical, in that the possibility of ‘explanation’ of reality is attributed 
to the inherent structures or mechanisms of reality, whether of natural things or social beings. 
Hence it is possible to speak of ‘a primary ontological truth’ and of ‘the secondary semantic truth’, of 
which the latter is contingent, provisional truth so that it constitutes epistemic relativism, meaning 
that ‘we cannot limit the order-of-things to our ability to know it, or reduce reality to the sum or our 
true statement’ (p.12). The concept of contingent knowledge presupposes the possibility of fallibility 
of human knowledge; hence it requires rational judgements. Against the charge of radical scepticism 
in regard to such judgement this position argues that ‘we do have relatively secure knowledge of the 
world’, while against the charge of the advocacy of absolute certainty it is argued that ‘our 
knowledge of the world is limited and contingent’ (pp.12-13).  Critical judgement is what relates our 
relatively contingent/certain hence transitive epistemic truth claims, and the intransitive ontological 
reality (p.13).  
Crucial to Wright’s conceptualisation of truth is his distinction between reality and ultimate 
reality, in that the latter is conceived in terms of the possibility of ultimate explanation. It is worth 
quoting his explanation of the distinction:  
[T]he fact that we can explain an event or object in a number of complementary 
and irreducible ways does not preclude us from asking questions about the meaning of 
reality as a whole: although a rich explanation ought to embrace as many disciplinary 
insights as possible, the question remains as to the possibility of some ultimate 
explanation. This is not reductionist explanation: it is not so much a question of 
affirming one disciplinary insight over all others … This raises the issue of the distinction 
between reality and ultimate reality: the former refers to the sum of all that exists, in all 
its stratified and multifaceted complexity; the latter refers to the enduring principle, 
power, force, mind or being that grounds reality and provides it with its fundamental 
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organizing structure, and hence its ultimate meaning, purpose and direction. (Wright 
2007, p.21) 
Wright provides three contrasting accounts of the ultimate order-of-beings in order to clarify 
this distinction (2007, pp.21f): Christian worldviews in which the ultimate reality consists in God 
alone; Buddhist understanding of reality with regard to the ultimate goal of Nirvana, that is, 
awakening, enlightenment and the cessation of desire; and a naturalist account of the ultimate 
reality of the universe. Among them is constituted mutual exclusivism, and the fact that truth claims 
are contested, controversial and even contrasting. However, if the comprehensive liberal approach 
aims to avoid those particular truth claims by dissociating them into objective studies or by 
subjective absorbing in the context of religious education, the political liberal approach aims not to 
avoid the contentious issues but to engage them critically in an informed way. For Wright it might be 
possible in critically informed learning to explore whether the reality beyond the truth claim is true 
or false. This is because the pursuit of truth in religious education has intrinsic value when it is 
secured in an informed and balanced judgement, and learning to perform such judgement would be 
a crucial way to live in harmony with the ultimate order-of-things, to achieve wisdom for life 
(pp.122ff). On the basis of the conceptualisation of truth and ultimate truth, Wright provides seven 
propositions, of which the last is related with ‘truthfulness’, which we will consider later.  
Proposition 1: Truth is the totality of all that is 
Proposition 2: Our knowledge of reality is partial and contingent 
Proposition 3: We can make critical judgments between conflicting accounts of 
reality 
Proposition 4: Reality is ordered, complex and multifaceted  




Proposition 6: The ultimate nature of reality is contested  
Proposition 7: A truthful life is one lived in harmony with ultimate reality  
                                                                                               (Wright 2007, pp.26-27)  
  
There are some points to be made on Wright’s conceptualisation of ultimate truth with 
regard to otherness. Previously, this thesis has argued that critical realism, particularly its core 
argument of transcendental realism, is characterised by lack of ontology of otherness, which 
constitutes the point of divergence on the issue of ultimate reality between Bhaskarian non-personal 
meta-Reality and the Trinitarian personhood of God. The possibility has been raised of judgement 
between the two contrasting accounts of ultimate truth claims in terms of the best inferred 
explanation of reality in regard to the crucial ontological dimension of otherness; hence the 
Trinitarian personhood account has been inferred as the better explanation of otherness. Thus, the 
focus on ontology has led the thesis to the issue of otherness, then ontology of personhood in its 
concern with ultimate reality, while Bhaskar’s ontology, although starting from the same theory, 
takes a contrasting trajectory in regard to ultimate reality. The cause of this difference is otherness.  
What does this mean for Wright’s conceptualisation of truth? Since Wright also grounds his 
conception of ultimate truth on critical realist ontology it seems that there are points to be made in 
relation to the two accounts of transcendence above. First, Wright’s conceptualisation of truth and 
ultimate reality takes a relatively neutral position, being grounded on his uncritical reception of 
transcendental realism, particularly in regard to the absence of otherness. His conception of 
ultimate reality as ‘the enduring principle, power, force, mind or being that grounds reality and 
provides it with its fundamental organizing structure, and hence its ultimate meaning, purpose and 
direction’ (p.21) indicates that it is grounded on the transfactual understanding of reality, which is 
significantly true but intrinsically unable to address the other as truly the other, or is able to address 
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the other only in the horizon of oneself. Thus his ontological conceptualisation of ultimate truth may 
possibly provide religious education with a middle field to which various contested truth claims can 
legitimately be brought in order to be critically engaged.191 Although in its very claim of ‘ultimate 
reality’ it may not be fully true to itself because, as long as it holds fast to critical realism and if it 
considers the point of otherness seriously, as argued in this thesis, it should take either a Bhaskarian 
non-personal account or a personal account that is able to explain otherness, such as that of the 
Trinitarian God, by remaining in the middle it may be a strategic choice for enhancing religious 
education in a critical way.192 Second, the argument of otherness developed up to the point of 
personhood of God may provide an example and a criterion for critically informed judgement 
between contrasting accounts of ultimate reality. Since Wright has insisted upon the need for 
informed critical judgement between contrasting ultimate truth claims as a way of cultivating 
religious literacy among pupils, the theme of ‘otherness’ might be a useful criterion against which 
different ultimate truth claims are measured. Furthermore, the way of argument about otherness 
taken in this thesis may enhance critical realist education by providing an example of how to deal 
with controversial issues in religious education.   
  
2.1.2. Truthfulness and personhood  
Truthfulness is cognate to truth. In response to the dissociation of truth from truthfulness in 
comprehensive religious education Wright insists that ‘a religious education concerned with truth 
must also address the challenge of how to live life truthfully – that is to say, in harmony with 
ultimate reality’ (Wright 2007, p.14). In this regard, Wright raises two questions: ‘What is our place 
                                                          
191
 Thompson raises a point about this middle field in terms of ‘openness’ when she critiques those religious 
education professionals, including Wright,  who ‘[a]ll are concerned to teach in a way that avoids a relativism 
which endangers all religions. At the same time all seem reluctant to base RE on one particular religion, while 
accepting at the same time that no education … can be neutral. They wish to place “openness” centre stage’ 
(Penny Thomson, 2004, Whatever Happened to Religious Education? Cambridge, The Lutterworth Press, p.149). 
192
 In fact, in another recent book, he critically engages the exclusivism in Bhaskar’s meta-Reality, contrasting it 
with Christian exclusivism. There he critiques the former in terms of its judgemental relativism (Wright 2012).  
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in the actual order-of-things? What is the meaning and purpose of life here on earth?’ (p.14 
emphasis added). An interpretation of these questions may reveal a characteristic of his 
understanding of truthfulness. As we have seen earlier, in the inclusive model of religious education, 
truthfulness of life has often been assigned to the responsibility of the autonomous individual, while 
objective study of knowledge of religious or secular beliefs remains as instrumental for the 
possibility of inner spiritual, awakening or learning experiences, which will then be measured by the 
basic values of comprehensive liberalism, such as freedom, tolerance and, for example, human rights. 
Behind all this there is presupposed a form of relationship between a broader society and its 
individuals: the individual is relatively autonomous in society, and hence finds meaning of life not 
necessarily or exclusively from the outer world but through reflective process of the self upon the 
outer world. In that process the self is always in the centre of spirituality. As Bernard William points 
out in his critique of the dissociation of truth and truthfulness, this indicates the feature of 
contemporary society whereby there is no necessary connection between the pursuit of the truth of 
the world and my particular understanding of the world, because of a deep scepticism among 
people regarding the pursuit of truth (Williams 2002). But with these questions, Wright highlights a 
reverse situation, in that we are still in relation with the world, but not the ‘outer world’, which 
presupposes separatedness of the individual, rather the world in which we have our place in the 
order-of-things. Truthfulness in this reversed relationship is defined as the life guided by the seeker’s 
ontologically true place, then by living in harmony with the truth of reality. Though our knowledge of 
the world is contingent, ‘we can still establish substantial understanding of the world’, hence we 
should strive to understand our true place in the ultimate order-of-things (Wright 2007, p.17).  
The idea of truthfulness as dissociated from truth cannot be sustained in the Trinitarian 
understanding either. Rather, in this tradition, it is intrinsically truthful to seek the truth of reality 
and to live by it because this is exactly how a person to be. Now, in regard to the notion of 
personhood, Wright’s conception of truthfulness as being in harmony with truth needs careful 
clarification. When we speak of truthful life as being in harmony with the truth of reality, the reality 
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of the world is not conceived as static, nor does being in harmony with reality mean a mere reaction; 
rather being truthful is to ‘respond’ hence to ‘relate’ from my true reality that is personhood. Here 
we define truthfulness in terms of Trinitarian hypostatical personal relation with the truth of nature, 
people, tradition or God. In all those relations we can and should keep the quality of personal 
relation, otherwise we may fall into being reified, being oppressed or alienated. We must remember 
that personhood is prior to ‘necessity’: God loves us not because He has to but in his freedom; He is 
not bound to necessity. This is where personhood makes the difference from the critical realist 
perspective: whereas personhood moves to the other, outer being and other reality not from certain 
necessity but in his ontological personhood as personal act in freedom, for critical realism there is a 
strong sense of necessity or principle, like non-duality, which is characterised as non-personal. The 
latter is ultimately bound in itself while personhood in its very mode of being always moves (ekstasis) 
to the other, hence being in relation as a person (hypostasis). Thus, when we say that truthful life is 
in harmony with reality, this should not be interpreted as relegating personhood by bounding 
truthfulness to a necessity. Truth is greater than necessity because it always comes out of personal 
striving to know the other (reality) as it is, and in order to do so, the pursuit of truth lets the other be 
as much as it is; pursuit of truth always presupposes otherness and hence the pursuit of truth is 
already truthfulness. However, as Wright stresses, since our transitive epistemic truth is contingent, 
our truthful striving to truth of reality needs to be guided and informed by best inferred explanation. 
This is particularly so when we are concerned with ultimate truth. Since the pursuit of truth in 
religious education cannot be reduced to the level of individual epistemic construction, although it 
certainly contains that dimension, it must start from a certain place and should be organised in a 
realist way. We will deal with this point by exploring Wright’s ontological framework for the pursuit 





2.2. Ontological framework and otherness 
Wright provides a heuristic conceptual framework for critical religious education.  It 
comprises four dimensions, reflecting four contemporary perspectives of religious education: 
ontological, semantic, hermeneutic and epistemological (Wright 2007, pp.131ff). However, here we 
will explore only the ontological dimension because, since ontology has been the central subject of 
the thesis, to which otherness has been raised as its cognate, a consideration of the ontological 
dimension of his approach to religious education can render a certain degree of consistency and lead 
us to a point where we can see the usefulness and limits of the application of Bhaskarian critical 
realism in Wright’s critical religious education.  
 
2.2.1. Transcendental realism of ultimate truth claim  
The conceptual framework of the ontological dimension has two main foci: transcendental 
realism of ultimate truth claim and particularity of discrete religion as the default position of 
religious education. In this section we will deal with the first ontological focus. By way of 
transcendental realism Wright aims to provide a conceptual framework that can include both 
theistic and non-theistic religious traditions, provided they hold realist accounts of transcendental 
reality (pp.132ff). The concept of ‘realist account’ is applied here in its minimal sense which requires 
two points to be met: reality conceived as existing independently of our ability to know it, and as 
ontologically distinct from us. This might be applied to both religious and secular accounts, each with 
its own claim for truthful life with its particular stance on life,193 but in regard to ultimate truth there 
is a distinction between them.  This difference lies in ‘the substance of their respective belief 
                                                          
193
 Religious educational models that take both religious and secular worldviews as worthy of acceptance in 
the course can be found, for example, in the Birmingham Agreed Syllabus of Religious Instruction (City of 
Birmingham Education Committee, 1975) and its practical manual for teachers Living Together (City of 
Birmingham Education Committee, 1975).  
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systems’, which appeal either to transcendental order or to natural order, respectively (p.133).194 In 
a key thesis Wright advocates the former in terms of ‘supranatural’, because ‘the religions are in the 
main concerned with a supranatural reality’ and ‘[s]upranatural belief [is] sufficiently normative of 
religion in general to constitute an appropriate heuristic vantage point from which we can go on to 
address and contrast pantheistic, naturalistic and non-realistic alterative’ (p.134). This is because 
both naturalist and anti-naturalist approaches are mistaken, particularly in their reductionist 
understanding of ultimate truth claims of religions. He refutes this reductionism in four points 
(pp.136-140): on the ground of the realist truth claim embodied in the historical continuity of 
religious tradition; on the ground of realist understanding of religious language; by revealing the tag 
of religious pragmatism as a product of modern western thought and post-modernism, and by 
revealing the functionalist account of spirituality as unsustainable. 
In Wright’s refutation of the reductionist charges against the transcendental realist account 
of ultimate truth, a particular point claims our attention with regard to the theme of otherness that 
has been developed here.  The point is about religious language; let us start from a functional 
understanding of religious language. 
The suggestion [of the reductionist] that we should not take religious truth 
claims at face value is dependent upon a distinctively Western post-Enlightenment 
agenda. (Wright 2007, p.137)  
According to Wright, what is presupposed here is a distinction between the domains of fact 
and value, which are conceived as belonging to different language games from each other: 
considering ‘theological statement as expression of inner spiritual experience [value] rather than 
realistic description [fact] of reality’ or ‘reducing religious language to functional role for enabling 
religious adherent’s life flourishing [value] rather than its commitment to depict reality [fact]’(p.137). 
                                                          
194
 For example, Ninian Smart’s six dimensional study of religion indicates that two broad categories can be  
distinguished: historical, containing ritualistic, experiential and social dimensions; and parahistorical, 
containing doctrinal, mythological and ethical dimensions.  The former category is more likely to be related 
with the life of religious communities, the latter with belief systems (Smart 1968). 
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This identifies religious language in terms of its function or pragmatic truth, which results in ‘a 
thoroughgoing relativism’ (p.138). Against the functional understanding of religious language Wright 
argues that ‘in most religious traditions there is a direct and necessary link between beliefs about 
the nature of ultimate reality and the spiritual search for salvation or enlightenment’ (p.138). At this 
juncture, there is one further point to be added in regard to the other and otherness. As we have 
seen, in Levinas’s thought and in Trinitarian theology, language event is a characteristic 
phenomenon appearing in the event of transcendence. In Levinasian philosophy, in the encounter 
with the face of the other as the transcendental experience, the I gives itself to the other by way of 
‘speaking’ or ‘saying’ before its egoistic comprehension of the other; in Trinitarian theology, God is 
revealed to us as the Word incarnate. What this indicates is that otherness accompanies language 
event, which sets the whole quality of being of one who engages with the other or God on a 
different ground, for example, on the ethical ground or the hypostatic personal relation, respectively; 
the language event cannot be reduced to expression of ‘self-consciously non-realistic pragmatism’ 
that is ‘incapable of explaining the phenomenon of deeply rooted commitment, and in particular the 
willingness … to the point of martyrdom’ (p.139). This incapability is linked precisely to the point 
made earlier regarding the qualitative difference between freedom of the dialectical agent and 
ethics of ethical subjectivity, where it was argued that freedom cannot be taken as naturally 
necessitating ethics; rather ethics can incorporate freedom in its responsible act for the other.195 
Moreover, language event is more likely to be related with the hypostatically personal account of 
ultimate truth than with a non-personal account, as we have seen in the comparison between the 
Trinitarian God as Person and Bhaskarian meta-Reality, where the latter, with its characteristic 
absence of otherness, gives its ultimate emphasis to self-awakening of what is inside, and in doing so 
recognises not language event with the other, but the rise of consciousness of the self. When this 
ethos is applied to religious education it could fit closely with a sort of radical constructivist 
educational approach in which pupils are encouraged to use religious language not to depict reality 
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 See, the concluding remarks of Chapter 3. 
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behind the language, hence moving to the other, but to build their own meaning structure by 
subjecting religious language to their schema according to its viability. In this sense it can be said 
that Wright’s critique of the inclusive model could be applied to a non-personal account of ultimate 
truth. But what about a type of religious education that is grounded on personal account of 
transcendental realism? While Wright’s transcendental realism of ultimate truth claim does not 
specify whether it should be about a personal or non-personal account of ultimate reality, it can still 
be considered as a step forward to otherness in the sense that the conception of ‘transcendental’ as 
supernatural may be a conceptual framework that provides pupils with a chance to face otherness 
between two contrasting accounts of ultimate reality without being circumscribed by 
comprehensive liberal attempts to attenuate otherness; rather pupils are encouraged to critically 
engage with that otherness. In order for this to be possible there is another ontological point to be 
considered, to which we turn next.  
 
2.2.2. Particularity of discrete religion as the default position 
If a non-personal account of ultimate reality runs the risk of leading religious education into 
an inclusive model, then such an account should be regarded as a particular stance rather than a 
universal stance that claims for a generic notion of religion. Such a generic concept can be found in 
phenomenological study of religion. Barnes’ key concern lies in the application of this approach to 
religious education. Phenomenological religious education has shown a tendency to avoid engaging 
seriously with critical issues such as assessing rival religions, doctrinal schemes or religious truth 
claims proper, while focusing on individual religious experience. More specifically, the focus is upon 
the significance of the experience rather than the significance of the particular religious reality that 
gave rise to the experience (Barnes 2006). Thus it gives rise both to a generic notion of religion, an 
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inclusive identification of different religions (Wright 2007, pp144ff),196 and to an emphasis on the 
significance of religious experience. Consequently, on the basis of the misconception of the nature of 
religion in terms of primacy of experience, the phenomenological approach sidesteps one of the 
most controversial issues in relation to religion: ‘that of assessing religious claims to truth and 
adjudicating between rival (conceptual) claims to religious truth’ (Barnes 2001, p.455). Barnes argues 
that the failure to take seriously such critical issues as assessing truth claims leads to a failure to 
recognise serious differences between religions whose ultimate truths are seen as mostly mutually 
exclusive. Instead, he takes seriously these differences, or the otherness of one religion to others, 
because this otherness is what makes a religion to be conceived as it is. On this ground he argues 
that religious education should be based on the recognition of such otherness, which is mostly 
apparent in different doctrinal schemes (Barnes 2009). Therefore, to take otherness seriously in 
religious education is to admit the point made by McGrath of the unavoidability of ‘seeing’ truth 
claims from a particular position (McGrath 2002, 2009). 
The importance of particularity is taken into account in Wright’s ontological framework of 
critical religious education, because discrete religious traditions, such as Christianity, Buddhism, 
Hinduism, and Islam all provide their particular stance of transcendent truth claims (Wright 2007, 
pp.140ff). Given the variety of transcendental truth claims, how to approach that variety is a 
controversial issue. Wright introduces three competing candidates, namely, discrete religious 
traditions, the notion of generic category of religion and personal spirituality, and he argues for 
discrete religion as the default position of religious education.  
Although most religious educators recognize the need for some level of 
dialogue between all three, there is no agreement as to which of them offers the most 
appropriate default position against which to compare and contrast the others. I will 
argue that it is indeed discrete religious traditions that ought to constitute the starting 
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 For Wright’s critique of the generic notion of religion in terms of its impossibility as essence in relation with 
a form of theological universalism, see, Wright 2007, pp.144ff.  
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point for the exploration of transcendent truth, and thus provide the contest for the 
subsequent exploration of religion as a universal category and of personal spirituality. 
(Wright 2007, p.141) 
Wright argues for discrete religious tradition as the default position in the debate between 
theological exclusivism and theological inclusivism, because this debate raises ‘a crucial ontological 
question: do discrete religious traditions offer complementary or incompatible accounts of the 
ultimate nature of reality?’ (p. 143) If their accounts are reconcilable then the generic notion of 
religion should be prioritised, but if they are mutually exclusive then the status of primary bearers of 
transcendental truth claims should be assigned to discrete religious traditions. He provides 
theological and philosophical critiques of generic approaches to religious education in terms of the 
reification of religion while ignoring particular truth claims, the impossibility of identifying the core 
essence or structure of religion, its biased account into philosophical idealism and theological 
universalism and its largely spurious moral charge of religionism197 against discrete religious 
traditions (pp. 144-147). The aspects that Wright refutes are linked to comprehensive liberalism in 
which ‘particular truth claims ought to be rejected because they tend to undermine social harmony’; 
crucial to this is that comprehensive liberal education ‘constitutes an explicit form of 
confessionalism, concerned to induct pupils into the normative beliefs and values of a closed liberal 
system’ in which all religions are treated as equally true, which ‘goes against the grain of the self-
understanding of the vast majority of religious traditions’ (p.147-148). Since Wright positions himself 
in political liberalism, he argues for critical religious education grounded in that stance, so that 
‘pupils are required to engage with a diverse range of contrasting and conflicting interpretations of 
religion in an informed and reflective way’ (p.148), which involves openness to the fact that ‘the 
history of religion is a story of conflict and dissent, often bloody, as well as of striving for peace and 
reconciliation’ (Yates 1988, p.143; cf. Wright 2007, p.148).  
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 By religionism, Wright means that which ‘engender[s] tribalistic attitudes and threaten[s] the stability of 
society’ (Wright 2007, p.147). The problem of religionism in regard to religious education was originally raised 
by John Hull.  
216 
 
Moreover, there is another dimension to the exclusivism/inclusivism debate that helps 
Wright to take discrete religion as the default position of religious education. As we have seen, the 
exclusive position argues for the exclusive validity of its particular account of reality of religion, while 
the inclusive position recognises the differences between particular accounts, and then suggests the 
generic category of religion. Both are dangerous because while theological exclusivism may fail to 
recognise certain religious aspects of dynamics gleaned by cross-cultural comparison, theological 
inclusivism may violate the particularities that make each religion distinct. Having recognised those 
dangers Wright gives two reasons for treating discrete religious traditions as the departure from the 
critical realist point of view: (1) to say truth is contingent is to admit that contested truth claims are 
being engaged directly rather than avoided in such a generic inclusive way, and (2) discrete religions 
are partial (open) totalities which are not ‘essential entities, but as substantial yet dynamic, 
malleable and emergent realities whose identities develop – at least in part – in response to other 
religious and secular spiritualities and traditions’ (p.141). Critical religious education reflects these 
points by requiring pupils ‘to engage with a number of variant readings and draw their own informed 
conclusion’ because ‘[t]his, in the long term at least, constitutes the best means of helping establish 
and preserve social harmony’ (p.148).  
Finally, against individual personal spirituality, Wright argues that ‘the identity of discrete 
religious traditions is grounded in the collective intentionality of the tradition as a whole, which is 
ontologically prior to the intentionality of individual adherents’ (p.155). This does not mean that 
collective intentionality regulates individual identity; rather it reflects constitutive agreement from 
its adherents. This makes it possible to conceive of discrete religious communities not as 
essentialised entities or arbitrary social constructions, but as ‘substantial social facts’ which as 
‘salvific communities’ offer ‘holistic worldviews oriented around the unity of belief and practice, 
rather than the atomistic spiritual experiences of individuals’  (pp.155-156). Hence language that 
individuals use for the description of their spiritual experiences is not free from religious language, 
nor is it purely self-construction: ‘they form part of the stories and narratives – more properly, the 
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meta-narratives – through which religious believers make sense of their lives. Such meta-narratives 
form part of the worldviews of both religious and secular faith traditions’ (p.180). 
Religious education therefore should provide an opportunity for critical engagement 
between pupils’ horizons of meaning gained from their specific experiences and the horizons of 
discrete religious traditions in a critically hermeneutic manner198 that is ‘oriented towards the 
contested issue of transcendence truth’ so that critical religious can be formed by attending ‘to the 
process of making informed critical judgements between conflicting truth claims’ (pp.205-206). To 
make such informed judgements, Wright suggests a critical contextual epistemology, which ‘entails 
weighing up a raft of probabilities by attending to a range of different authorities’, and, finally, 
identifies five criteria that constitute ‘the appropriate milieu’ for such judgement: ‘a holistic model 
of faith-seeking understanding, combining reason, feeling, thought and action in a unified practical 
wisdom’ (p.230).  These criteria, however, should not be limited to critical judgement but should be 
conceived as implying ways of pursuit of truth and truthfulness.   
 
2.3. Pursuit of truth and truthfulness: ontology and otherness  
Now the chapter faces its final question of how we can pursue truth and truthfulness in 
religious education in the light of both ontology and otherness. For Wright, education is both 
nurture and critique (Wright 1999; 2000): it will inevitably nurture pupils into ‘a particular worldview, 
will inevitably transmit a set of values and ultimate spiritual commitments’.  This does not mean 
conformity within schools, but encouraging pupils to work out ‘their own relationship with their 
school’s fundamental views’ (Wright 1999, p.37). Nurture in this sense is defined as the ground of 
critique, because in order for education as nurture not to be abused it is of utmost importance that 
the other pivotal dimension of learning process, viz. critique, be maintained. Wright advocates 
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 Wright draws his critical hermeneutics largely from Gadamer (1979) and Habermas (1989, 1991).  
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critical education not only for emancipation through the empowerment of pupils, but also for the 
search for the truth in spiritual education, whereby teaching spirituality should be a controversial 
issue (Wright 2000). The embracing of controversial issues in the search for truth leads Wright to 
argue for the dialectics of nurture and critique in religious education because ‘the adoption of core 
values need not rule out healthy dissent within the community; indeed such dissent may well form 
the catalyst for further spiritual growth within the community’ (Wright 1999, pp.37-38).  
What we see here is a form of dialectical openness to the other, implied in the term ‘happy 
dissent’, which indicates recognition of otherness to the degree that it opens to a horizon of the 
other, and certainty of intellectual and uncertainty of receptivity of uncertainty (transcendence) 
become complementary with each other. Wright, in his reading of Levinas and Derrida, appraises 
them for their position that ‘the dogmatic certainty that the only reality is that which we create for 
ourselves is replaced with a thoroughgoing openness to the horizon of the Other’, hence he claims 
that ‘we must be humble in our judgments, and actively resist any premature closure of 
understanding’. But Wright also points out a danger in their position whereby the commitment to 
alterity may transform itself ‘into yet another closed meta-narrative grounded in a thoroughgoing 
and systematic agnosticism’. Thus he argues that there is no need to consider the commitment to 
listen to the other as obscuring what is already known or as requiring the suspension of the faculty 
of reason, because ‘[i]ntellectual and receptivity are complementary, not mutually exclusive, virtues’ 
(Wright 2004, p.63-64).  
This indicates a kind of double openness. First we can say that there is a dimension of 
receptivity, that is openness to the other in a way of receiving the other; a mode of being 
characterised with non-agential moment, which takes ontological priority as seen in Levinasian ‘first 
teaching’ and the Trinitarian revelation of the Word.  Wright’s conception of nurture in a particular 
tradition is also basically constituted by receptivity of the other. In this sense Bhaskar’s conceptions 
of ‘disposition’ and ‘arrangement’ of human agency into a specific geo-historical place should also be 
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understood in terms of receptivity before they are considered as fundamental constituents of reason, 
which in turn is conceived as a property of human agency. Being nurtured is primarily being opened 
to the other. Therefore, while growing up in a particular tradition is inevitable, it does not preclude 
openness to otherness since without the receptivity of its tradition there would be no beginning of 
life or ‘self’ at all. Whether conceiving human being as created or as thrown into the world, what is 
fundamentally acknowledged is the priority of non-agential event of givenness, being disposed-ness 
and receptivity of the given particular tradition. The problem is whether the receptivity (and nurture) 
leads to continual openness toward pursuit of truth and truthfulness, which inevitably requires 
continual openness to the other, or remains in comprehensive closure in self-confidential totality as 
claimed in comprehensive liberalist individual.  This claim of the ontological priority of receptivity 
contrasts with the claim of radical constructivism, in that the fundamental priority or weight is given 
to the role of the organic function of schema-making of an individual. Since the latter presupposes 
ontological priority of an individual, the other is always considered as secondary and placed at the 
hands of the individual in his construction of his world. Hence, in the constructivist understanding 
there is conceived only the process of assimilation and accommodation, but not a genuine sense of 
‘critique’ as Levinas stressed (Levinas …) . While assimilation and accommodation always work on 
the ground of meaning system of my horizon, the face of the other appears regardless of my 
meaning system or my horizon; appearing as a breach of my totality it becomes the very critique of 
my being and the very moment of transcendence. The first dimension of openness, articulated as 
receptivity, revelation or transcendence, leads to the second dimension of openness. As a 
consequence of the first openness, somehow we become able to see critically, as Wright argues; to 
respond to the other, as Levinas argues, in an ethical way of giving ourselves by attending to the 
other through ‘saying’, ‘expression’ and ‘substitution’; to love the other in freedom not from 
(dialectical) necessity but from the ground of personhood, as Trinitarian theology teaches us. This 
double openness can be termed simply ‘being beloved and being loving’. Therefore, pursuit of truth 
and truthfulness in the sense of the double openness that is grounded only on the ontology of 
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otherness indicates the intimate relationship between truth and truthfulness, which ‘suggests the 
organic unity of religious education: the search for truth and pursuit of truthful living ought to form 
twin aspects of a single process’ (Wright 2007, p.55). 
  
3. Concluding Remarks: Ontology and Otherness and 
Possibility of Christianity in Religious Education in Christian Schools 
Motivated by concern over the dominant inclusive model of religious education, Wright has 
developed a critical realist approach to religious education. As we have seen, he critiques both 
generic understanding of religion and its related implicit, inclusive model of religious education for 
their epistemic fallacy. With regard to the generic notion of religion, there is a Kantian a priori 
structure employed by the human mind in order to imagine an abstract notion of religion beyond 
the particular religious truth claims, which in turn, when related to the inclusive model, becomes 
supplementary for pupils’ individual construction of meaning  as a form of exercise of their 
autonomy in the religious education classroom, but in doing so it tends to reduce ultimate truth 
claims of particular religions to instruments of individual meaning structure, as often found in 
postmodern forms of education such as radical constructivism. Wright points out that such 
postmodernist spirituality in religious education tends to produce religious illiteracy among pupils 
(Wright …).  
As an antidote to these weaknesses, Wright has introduced to religious education the 
pursuit of ontological realist understanding of truth of religions, incorporating this with pupils’ 
critical engagement with those ultimate truth claims. This approach is based on a critical realist 
understanding of stratification of reality, so that he is able to argue for ultimate truth as the highest 
level of reality. However, since ultimate truth claims of particular religious or secular traditions 
cannot be assumed to be simply harmonious with each other, and are often contrasting, Wright has 
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pointed out three crucial points: first, religious education should take truth as a controversial issue 
rather than avoiding it by bracketing it into a ready-made set of generic notions of religion, what is in 
fact an ideological bracketing of religion into comprehensive liberal principles of freedom and 
tolerance. Second, pursuit of truth should be associated with pursuit of truthfulness of life; in other 
words, truthful life should be guided by pursuit of truth rather than by individual moral preferences. 
Third, a particular religious tradition, rather than a generic notion of religion, should be taken as the 
default position of religious education since it is the particular traditions that are the bearers of 
ultimate truth claims, which often contradict one another.  
However, we should examine Wright’s critical realist approach to religious education with 
regard to otherness, just as we have with the original Bhaskarian critical realism. In this thesis it has 
been argued that Bhaskarian critical realism is limited by its lacuna of the ontological realism of 
otherness in its characteristic agent-centred explanation of reality. With the recognition of this 
lacuna the thesis has explored the possibility of non-agential moment, which makes possible the 
ontology of otherness. In doing so, it has argued that ontological realism of otherness makes 
possible ethical turning for dialectical agency, which constitutes a double openness in understanding 
of human being. Moreover, if we accept the critical realist claim of stratification of reality, and 
accordingly seek to understand the deepest level of reality, often referred to in terms of ultimate 
truth as Wright points out, then, it has been argued, we would be faced with two contrasting 
understandings of ultimate reality between the non-personal account and the personal account of 
transcendence.  While the former claims universality in spite of being itself a product of modernity, 
the latter does not fail to acknowledge its root in a particular tradition; while the former takes 
particularity as an ordinary (lower) level of truth in the name of a higher level of universal truth, but 
in doing so becomes unable to account for the ontological distinctiveness of otherness by reducing it 
to being secondary, the latter takes its stance in a particular religious tradition, which claims for God 
as personal in that the ontological dimension of otherness is acknowledged as constitutive of the 
very being of God. Personhood of God in the latter has been argued as making possible the double 
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openness of human being, and hence is understood as penetrating all process of the double 
openness. Otherness is what makes the crucial difference when it is recognised in critical realism. 
Therefore, if Wright’s approach to religious education takes critical realism as a pivot, then it must 
face the issue of otherness.  
As we have seen above, Wright’s critical realist approach to religious education is not 
indifferent to the issue of otherness. Rather, the significance of otherness is implied to a certain 
degree in his critical religious education: first of all, in common with Bhaskarian critical realism, its 
pursuit of truth is based on the recognition of the ontological independence of ultimate reality from 
human knowledge. The acknowledgement of ontological independence is the starting point of the 
recognition of otherness. Though Bhaskar quickly moves on to the agential-centred explanation of 
the ontologically independent reality, it is the teaching of Levinas that the very first encounter with 
otherness is non-agential moment. In his reading of Levinas, Wright takes seriously what otherness 
or alterity can bring to the reified certainty without falling into antagonism, hence alterity is what 
can be celebrated, since it makes possible enhancement of or critique to existing knowledge of 
reality. Moreover, unlike Bhaskarian meta-Reality, which is unable to conceive the genuine sense of 
otherness by subordinating it as a particular claim, Wright’s conception of discrete religious tradition 
as the default position paves a way for religious education to take otherness between religions 
seriously, and for a personal account of transcendence rooted in Christianity to be taken seriously in 
the public sphere of religious education. 
The last point leads us to the final remark on the possibility of Christian religious education 
in Christian schools. If we pursue ultimate truth and truthfulness in religious education on the ground 
of ontological realism as Wright argues, but at the same time we take seriously the difference that 
otherness makes in the understanding of transcendence, then such an approach of ontology and 
otherness requires religious education to take seriously the issue of personhood in its pursuit of 
ultimate truth of transcendence. This is because critical realist ontology requires the rediscovery of 
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ontology of otherness, because otherness makes possible ethics and because the ultimate sense of 
otherness can only be possible by personal relation rather than by the necessity of non-personal 
principle. It is the very particular tradition of the Trinitarian account of personhood of God in 
Christianity that provides such a personal account of God. Moreover, the ontology and otherness 
approach requires religious education not only to be a form of learning about personhood of 
Christianity, but also to encourage pupils to live by it in the way of double openness (dialectical 
openness to the world and ethical openness to the other), in which hypostatical personal relation is 
understood as grounding all the process of openness. In doing so it is the nature of this approach to  
pursue truth and truthfulness in religious education under the light of the Christian account of the 
Trinitarian God. Comprehensive liberalists would critique this approach by raising the possibility of 
uncritical indoctrination or limiting pupils’ autonomy by putting them into a particular religious 
ethos. However, in recent research Mark Pike shows some cases of Christian ethos schools 
committed to Christianity-based core values in their education, including religious education. He 
points out that pupils attending those denominational schools show not only the positive influence 
of Christianity upon their lives but also a deeper understanding of Christianity, engage in more free 
discussion and critique about Christianity and other religions, hence exercising their autonomy, and 
are more likely to feel good about themselves and life while less likely to hold liberal views on 
tobacco, sex, and alcohol than are those in non-denominational state schools (2011). What Pike 
suggests for us is not the necessity of Christian ethos schools, but the possibility of Christian ethos 
schools for their educational contributions for pupils. Christian religious education in Christian 
schools has often been undermined by the principle of comprehensive liberal education, but this has 
fostered among pupils a secular orthodoxy, while leaving out religion from their lives. This is itself a 
reification of ideology; it is a closed worldview. In this sense, Wright’s emphasis on taking truth as a 
controversial issue in religious education is considered of utmost importance for its educational 
contribution, for regaining a genuine sense of critique by inviting pupils into informed dialogue with 
different truth claims. By taking ultimate truth claims as controversial, Wright’s critical religious 
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education remains available for all types of schools, whether religiously founded or state maintained. 
In this sense, his approach can be said to take a moderate position in regard to ontology and 
otherness, since it does not take a fuller sense of otherness in religious education practice. However, 
if one takes the ontology and otherness approach in a fuller degree in religious education then it 
should seriously engage with the personal account of God, like the Trinitarian account of 
personhood of God. In this regard, Christian tradition lived and pursued in Christian schools can be 
said as the particular religious tradition that can provide the Trinitarian account better than any 
other religious tradition, hence Christian schools are the better place for doing religious education 

















Ontology and Otherness and Possibility of Christianity in 
Religious Education in Christian Schools 
 
The thesis has been a critically progressive exploration of a theoretical ground of the 
possibility of Christian religious education in Christian schools in Korea. Having concerned with the 
reality of Religion in Korea, the thesis presented in Introduction the problem of ambiguity of Religion, 
the current form of school religious education in the country, and presented the aim of the thesis as 
such; ‘to explore a theoretical ground for religious education for the actual site of religious education, 
particularly for the major part of religious schools, viz. Christian schools’. It is because the reality of 
Religion: religious schools are the place where Religion has been actually existed; it has been so from 
the very beginning of the modern school system in Korea. But, more noticeably, Religion has existed 
almost exclusively in religious schools even after the inclusion of Religion into the national 
curriculum in 1981 and after the introduction of the statutory syllabus under the double-selective 
regulation. However, the current curriculum of Religion has not recognized sufficiently the reality; 
instead it has imposed a compromised syllabus upon the actual site with the result of practical 
ambiguity. Thus the thesis aims to pave a way for the possibility of Religion for the actual in a way 
that overcome s the problem.  
For the sake of Conclusion of the thesis, it is worthwhile to re-present the problem in 
details as below so that the thesis concludes its study by stating the relevance of the explored 
theoretical ground to the problems.  
 




Practical ambiguity is structured into the actual site of Religion in the form of 
statutory syllabus  
Contrary to the original intention of the elimination of the ambiguity that was conceived as 
being caused by the denominational approach, the result has been the embodiment of practical 
ambiguity in the structure of Religion in the compromised statutory model syllabus by which the 
actual practice of Religion among religious schools has become containing the two conflicting 
approaches into it: in the situation that no public school seems to take Religion in their curriculum, 
the religious schools, which have been the actual site of religious education in school system of 
Korea, are seriously restricted to the compromised statutory syllabus with the negative charge of 
denominationalism. As such, Christian religious education in Christian schools, which are the major 
part of religious schools, has been de-legitimated under the so-called inclusive, publicness-aimed 
religious education. This structurally embodied ambiguity could hardly be said to be an improvement 
on the previous situation. Rather it can be said that it has structured practical ambiguity into the 
actual site of religious education by setting up the subject in the compromised statutory syllabus.   
 
Undermining the possibility of Christianity of Christian schools to contribute to 
publicness of education  
As seen in the history of Religion in Introduction, there has been negative view on religious 
education in religious schools. For example, the subject was eliminated in the 3rd national curriculum 
because there were tensions and conflicts in regard to religion after the implementation of the Non-
Examination Entrance to Middle School Act in 1967. When it was officially resumed since the 4th 
national curriculum, religious schools has often been charged with denominational teaching which is 
conceived as contrasting to publicness of education. However the negative charge of 
denominationalism has undermined the possibility of individual religion, particularly Christianity in 
Christian schools to be a good place for publicness of education.  
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According to Sebastian Kim Christian theology has always tried to be relevant to its context 
and society). Particularly in modern highly secularised and plural societies, it continues in the form of 
public theology that seek to engage in dialogue with those outside Christian circles on various issues. 
As such it encourages Christians to participate in the public domain. It seeks to converse with 
citizens on issues wider than religious matters.  In doing so, he argues, contrary to the charge of 
denominationalism from those in the inclusive model of religious education, the strength of 
Christianity in any society has more to do with the integrity of the Christian Church by seeking the 
public good through the public significance of the Christian message. To this end, Christians would 
even risk their security out from their safe place. In this regard, Kim states clearly on the publicness 
of Christianity (Sebastian Kim 2011) 
With the growth of civil society and the increase in secularism, there is both an 
invitation and also an urgent need for Christian theology to be actively engaged in 
conversation on public issues ... it can put forward moral, ethical, and spiritual insights 
that make a vital contribution to addressing problems and promotes the common good 
in modern societies. (Sebastian Kim 2011) 
 
In recent research Mark Pike also shows cases of Christian ethos schools committed to 
Christianity-based core values in their education, including religious education.  He points out 
that pupils attending those denominational schools show not only the positive influence of 
Christianity upon their lives but also a deeper understanding of Christianity, engage in more 
free discussion and critique about Christianity and other religions, hence exercising their 
autonomy, and are more likely to feel good about themselves and life while less likely to hold 
liberal views on tobacco, sex, and alcohol than are those in non-denominational state schools 
(Pike 2010a, 2010b). What Pike suggests for us is not the necessity of Christian ethos schools, 




Christianity as a particular religious tradition can participate in the public sphere with its 
contribution. In the same way, as Mike’s research has shown, Christian religious education in 
Christian school can make contribution to publicness of education without losing the Christian core 
value in their religious education. This may also be applicable to other discrete religions. Thus, if 
religious schools conceived are as part of the public sphere, then it is worthwhile to encourage the 
religious schools, the actual site of Religion, to pursue publicness of religious education not simply 
no-where but from their religious tradition by pursuing truth of their religious tradition in a critical 
manner. However, the current curriculum of Religion reflects the negative charge upon religious 
schools so that it places individual religious tradition in a separate section in order to be taught after 
the general approach to religion rather than recognizing the pivotal role of particular religion to lead 
the whole process of religious education. This is the result of the negative charge of 
denominationalism and of the undermining possibility of particular religion for publicness of 
education.   
 
The liberal inclusive model of Religion as limiting Christian schools to develop 
their own religious education curriculum 
There is another crucial problem that the statutory syllabus and the implied purpose of 
publicness of Religion have brought upon the actual site of Religion: the liberal inclusive model of 
religious education.  
As seen Introduction, those who claim for publicness of Religion have shown their inclination 
to liberal inclusive model of religious education. At the same time they have charged the religious 
schools with denominational religious education which is conceived as partial and exclusive, hence 
non-publicness. Particularly, Yoon, Chung and Kim who have been influential in the formation of the 
current curriculum of Religion take phenomenological approach as the way to achieve the aim of 
publicness of Religion implied in the statutory syllabus.  
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However, there is an important critique to the inclusive religious education to be noted. 
According to Wright, religious education developed from phenomenological approach to religion has 
advocated inclusive model of religious education, which implies the generic notion of religion 
(Wright 2007). When conceiving religious phenomena with the generic quality, religious education is 
regarded as “inclusive” of any religions for any pupils regardless to their religious or non-religious 
background. In doing so it ‘encourages pupils to develop their own personal and idiosyncratic visions 
of ultimate reality’ (Wright 2000, p.77). The inclusive approach and the generic notion of religion 
have been likely a form of liberal education where two principles of freedom and tolerance work as 
for encouraging pupils to construct their meaning of life out of the personal and idiosyncratic visions 
of ultimate reality (Wright 2000, 2007). For Wright, the inclusive approach is seriously flawed. He 
points that the inclusive model of religious education is constituted by a closed and reified 
worldview. He argues that the inclusive religious education postulated in terms of social harmony on 
the basis of individual freedom seems to reflect a comprehensive liberalist vision of society, in which 
two principles, freedom and tolerance, are reified as having intrinsic value rather than being used as 
an ethical interim for continual emancipation by searching for truth. Without pursuit of truth the 
liberal inclusive education and its favoured phenomenological approach more likely entail 
dissociation of truth from truthfulness. Moreover, such generic notion of religion and its related 
inclusive model of religious education entail dissociation of truth and truthfulness which is deeply 
related with epistemic fallacy: to reduce being to knowledge of being. Unlike to this, he argues that 
religious education should foster truthful life but at the same time it cannot be dissociated from 
pursuit of truth of reality. It is because that truth cannot be simply gained by individual imaginary 
meaning construction advocated in inclusive approach but it can be pursued only from a particular 
social position to which individual belong, like a religious tradition. This is why Wright takes a 




However, in the Korean context, through both setting Religion in the mono form of the 
statutory syllabus and directing it into the particularly conceived aim of publicness, while being 
inclined to liberal inclusive education, it has become the case for Christian schools that they are 
limited in developing their own religious education curriculum, otherwise, could lead them to 
positively response to publicness of education from their particular religious tradition.  
 
The critically progressive exploration - Ontology and Otherness 
Concerned with the problems of the context, the thesis took Wright’s critical religious 
education as the stepping stone in a critical manner in order to overcome the problems and at the 
same time to provide a theoretical ground for the possibility of Christian religious education in 
Christian schools. However, with notice of a crucial problem of critical realist ontology, the thesis 
begins its critically progressive exploration from immanent critique of the ontology toward the 
theory of Ontology and Otherness.  
 
Ontology  
Firstly, the thesis focused on transcendental realism as the key idea of critical realism that 
penetrates all stages of critical realism. The thesis identified transcendental realism as a special 
form of explanation, pointing out a characteristic feature of it in terms of its explanatory stance, 
viz. ‘agential-centredness of being’: the intrinsic tendencies of a thing are qualified as transfactual 
so that they are regarded as the agential causal powers of that thing: transcendental realism re-
vindicates ontology in terms of the intrinsic tendencies of being, taken as the explanatory stance 
from which that being and its relations with the circumstances are explained. More specifically, 
transcendental realism as a form of causal explanation was defined by its explanatory stance: it is 
the agential intrinsic tendencies of a being; that is, it explains a being fundamentally from the 
agential causal powers of that being. Therefore, the thesis designated the term agential-centred 
explanation to describe the characteristic feature of transcendental realism, because agential 
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highlights the key point of the argument that transcendental realism as a causal explanation finds 
the causal powers primarily from inside a being and its relationality, rather than from something 
outside of a being. However, this raised the question of the non-agential moment, which in turn 
gives rise to another question of exteriority or the other.  
 
Dialectically ethical agency  
The thesis moved on to explore the question of whether the agential-centred explanation 
of reality is persistent in Bhaskar’s explanation of social reality, particularly his explanation of the 
human being. The ontology of the human agent, seen in Possibility of Naturalism, has the same 
pattern of characteristic features as that of natural things, and has pointed out that this gives rise 
to the question of the non-agential moment. Our reading of Dialectics also showed that Bhaskar 
deepens the critical naturalist account of human agency by establishing the human agent as 
ethical agent in the dialectically changing world of reality through an ontological-axiological chain 
in which absence and alethia come to take a pivotal role. Thus, Bhaskar’s Dialectics was shown as 
an agential-centred explanation particularly in the sense that the pivotal concepts of absence and 
alethia should be seen as what make the dialectical movement of reality agential movement. Both 
concepts are essentially connected with agency. 
Having explored critically Bhaskar’s critical realism up to his theory of Dialectics, the thesis 
took a further step to answer the questions of the non-agential moment and otherness of the 
other, which were raised by the reading of Bhaskarian ontology. The thesis attempted to present 
Levinas’s philosophy as providing an answer to them and then presented a critical dialogue 
between the two philosophies in terms of their compatibility and difference in order to identify a 
point of integration between them. As for the compatibility between them, firstly, the Levinasian 
account was understood in terms of the Bhaskarian holy trinity of critical realism. The second 
compatible point between them was found in their structural understanding of ethical rationality: 
ethical rationality was understood in terms of processuality; it is not static but is in continual 
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dialectical construction; and at the outset of the process, the structural understanding of ethical 
rationality in both accounts recognises the importance of the (concrete) singularity of the agency 
as the starting site of the ethics, considering ethics as dependent upon the agency because, once 
ethical rationality is set on the ground of the singularity,199 it was understood that the ethical 
agent will seek and conduct absenting absence in its multi-level relation. 
 
Ontology and Otherness 
The thesis also expounded a radical, perhaps ultimate, difference between two 
philosophies which generates some other significant differences, including the difference in stance 
between agential centredness and the non-agential moment. The radical difference is related to 
the understating of the initial setting of the agent on the ethical ground. For Bhaskar, we saw the 
dialectical logic of ethical rationality from freedom to solidarity; the latter would be the proper 
case of ethics while the former is focused on freedom. What we can see is an extensional structure 
from the desire for my freedom to the desire for the other’s freedom; the latter is entrained by 
the former. By putting together the idea of alethia with the dialectical logic, it was said that the 
human agent for Bhaskar is implicitly ethical from eternity in the way that it is somehow guided by 
the alethia in its actual course of life to pursue freedom for oneself first then gradually for the 
other. According to Levinas, however, ethics was shown not to be generated from freedom; rather 
freedom is conceived as making ethics an option or opinion; freedom as entailing a greater 
likelihood of the exercise of power in the form of possession and mastery (that is interested in its 
own conatus alive) than does ethics. 
An explanatory example of Levinasian ethics was given in regard to the non-agential 
moment: absenting hunger of the other is ethical and is only possible because the face of the other 
commands me. It is not a rational understanding, but is pre-cognitive affection upon me. The initial 
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 The account of the initial setting of the agent on the ethical ground is the point of greatest divergence 
between Bhaskar and Levinas. This point will be dealt with later, but for the time being what is concerned is 
the process after the initial setting.  
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setting of the I on the ethical ground is not the work of the agential movement or choice; rather it is 
by calling of the other, by being exposed to the other. Thus it is not the agential movement but the 
non-agential moment. Even the implicit alethia in me cannot replace the significance that the other 
brings to me. It is not a kind of Platonic reminiscence of what is already in me. It is not drawing out 
from inside, but is rather sensuous affection on me from exteriority, viz. the other whose invocation 
puts my freedom into question. Ethics for Levinas is a breach of freedom: by being commanded my 
will for myself is persecuted; I become a hostage for the other; I have subjectivity in the sense that I 
am subject to the other. Therefore, the relationship with the other in ethics was explained as 
asymmetrical. 
 
Double Openness  
Most importantly, by putting together Bhaskar’s dialectically ethical agent and Levinas’ 
ethical subjectivity, the thesis articulated a form of integration between them, called double 
openness. Bhaskarian agent was explained with only one kind of openness: dialectical openness, 
which is natural: Bhaskar defines the human agent as an open totality on the ground of human 
being’s dialectical nature, of which a short definition could be process-in-product and product-in-
process. So it is the dialectical nature that makes possible the dialectical openness in that ethics, 
understood as a characteristic agential movement, is incorporated through transformative negation. 
However, Levinasian subjectivity was explained as consisting of two kinds of openness: a priori 
openness to the other (ethical), that sustains and pulses the dialectical openness to be a special case 
(ethical): the first and prior openness indicates the exposure to the other, while the second refers to 
the dialectical openness of the agent radically transformed by the first openness. Thus the double 
openness articulates a point of integration between them in terms of ethical subjectivity, which may 
fill the lacuna in Bhaskarian ontology while putting Levinasian otherness on a critical realist ground. 
The ethical subjectivity is an openness prior to openness: the first openness is the subjection 
(exposedness) to the other, which is followed by the second openness that is devotion to Being, 
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which is agential involvement of Being. The second openness presupposes ethics, the first teaching 
from the other, though it is also true that the first teaching may have become a meaningful pulse of 
the ethically assigned intentional consciousness of the subject.  
 
A critique of meta-Reality  
On the basis of the theory of Ontology and Otherness the thesis examined two contrasting 
account of transcendence: Bhaskar’s meta-Reality and a classical Trinitarian account of God.  Wright 
shows that both accounts are ontologically exclusivist, epistemically exclusivist and soteriologically 
inclusivist (2012, pp.90ff). At this juncture, the thesis expounded the point that what makes them 
different from each other, even contrasting each other in regard to the ultimate reality, is Otherness. 
As seen earlier, for Bhaskar, the primary mode of being is ‘implicit’. This crucial feature was 
attributed to the penetrating explanatory form of agential centredness in that the central role of the 
agency is defined with the transformative praxis in forms of negation (shedding) and realisation. The 
logical structure is that Bhaskarian critical realism, from the first to the last, is based on and 
dependent on the crucial aspect of his ontology that defines the primary mode of being as ‘implicit’ 
as tendencies (necessities), which entrain the necessity of the transformative agency whose action is 
characteristically transformative negation for awakening: awakening here is a connotative concept 
which implies both the presupposition of what is to be awakened within the self and the ways of 
awakening, such as shedding, filling and realising. What is stressed in both is that the self-
transformation in that agency is not only the locus of change but is itself autonomous and 
deterministic for its realisation. Awakening therefore is about self-transformative efforts within the 
stratified self, in that any notion of heteronomously given salvation is fundamentally unacceptable, 
hence incommensurable. Moreover, Wright considers this point as a specific ontological assumption 
of human being as ultimately good and autonomous. But he points out that this assumption as a 
production of modernity is highly questionable and indeterminate (Wright 2012, pp.98f): it is rooted 
in the notion of perennial wisdom which emerged in nineteenth century Romanticism and is 
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comfortable to a democratic liberal economy in the guise of the claim that ‘human beings are free 
and equal, then they must have free and equal access to spiritual truth’ (Wright 2012, pp.22f).  
 
Here one can see the highly compatibility between the liberal inclusive education and 
Bhaskarian agential-centred understanding God. Though the liberal inclusive model may say of 
publicness of religious education in terms of freedom and autonomy of human being as similarly seen 
in the discourse of publicness of Religion in Korea, it is seriously lack of the sense of otherness, 
remained at the level of the second openness of the double openness.  
 
 
Trinitarian God and Personhood as the better explanation of Otherness 
Contrary to meta-Reality where all things are explained in terms of being implicit so that 
nothing cannot ultimately be astonishing, the thesis focused on Trinitarian understanding of 
transcendence in that one can capture the overflowing nature of encounter with infinity (in 
Levinasian sense), like the engagement with the face of the other; filling the self with what cannot 
be drawn from within the self and overflowing with more than the self can contain, so that it 
becomes desire, inspired from the other than the self and inspiring the self-dialectical process. 
McGrath explained this in terms of the iterative procedure that is to infer to the better explanation 
of the given situation. This procedure points the necessity of “seeing” from a particular position 
while using the abductive reasoning, by which one can explain an unexpected or astonishing 
phenomenon by reasoning a bigger or better picture (explanation).  
According to this procedure, Trinitarian account of transcendence is better and correct 
explanation in regard to Otherness. Moreover, it is the personhood of Trinitarian God, particularly 
the Father who let the others be and, as Zizioulas pointed out, of whom otherness is a constitutive 
part; who love in freedom, not from necessity: this can be explained by His “personhood” rather 
than any qualities, like Bhaskar’s alethia, he has. While the notion of alethia of Bhaskar denote 
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qualities of the Self, from which all things come out and implicit in it so that there cannot be genuine 
sense of otherness, the notion of personhood of Trinitarian God can explain the genuine sense of 
otherness, hence the latter is a better explanation of otherness.  
 
A model of stratification of human being and the importance of a particular place  
If we have been informed by Bhaskar with a limited sense of love, simply speaking, as a 
binding force of the self, hence constituting ethical dialectical agency,  and if Levinas has taught us 
the inevitability of otherness and my ethical response to the other, hence constituting ethical 
subjectivity, it is the Trinitarian theology, particularly that of Zizioulas, that lets us know who we are, 
not in the sense of qualities we ‘have’ but more fundamentally in the sense of who we ‘are’; that is, 
we are person, ‘being loved then loving’ after the model of the Trinity.  
However, there seems be a structure between them. If one stay in the position of 
Bhaskarian dialectical agency she would not be able to “see” the other as the ethical subjectivity of 
Levinas sees so that she can only have a life of dialectical openness in that her freedom is always 
prior to the other. Likewise, if one is stuck on the level of Levinasian ethical subjectivity then she can 
“see” her subjectivity as a quality she “has” rather she is; it is a limited vision of one person. 
However, if one “sees” herself in the Zizioulas’s level of personhood then her vision of life reaches to 
the point that she as a person is being other of someone and is loved and loving as a person; that is 
the essential meaning of being person. Finally, such personhood is not self-generated, but is a gift 
from the divine person by his hypostatic relation to us.  
Following the structure a model of ontological stratification of human being was suggested 
as below, 
(Bhaskarian) Dialectical agency, as incorporated into 
(Levinasian) Ethical subjectivity, as originating from 
(Zizioulas)  Personhood generated by  




It should be noted that each of them are provide for us “a bigger picture” for the 
explanation of human being and its relation with the world. However not all of them has the 
same capacity to grasp the whole reality. As McGrath pointed out one can take a particular 
stance to “see” the world; likewise, Wright emphasised the importance of taking a particular 
religious tradition for the pursuit of truth which may entails truthful life to the degree that the 
sense of truth provides. For example, remaining at Bhaskarian level, life can be true to the 
degree that it awakens what is true for the self through transcendental identification, 
including transformative negation; at the level of Levinasian ethical subjectivity, life may be 
true to the degree that it desires beyond itself and becomes responsible for the other 
according to the ethical truth, provoked by encountering the other then inscribed in 
consciousness; at the level of personhood, openness is conceived not as a quality we have, but 
as a constitutive part of a person, because being a person means being in the hypostatic 
relation, in that a person is being other of someone else in the mode of beloved and loving, in 
which ethical relation is already implied. Life in the level of personhood is, therefore, 
ontologically truthful since by becoming a person we are hypostatically realised truth or a new 
birth in truth, but still in need of becoming more fully person, not only by transformative 
dialectical negation but fundamentally in faithful relation with the persons of the Trinity.  
 
The need of critical judgement for a better place and the possibility of Christian 
religious education  
What is needed is a critical judgement between levels, particularly in regard to our 
concern of the Koran context. If Bhaskarian level of dialectical agency is compatible with the 
model of liberal inclusive religious education as Wright pointed out (Wright 2012), then it can 
be said that such inclusive model of religious education limits Christian schools and its 
Christian religious education to the degree of the first openness that encourages freedom of 
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oneself prior to the other, which in turn leads to the betrayal of the very teaching of 
Christianity.  
The problem of practical ambiguity that the Christian schools have can be seen in this 
regard. The ambiguity is not simply a matter of choice. It is a matter of truth and truthfulness 
to Christian schools. By posing comprehensive liberal principle, freedom and tolerance, the 
liberal inclusive model curriculum of Religion has been oppressed Christian schools in a way 
that limits them in pursuing truth to them hence makes them remained being less truthful. At 
the heart of the ambiguity, therefore, there is matter of truth and truthfulness for Christian 
schools.  
 
However, if Christian schools are provided with possibility to develop their curriculum 
of Religion according to their vision of Christianity, like that of Trinitarian personhood, the 
quality of publicness of the curriculum of Religion cannot be dismissed as simply 
denominational. Rather, according to the model of stratification of human being, Christian 
religions education pursued from the particular Christian tradition can be deeply influential for 
social integration in terms of being for other and being person for other, that is, to love in 
freedom. Moreover, with its provision of publicness of Religion gained from the Trinitarian 
personhood, the curriculum religious education developed for Christian schools can be a 
critical learning place whereby those different truth claims of other levels come to be 
examined. Furthermore, by using of those levels of the stratification of human being as 
organising principle of the curriculum of Religion, Christian schools can have a more robust 
curriculum of Religion than the current form of Religion in the sense that it can deals with 




Therefore, the thesis concludes with the suggestion that Christian religious education 
for Christian schools in Korea is not only possible but it should be pursued on the theoretical 
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<Table 1> the number of religious schools that chosen Religion in their school curriculum in 2004 
(Byoung-chul Ko 2005, p. 112) 
 
Religious schools Number of schools No. of schools with  
Religion 
No. of schools  abiding by 
the double-selective 
regulation of Religion 
Christianity 162 82 61 
Catholic 38 9 9 
Buddhism 12 9 9 
(Moon’s) Unification 
Church 
3 3 2 
The Seventh-Day 
Adventist Church 
8 8 5 
Others 13 3 2 
Total 236 114 88 
 
 
<Table 2> the statutory model syllabus of Religion for the 7th National Curriculum (2002-2007) (Chin-
hong Chung 2001, p. 30) 
 
Themes Contents to be learnt 
I. Human and Religion 
 
 Ultimate questions and ultimate problems 
 Engagement with religion and solutions of problems 
 Knowing and Believing  
 Meanings and functions of religion 
II. Understanding of Religious 
Experience  
 
 Various problems of life 
 Perspectives of cosmology, history and life and death 
 Sacred books and religious norms  
 Religious rituals and religious practices 
III. Different Religious Traditions 
 
 Religious thoughts and their background  
 True thing and realization 
 Understanding of character of religion 
IV. Religions and Cultures of the 
World 
 
 Confucianism and Taoism 
 Buddhism  
 Christianity 
 Islam and others  
V. Religious Understanding of 
Human Being and Nature  
 
 Various perspectives of human being 
 Religious perspectives of human being 
 Religious perspective of nature 
 Science and religion 
VI. Religions and Cultures of 
Korea 
 
 Korean Buddhism and its culture 
 Korean Confucianism and Taoism and their culture  
 Korean Christianity and its culture 
 Korean shamanist faith and national religions 
VII. Religious Communities  
 
 Ideologies and structure of community  
 Social functions of religion  
 Reconciliation and co-existence between religions 
 Religious formation of personality 
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VIII. Traditions and Thoughts of a 
Particular Religion 
 The sacred book, doctrines and the history 
 Religious life  
 Korean religion and creation of culture  
 Drawing of my religious life  
 
 
<Table 3> comparison of the statutory syllabus with the actual textbooks of Religion (Kim, Gui-sung, 
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Holy Spirit (3) 
(Total 193 
pages of three 
volumes/ 
40%) 
The Bible of 
Christianity 
(1), 
Works of God 
in the New 
Testament (1), 
Works of God 











pages of three 
volumes/53%) 
 
 Total  278 pages 183 pages 486 pages 392 pages  
* PCK is the abbreviation of Presbyterian Church of Korea. ** KFCS is the abbreviation of Korea 
Federation of Christian School. 
 
 
 
 
